Gulf Leaders Should Be Concerned About Dueling Narratives During Trump’s Visit

In the first overseas trip of his second term, U.S. President Donald Trump is visiting Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Below, three Middle East experts discuss the implications and possible outcomes of the president’s five-day itinerary.

What are the possible outcomes of the trip?

Amr Hamzawy: Trump is visiting the Middle East at a moment of extreme regional tension. The war in Gaza is persistent and ongoing, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis that’s affected more than 2 million Palestinians. Continuation of conflict is preventing all reconstruction efforts envisioned by Arab states in a comprehensive plan that has yet to begin implementation. Although the U.S. administration ended its military campaign against the Houthis in Yemen after the group pledged to halt its attacks on commercial and military vessels passing through the Red Sea, U.S.-Iranian negotiations have yet to yield clear agreements on Tehran’s nuclear program, its behavior in the Middle East, or the easing of sanctions. The administration’s approach to other regional crises—in Syria, Libya, and Sudan—remain unclear.

Therefore, I expect Trump’s visit to primarily result in trade, investment, and security deals between the United States and the Gulf states and little in the way of politics.

Andrew Leber: I expect to see economic deal-making to be the central focus of this trip, as reflected in the host of business leaders accompanying the president on the trip. Announcements will primarily take the form of large-scale investment pledges from the countries into various strategic sectors of the U.S. economy, with Trump already pledging to fast-track any new investments from the region. I also expect to see announcements on AI and semiconductors that more closely connect Gulf sovereign wealth funds and Silicon Valley firms, part of efforts by Saudi Arabia and the UAE to position themselves with supply chains relevant to both the U.S. and global economy.

I expect to see some reports of bilateral discussions on regional concerns—chiefly, continued fighting in Gaza and developments in Syria—albeit emphasized more in Gulf readouts than in American ones. Regional leaders have succeeded in getting Syria on the U.S. agenda, however briefly, with Trump announcing a lifting of Assad-era U.S. sanctions and meeting Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa (in the presence of de facto Saudi ruler Mohammad bin Salman). I doubt we will see any major surprises in terms of specific U.S. commitments regarding Gaza or Iran. Still, even avoiding some of the president’s previous rhetoric would be a win for regional rulers conscious of the apparent contradictions between espousing support for the Palestinian cause and welcoming an administration that has accommodated Israel’s renewed attacks on Gaza.

Zaha Hassan: The deals Andrew mentioned—ones good for the U.S. economy and profitable for the Arab Gulf states—require a conducive political environment for such investments. The ongoing destruction of Gaza and Israel’s blockade that has induced starvation there is casting a shadow over the trip.

Hamas’s release of the last living American hostage from Gaza ahead of the president’s visit increases the pressure from Israeli hostage families on Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, but it also gives Gulf states something to work with in convincing Trump that U.S. leverage must be deployed on Israel to achieve a permanent ceasefire. Trump’s Middle East envoy, Steve Witkoff, appeared frustrated with Netanyahu’s stalling when he told the families that the United States wants the hostages home but Israel is not willing to end the war.

Israeli negotiators are now headed back to Doha to resume talks for a ceasefire deal with Hamas, as some daylight is appearing between the Trump administration and Israel. It is no accident that it’s coming as Air Force One landed on Saudi Arabian soil. 

Do you expect to see much discussion around diplomatic initiatives, especially the normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia?

Amr Hamzawy: Trump may use the visit to announce some important diplomatic initiatives relating to the war in Gaza, including the delivery of humanitarian aid and a temporary ceasefire in exchange for the release of half the remaining hostages. However, none are likely to change the bitter reality in the Middle East.

Andrew Leber: While Trump may still desire a normalization deal, circumstances are quite different than his first term. Saudi Arabia continues to maintain cordial ties with Iran in the wake of a 2023 rapprochement, lessening the pressure to conclude a regional alignment with Israel. Furthermore, Israel continues to launch strikes into Gaza and impose a humanitarian blockade, putting pressure on Saudi leaders and commentators to downplay any sense that Riyadh is abandoning the Palestinian cause. Moreover, the president has not pressed Saudi Arabia to accept a normalization deal in public. Instead, he has focused on the potential for bilateral gains.

Zaha Hassan: I agree with Andrew: The prerequisites for Israeli normalization with Saudi Arabia—and with the other Arab Gulf countries that have yet to establish diplomatic relations with Israel—look very different in 2025 than they did five years ago, when the Abraham Accords were signed between Israel, the United States, Bahrain, and the UAE.

As expected, the accords have in no way furthered Palestinian-Israeli peace. They offered mutual recognition and economic ties between the Arab signatories and Israel but did not move the needle on regional security. Instead, the situation in occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the West Bank worsened considerably following the accords, with almost daily Israeli incursions into the West Bank, expansion of settlements, and efforts to restrict Palestinian life in East Jerusalem. Then came October 7, 2023, and its catastrophic and ongoing aftermath in Gaza. 

