The Most Significant Long-Term Consequence of the U.S. Strikes on Iran

Operation Midnight Hammer represented an extraordinary demonstration of American military capabilities. Seven B-2 Spirit stealth bombers targeted Iran’s nuclear installations at Fordow and Natanz with fourteen 30,000-pound bombs while a guided missile submarine simultaneously launched more than two dozen cruise missiles at Isfahan, Iran’s largest nuclear research complex. The strikes penetrated Iran’s most protected facilities, though preliminary intelligence assessments suggest the impact may have fallen short of the White House’s claims of “total obliteration.”

The fundamental limitation of the strikes lies in the distinction between infrastructure damage and capability elimination. Military action can destroy equipment and facilities, but it cannot eliminate knowledge, dispersed materials, or the underlying strategic drivers of nuclear weapons development. By reportedly relocating its most sensitive materials ahead of the strikes, Iran appears to have safeguarded the core of its enrichment program, while intact bunkers may still provide a springboard for reconstruction.

Whether Operation Midnight Hammer effectively curbs the proliferation threat from Iran hinges on two interlinked factors: Tehran’s domestic political resolve to curb any weapons-development trajectory and the ability of diplomatic efforts to reestablish rigorous safeguards backed by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Absent both, the strike’s tactical effectiveness will lead to little more than a temporary pause—delaying rather than preventing the next confrontation over Iran’s nuclear ambitions.

Damage

Satellite imagery confirms that strikes at Fordow and Natanz penetrated the surface installations and sealed key underground access points. At Fordow, at least six distinct craters appear on the ridge above the buried centrifuge halls, with debris radiating outward in patterns consistent with penetration of the protective rock layers. The bombs—GBU-57 Massive Ordnance Penetrators—likely continued through the rock into the centrifuge halls and other sensitive areas before detonating, potentially causing far more extensive underground damage than surface imagery can reveal.

Natanz, already compromised by Israeli missiles, appears to have suffered additional devastation, as the U.S. strikes likely penetrated directly into remaining centrifuge cascades and critical infrastructure areas. And even before the United States struck, Natanz had suffered complete destruction of its electrical infrastructure, as major substations, emergency generators, and power feeds were destroyed, rendering the remaining centrifuge cascades inoperable.

At Isfahan, the extensive surface damage visible in satellite imagery appears primarily attributable to earlier Israeli strikes that eliminated Iran’s primary uranium hexafluoride production facility and uranium metal production capability. U.S. Tomahawk missiles targeted what remained of the complex, including entrances to underground highly enriched uranium (HEU) storage facilities—though Iran likely had relocated these sensitive materials.

This physical destruction of nuclear infrastructure may impede immediate operations, but it does not eliminate the risk of proliferation. Notably, IAEA inspectors last verified Iran’s nuclear material inventories just days before the Israeli strikes began on June 13, raising the possibility that Iranian authorities preemptively relocated key stocks of HEU from declared facilities to undisclosed locations. Satellite imagery from June 19–20 shows dump trucks and bulldozers near tunnel entrances at Fordow, with analysts suggesting that dirt was being brought in to seal the tunnels rather than remove contents—though the presence of other unidentified trucks leaves open the possibility of material relocation.

The sealing of entrances at Fordow and especially Natanz introduces more than short-term access barriers. At Natanz, an estimated 15,000 centrifuges were likely rendered inoperable due to abrupt power loss, with the IAEA confirming two missile impact holes above the underground enrichment halls that likely led to localized radioactive contamination and chemical hazards. The scale of damage suggests that Iran is unlikely to recommission these heavily compromised and now-vulnerable sites. Reconstitution would likely require constructing entirely new facilities, rather than simply excavating and repairing the tunnels.

Further complicating Iran’s nuclear recovery is the damage to the uranium conversion infrastructure at Isfahan, although the full extent of the disruption remains under assessment. In addition, a not-yet-completed enriched uranium metal processing facility—widely regarded as a key component in nuclear weaponization—was reportedly destroyed at the research complex. Although this could create a bottleneck in weapons development, the underlying uranium metal conversion processes are relatively simple chemical operations that could, in principle, be rebuilt in parallel with enrichment restoration, limiting long-term delays to a potential weapons program.

Reconstitution

Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, though damaged, retains substantial reconstitution potential across multiple dimensions. Iran’s existing 60 percent enriched uranium stockpile, if successfully relocated as suspected, retains its proliferation potential, regardless of infrastructure damage. Before the strikes, Iran could have converted this stockpile into weapons-grade material for several nuclear weapons using Natanz or Fordow. The destruction of their operational capacity eliminates Iran’s primary pathway for rapid enrichment to weapons-grade levels and may force Iran to rely on smaller, less efficient facilities or covert capabilities.

