On Sunday, after months of turbulence, Germany went to the polls to choose a new government. The result may have been predictable, but its ramifications for politics in Germany, the EU, and beyond will be significant.
In November, the governing coalition led by Chancellor Olaf Scholz—which encompassed the center-left Social Democrats (SDP), the Green Party, and the Free Democrats—collapsed amid infighting over the country’s budget and its sluggish economic outlook. In the weeks before the vote, Elon Musk openly endorsed the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance pressed German conservatives to stop shunning coalitions with the country’s far-right, and EU leaders grappled with the United States’ seeming realignment in the conflict in Ukraine.
The center-right CDU/CSU, led by Friedrich Merz, emerged as the winner—though with only 28.5 percent of the vote, the party still suffered its second-worst election result in history. Scholz’ SPD managed only 16.4 percent, its weakest result to date. In contrast, the AfD had a very good night: coming in second at 20.8 percent, the party more than doubled its vote share compared to the previous election.
The election will likely usher in a new coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU. Yet the results affirmed two major trends that have shaped German politics in recent years: increasing political fragmentation, with formerly dominant centrist parties losing popularity, and the rapid rise of the previously marginal far-right—the latter of which could have the biggest impact on German democracy going forward.
Why Did the AfD Perform So Well?
Over the past decade, countries across Europe have seen the rapid rise of far-right political parties, and Germany is no exception. The AfD, which was created in 2013 and only entered the German parliament for the first time in 2017, is now the country’s second-largest political force.
For those worried about Germany’s liberal democracy, the party’s ascendance is deeply concerning. The AfD has repeatedly been investigated for its ties to anti-democratic networks. Several of its state-level branches have been designated by German courts as right-wing extremist groups. Some blocs within the party define German citizens with migrant backgrounds as “not properly German.”
The AfD first grew its support amid widespread discontent with the influx of large numbers of migrants and refugees in the mid-2010s, and its tough anti-migration stance remains key to its popularity. According to the latest exit polls, 99 percent of AfD voters—and 46 percent of all German voters—say that the AfD’s plan to limit migrants and refugees would benefit the country, and most AfD voters indicate migration and domestic security are their top issues. A recent spate of terrorist attacks perpetrated by migrants only increased the salience of the issue.
The AfD has also adeptly capitalized on voter discontent with other issues, from COVID-19 pandemic restrictions to climate change policies. It has successfully positioned itself as the only party willing to question the centrist consensus, appealing to voters with limited trust in political institutions and high discontent with the status quo. Eighty-five percent of AfD’s supporters say it is the only party addressing their frustrations with mainstream politics.
The party received its largest boost from previous nonvoters, and it also did well among working-class or unemployed Germans. Although its support grew across the country, its base remains in Germany’s formerly communist east. The traditional explanation for this pattern has been the region’s economic decline, but recent research suggests additional factors may be at play, including a strong tradition of populist politics and a desire among East Germans to assert a distinct cultural and political identity against the West.
Rethinking the “Firewall”
In an effort to contain extremist forces, Germany’s mainstream political parties have traditionally refused to form coalitions with far-right parties such as the AfD. This strategy of erecting a so-called firewall has been a central institutional safeguard of Germany’s postwar democracy. Yet as the AfD has grown stronger, this firewall has become increasingly fragile. Similar norms in other European countries have eroded, including in the Netherlands. In January, the CDU advanced two anti-immigration measures in parliament that needed the support of the AfD in order to pass. The proposed bill tightening asylum laws narrowly failed, but a parallel non-binding motion succeeded, thereby weakening the taboo against working with the far right.
For now, however, it appears that the norm against coalition formation will hold. Merz has repeatedly ruled out a coalition with the AfD, including after Sunday’s victory. Vance’s repudiation of the firewall policy only seems to have strengthened the CDU’s resolve, with Merz dismissing the U.S. vice president’s statements as illegitimate political meddling. In many ways, this stance reflects the views of most German voters, with almost 80 percent voting for parties that reject cooperation with the AfD. Close to two-thirds of Germans agree that the AfD has not distanced itself enough from extremist positions.
At the same time, it remains to be seen how a noncooperation policy combined with rising popular support for the AfD will shape German politics in the years to come. One key concern is that another centrist governing coalition will play into AfD supporters’ sense of exclusion while pushing more dissatisfied Germans to the political fringes, thereby expanding the party’s support. The longer-term consequence could be a further weakening of the political center, similar to what has already happened in France. So far, centrist political parties have struggled to win back the support of AfD voters: the conservatives’ stark rightward shift on migration ahead of the election, for instance, does not appear to have worked.