Saudi Arabia has committed itself to a different formula: the Arab Plan, which outlines strategies for the reconstruction and redevelopment of Gaza, asserts support for a sovereign state of Palestine (based on the lines of  June 4, 1967, with East Jerusalem as its capital), and agrees to mount an international campaign, along with Egypt and Jordan, for a diplomatic settlement. According to the plan, normalization with Israel will occur only after Israeli and Palestinian leaders sign a peace agreement that resolves all final status issues between the parties, ends Israel’s military occupation, and establishes Palestinian sovereignty over Gaza and the West Bank (including East Jerusalem). In September, Saudi Arabia established a global alliance to further the two-state solution, and it will co-chair the group’s next meeting, alongside France, in June at the UN in New York. Some big announcements may be made there around Palestinian recognition.

The news that Trump will accept a luxury 747 from Qatar has caused a stir in the United States. What’s the Qatari government’s logic ?

Amr Hamzawy: Qatar has always sought to build strong diplomatic, security, and trade relations with the United States, and it has always viewed these ties as an important component of its Middle East role.

Historically, Qatar has feared Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, its powerful neighbors. In 2017, Riyadh and Abu Dhabi imposed a boycott of Doha over its relations with Iran and support for Islamist groups. The boycott was a challenge for the Qatari government, but it was helped by its good relationship with the United States.

In this context, Qatar’s desire to build friendly relations with Trump and his administration—and maintain its special relationship with the United States, whose largest military base in the Middle East remains the Al Udeid base in Qatar—is understandable.

Qatar will always hedge its relations with its powerful neighbors and will always view the relationship with Washington as an important guarantee for its existence, just as it views its active diplomacy—mediating between Israel and Hamas and, in the recent past, mediating between the United States and the Taliban in Afghanistan—as an additional guarantee for its survival.

Andrew Leber: Qatar’s leadership learned during the first Trump administration that it needs to keep the president “on side” to forestall any efforts by its immediate neighbors to try to move against it. Giving Trump an expensive gift is a continuation of its greatly expanded lobbying efforts inside the United States since then. It is likely intended more as an insurance policy rather than an explicit quid pro quo, particularly given past Republican criticism of Qatar’s connections to Hamas. Still, this may backfire in being too blatant of a payoff.

The entire population of Gaza is now at critical famine risk, a UN report says, as fighting continues throughout the strip. How will (or won’t) the war in Gaza factor into Trump’s visit?

Zaha Hassan: The assessment from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification comes after Israel imposed a complete blockade of all essentials to sustain human life in Gaza. No food, water, medicines, fuel or other supplies have been allowed to enter Gaza for over two months. Prior to this, supplies had been restricted to a trickle but not completely cut off. Arab Gulf leaders have to be concerned about split screens and news reels of the pomp and circumstance of the U.S. president’s arrival in the region alongside images of emaciated Palestinian children in Gaza.

The situation in Jerusalem is also a concern. Ahead of Trump’s trip, Israeli settlers stormed the Al Aqsa Mosque esplanade. Ultranationalist religious settlers are feeling more emboldened to take such actions in the West Bank, given the few repercussions over the situation in Gaza. And then there are the Yemeni missiles being fired at Israel while Trump is welcomed by the Saudi crown prince.

All this underscores that what happens in Palestine does not stay in Palestine. Not only are there regional implications, but they are impacting relations with the one country with the most leverage to end the violence. That message has to factor into every stop on Trump’s Gulf tour. 

Amr Hamzawy: Over the past few weeks, the Trump administration has made only limited attempts to restore a ceasefire in Gaza and issued few statements about the catastrophic humanitarian conditions in the strip. Trump’s Gulf visit may result in new statements regarding the need to end the dire humanitarian situation and achieve a ceasefire, a move that Gulf governments will support.

However, the seriousness of American action will inevitably depend on an organized effort, which has yet to take place, to achieve a ceasefire and accept the start of implementation of the Arab Plan. This is the only comprehensive plan agreed upon by Palestinians, Arabs, and Europeans and capable of bringing about real change on the ground in the Gaza Strip.

Israel appears to have been sidelined during this visit. How does this impact the region?

Amr Hamzawy: It is too early to talk about Israel being marginalized in U.S. Middle East policy. The fact that Trump is only visiting the Gulf does not mean that U.S. relations with Israel are declining, just as it does not mean that U.S. interest in Jordan or Egypt, two U.S. allies, is waning. Trump’s visit to the Gulf has commercial, investment, security, and technological implications for this rich part of the Middle East.

As for other regional issues, including the Palestinian issue and Israel’s security, everyone is still waiting to know exactly where the Trump administration stands and who is shaping its Middle East policy: Witkoff alone, or whether the State Department and other institutions play a role.