Iran’s stockpile of uninstalled centrifuge components presents another reconstitution factor. The country has manufactured advanced centrifuges for years that have not been under IAEA monitoring since the nuclear deal collapsed, creating a reserve that could support rapid program rebuilding. Meanwhile, strikes have extensively damaged the above-ground centrifuge research and development facilities at Karaj, the Tehran Research Center, and Natanz. That being said, it is unclear whether the underground centrifuge infrastructure still remains operational. Ahead of the strikes, Iran announced plans for a third enrichment site near Natanz, suggesting contingency planning for a scenario where either Natanz or Fordow could be heavily damaged.

Despite the damage, Iran’s long-term capacity to reconstitute its nuclear program remains fundamentally intact. The strikes have undoubtedly set back Iran’s technical timeline for achieving nuclear weapons capability by destroying critical nodes at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. However, they have not eliminated the core elements that have sustained the Islamic Republic’s nuclear trajectory for over two decades: a broad and distributed infrastructure, a deep bench of technically trained personnel, extensive domestic supply chains, and—most critically—a resilient political will.

The Political Will

Resolve to continue Iran’s nuclear program has been reaffirmed by both current and former officials. Ali Shamkhani, the former secretary of Iran’s Supreme National Security Council who survived an Israeli assassination attempt on the first night of strikes, declared that Iran’s “enriched material, indigenous knowledge, and political will” remain untouched. “Even assuming total destruction of the sites,” he stated, “the game is not over. . . . The initiative—both politically and operationally—is in the hands of the side that understands the rules of a smart game.” Echoing this, Iran’s ambassador to Geneva emphasized that Iran would “resolutely defend its inherent right to defend itself against any aggression” and “never give up its inalienable right to the peaceful use of nuclear knowledge and energy.” These declarations reflect a broader strategic consensus: Its infrastructure may be vulnerable, but Iran’s intent to preserve and, if necessary, rebuild its nuclear program is undiminished.

What has changed most dramatically since the strikes is Iran’s internal discourse on nuclear weapons. A subject once confined to opaque references or framed through the lens of peaceful energy has now become central to national security deliberations. For the past two years, statements by Iranian officials, parliamentarians, and commanders have become markedly more explicit, with discussions about potential weaponization entering public debate. Yet, in the aftermath of the twelve-day war, the long-standing division between hard-liners advocating for nuclear escalation and moderates urging restraint is narrowing. Iranian elites increasingly see Tehran’s “threshold strategy”—maintaining weapons proximity without crossing the line—as a miscalculation, with growing internal pressure to consider the development of an actual deterrent. Additionally, Iran’s increasing alignment with Russia, China, and North Korea creates potential pathways for technology transfer and technical cooperation.

Iran’s shift toward a hardened nuclear posture is now being formalized through legal and political instruments designed to sever oversight and assert full national control. On June 25, 2025, the Iranian parliament overwhelmingly passed a law suspending cooperation with the IAEA, conditioning future inspector access on approval by the Supreme National Security Council. Parliamentary Presidium member Alireza Salimi explained that the bill bars IAEA inspectors “unless the security of the country’s nuclear facilities and peaceful nuclear activities is guaranteed,” and imposes penalties on any individuals who facilitate unauthorized inspections. The vote—210 in favor, with only two abstaining—was accompanied by chants of “death to America” and “death to Israel.”

The collapse of IAEA monitoring represents perhaps the most significant long-term consequence of the U.S. and Israeli operations. Iran had already signaled reduced cooperation with the agency, blaming IAEA information-sharing for enabling the targeted strikes. For example, the head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization declared that if the IAEA did not condemn U.S. and Israeli attacks, then the IAEA and its leader would “face direct consequences from our decisions.” In reality, the IAEA had condemned the attacks, though not to a degree sufficient to satisfy Iranian officials. This resulted in Iran portraying the IAEA, a neutral UN watchdog, as a party complicit in attacks on its nuclear facilities. Without IAEA oversight, Iran gains operational space to pursue covert reconstitution efforts while the international community loses crucial oversight on Iran’s nuclear activities. Because of the strikes, the verification challenges posed by Iran’s dispersed materials and damaged facilities require enhanced rather than reduced IAEA access.

Iran’s Way Forward

With access suspended and political discourse veering toward open advocacy of weaponization, Iran appears to be seeing its internal red lines dissolve, even as its physical capabilities remain uncertain. Tehran’s determination to rebuild is clear, but its actual capacity to rapidly reconstitute a functioning enrichment and weaponization pipeline remains an open question. The full extent of the damage to underground infrastructure at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan is still unknown—a gap in knowledge that only IAEA access can fill.

The choice of whether to reconstitute will likely depend on Iran’s assessment of ongoing military threats, available resources, and strategic objectives. A deliberate rebuilding approach might take several years but could result in a more resilient and capable program. Alternatively, a rapid, weapons-focused effort might achieve nuclear capability within months if Iran successfully consolidated its existing materials and expertise. Yet any visible steps toward reconstitution or a further curtailment of IAEA oversight will almost certainly invite additional Israeli preemptive strikes, continuing the cycle of military action.