Europe Does Not Have the Luxury to Panic Over Trump’s Election

Europeans have over the past year fretted endlessly over the possibility of Donald Trump’s return to the U.S. presidency. Once he secured his spot on the 2024 ballot, they began discussing the need to get ready for the exact scenario they now face. But most of those conversations ended there. The magnitude of disruption of a Trump victory for Europe’s security, prosperity, and even democracy was seen as too overwhelming. Instead, Europeans simply hoped that the worst would not come to pass. This was a mistake. Now, they have neither the time to waste nor the luxury to panic. 

The U.S. election’s outcome has confirmed that Trump’s foreign policy position—his transactionalism, his unilateralism, and his love for autocratic strongmen—is now firmly mainstream. The appeal of Trump’s foreign policy pitch to the American people is clear: deter challengers through strength rather than alliances, reduce overseas commitments, and get allies and partners to pay up for U.S. protection and goodwill. In short, spend less, win more. Europeans must now work together to prevent the worst—for Ukraine, for NATO, for trade flows, and for the future of their union. 

The most urgent priority is Ukraine. The end of U.S. financial and military support could lead to a defeat on the battlefield for Ukraine, with an immediate Russian threat to Europe’s east and NATO. A botched peace deal brokered by Trump could make the situation worse.

Europeans need to lead by taking Ukraine policy into their own hands. First, this strategy requires a plan to boost financial support to Kyiv—for example, by increasing the loans that Ukraine receives from Europe based on the interest from Russian frozen assets. Next, European leaders should meet with Kyiv to discuss and coordinate strategy. Then, they make an offer to Trump: Europe will take over all financial support for Ukraine if the United States maintains its military support, which Europeans are not able to provide themselves. Upping their investment in Ukraine, which caters to Trump’s shareholder logic, could also provide Europeans a chance to secure a seat at the table in any potential Ukraine peace negotiations. 

The instinct of many Europeans will be to try to stay away from peace talks, which are likely to result in an unfavorable deal for Ukraine. But this impulse is exactly the wrong strategy. Europe needs to deploy every tool it has to influence the outcome in Ukraine for the better. The worst scenario would be sanctions relief for Russia and an end of U.S. weapon deliveries for Ukraine—a carte blanche for President Vladimir Putin. The least-worst scenario would be a ceasefire without security guarantees but continued U.S. weapon deliveries that allow Ukraine to prepare for a ceasefire breach and renewed Russian aggression.

The second priority is NATO and European security. Trump’s election means that the conversation about NATO will inevitably change from one on sharing the burden of European security to shifting the burden. Europeans must follow through on their talk of a European pillar in the alliance and make sure that pillar can stand on its own if necessary. Europeans will need to buy crucial capabilities, stockpile ammunition and spare parts, invest in the combat capacity of Europe’s armed forces, and populate NATO’s command and control structure with European personnel. They must also militarily reinforce their eastern allies.

This will take some time, even if Europe operates with the greatest urgency. To get Trump to entertain a plan to gradually shift the burden of European security, rather than suddenly withdrawing U.S. personnel and forces, Europeans should start with an opening offer of a new defense pledge. Ahead of the NATO summit in the Netherlands next June, they should offer to raise defense spending to 3 percent by the end of Trump’s tenure in 2028. They should deploy all instruments at their disposal to make this pledge credible: Berlin should use the opportunity of its collapsing government to overcome some of its fiscal conservatism in favor of more defense investment. Brussels should refrain from reprimanding Warsaw over breaking EU fiscal rules with its higher defense spending pledges. And all EU member states should support EU defense bonds—a crisis of this magnitude demands it. Not all of this money needs to be spent on U.S. kit. Europeans must pitch their defense investments as a win-win for the transatlantic defense industrial base: If the overall pie is getting bigger, everyone benefits. 

Third, Europeans need to get their own house in order. They must unite rather than scramble to individually win Trump’s favor and, in the process, lose any collective leverage they may have. Each European country on its own is too weak to successfully negotiate with Trump. Only together do Europeans have the political and economic clout to make an impression on the president-elect.

Coordination needs to go beyond the traditional power centers of Paris and Berlin. France and Germany are weak and isolated right now, with the German government collapsing and the French government dealing with a deadlocked parliament and threats from the far right. Instead, Europe should assemble a rapid reaction force consisting of the most important EU member states (Germany, Poland, France, Italy), the United Kingdom, the European Commission, and European NATO representatives—the E7. Trump’s victory will necessarily embolden European populists who will feel bulletproof against criticism from their peers and happy to use the threat of their veto in the EU and NATO. Some of them may be of value as European messengers that are palatable to Washington, but Brussels should remind them that the real leverage lies with those who control the common budget purse strings.

There are other urgent challenges. On trade, the EU has the greatest power to act on behalf of its members. Brussels has experience with kicking the can down the road and offering symbolic piecemeal deals to Trump, who is obsessed with trade deficits but also vulnerable to the political backlash that may follow his sweeping inflationary tariff proposals. Europeans should also expect greater pressure from Washington to sanction Beijing for its escalating support of Moscow’s war in Ukraine. Europe’s lack of action undermines the credibility of its Ukraine policy and its demand for U.S. financial and military support. Europeans must also be ready for U.S.-China competition to continue to dominate tech and industrial policy and for the United States to demand complete alignment with its policy of ever-higher fences around ever-bigger yards. 

Europeans have a tendency to feel morally superior to the United States, especially with Trump at the helm. However, this time, Europeans will have to get their hands dirty. They now must consider their strengths, have their opening offers ready, and avoid rushing to give up all leverage immediately. It’s going to be a long four years.