The Future of Germany’s Foreign Policy
In the hours after the results came in, the German political debate rapidly pivoted from the inward-focused campaign to the formidable foreign policy challenges ahead. The German foreign policy framework, built on post-World War II pillars of robust engagement within the European Union and a strong transatlantic alliance with the United States, appears poised for a strategic recalibration.
During Scholz’s tenure, Germany’s presence in European politics was notably subdued. Typically a linchpin in the EU for its role as a compromise broker and coalition builder, Germany was instead perceived as punching below its weight. The Scholz government was beleaguered by domestic political squabbles and the arduous task of holding a fractious coalition together. It often sent mixed signals that seemed to prioritize national interests over collective European goals, and it strained Germany’s crucial relationships with France and Poland.
Merz has wasted no time in asserting his intention to revitalize Germany’s role on the European stage and underscoring his commitment to mending fences. His promise to expedite coalition negotiations to form a government by mid-April is a testament to his urgency. But internal dynamics could slow him down: The CDU/CSU’s subpar electoral performance has left Merz with diminished authority, and although his coalition will likely be more internally coherent, it will have to contend with a significant opposition bloc.
During the campaign, Merz touted his transatlantic ties to forge better relations with Washington. And as leaders from France and the UK travel to Washington this week, Germany’s absence is conspicuous. But after the first few weeks of the Trump administration and in light of his interactions with U.S. administration representatives at the Munich Security Conference, Merz is undergoing a significant disillusionment and reassessment of his approach to Washington. In his election-night comments, Merz described the United States as an unreliable partner that doesn’t care about Europe’s fate, noted that the continent is under pressure from both Washington and Moscow, and questioned whether NATO would still exist “in its current form” by the next alliance meeting in June.
Scholz, the “peace” chancellor, found himself in the unlikely position of leading the country’s defense revival, or Zeitenwende. Now Merz, a passionate transatlanticist, may find himself steering the country’s path away from the United States.
The Likely Shifts Ahead on Defense Policy
Merz has indicated that a top priority for his government will be achieving strategic independence from the United States in defense matters, particularly in response to Russia. This assertion points to a pivotal shift toward an independent European defense capability, a move with profound implications for both Germany and its European allies.
For Europe to establish a defense architecture that operates independently of U.S. support, a significant recalibration of strategic responsibilities across the continent will be required. This entails not only increased investments in troop strength and the closing of critical capability gaps but also the development of a European nuclear umbrella. Merz’s openness to discussions with France and the UK about extending their nuclear protection to cover Germany is already a radical departure from the past reliance on U.S. nuclear guarantees.
The financial implications of such a shift will be substantial. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has accelerated European defense spending, while exposing the limitations of existing defense industrial capacities and supply chains across Europe. Germany created a special 100 billion euro defense fund that allowed for rapid increases in spending to meet NATO’s defense spending goal of 2 percent of GDP. However, this fund is expected to be depleted by 2027. Scholz’s government has struggled to find the resources to maintain this level of expenditure, especially at a time of economic stagnation and with Germany’s economy under pressure to simultaneously reduce its dependence on Russia and deal with a second China shock.
The Merz administration may need to consider several fiscal maneuvers to sustain and possibly increase defense spending—to defend Europe without America, 2 percent will not be enough. But the financial challenge is enormous: 3 percent of GDP defense spending would be 120-130 billion euros, meaning Germany would have to find an additional 70 billion euros for defense every year from 2028. Options on the table include loosening Germany’s stringent debt brake, implementing tax increases, reducing social spending, and advocating for EU-level joint borrowing for defense purposes. A combination of all likely will be required, and none will be popular or easy to achieve. The feasibility of reforming the debt brake, in particular, hinges on a two-thirds majority in the Bundestag and would require support from the defense-skeptical Left Party. Though Green Party leader Robert Habeck signaled a willingness to negotiate this reform in the outgoing Bundestag, where a two-thirds majority could potentially be won, Merz has ruled out broader debt brake reform in the short term. Another option under discussion is the creation of a new special fund for defense.
Europe’s ability to secure what it can only hope will be a just peace deal for Ukraine without the United States will be a first urgent test of its resolve and capabilities. EU leaders are urgently crafting a multibillion-euro aid plan for Ukraine, with an emergency summit scheduled for March 6. Germany, as Europe’s largest economy and the second-biggest donor of military aid to Ukraine after the United States, will play a critical role.
As Merz attempts to build his coalition in the coming days, he’ll be challenged at home and abroad. He’ll need to address the growing power of the far right and find a way to solve his country’s solvency issues in order to pay for its own security and defense, as well as continue to aid Ukraine. After years of an inward-looking Germany, Berlin urgently needs take on responsibility for the survival of the European project.
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