Three former European leaders have been at the center of the EU reform debate since publishing a set of reports in 2024: Mario Draghi presented ideas on competitiveness, Enrico Letta on completing the single market, and Sauli Niinistö on internal security. But so far, no one has bothered to propose reforms of EU foreign policy. This is not because it is in such great shape, but rather because many insiders consider it a lost cause.

In fact, there is hardly an area of the union’s action that has seen similar setbacks over recent years. Even the most impressive achievement, the EU’s robust and coherent response to Russia’s full-fledged invasion of Ukraine, celebrated by then high representative Josep Borrell as “the birth of the geopolitical EU,” looks less glorious now. Europeans have been all but excluded from Washington-Moscow-Kyiv negotiations that might result in a one-sided deal threatening the survival of a sovereign Ukraine.

During the Gaza war, a deeply divided EU proved incapable of developing policies that would have any impact on the realities on the ground. On Iran, where the bloc had previously played a crucial role in bringing about an agreement on the country’s nuclear program, Europe has been unable to find a common response to a war that has grave consequences for its interests. The list of foreign policy challenges, on which Europe has been largely missing in action, is depressingly long.

Whether it concerns engaging with U.S. President Donald Trump’s administration, elaborating security guarantees for Ukraine, or dealing with the challenge of Arctic security, the EU falls short. It will almost always prove to be either too big, because reaching unanimous decisions among twenty-seven members takes too long, or too small, because non-EU states such as the UK, Norway, or Canada are indispensable partners on many issues.

Conceived for the relatively benign international environment of the early years of the twenty-first century, EU institutions and procedures are too cumbersome to cope with war and chaos. It is time to set up a European security council and to merge the European External Action Service (EEAS) and European Commission.

Coalitions of the willing have recently taken the lead on various foreign policy issues, but that is not a sustainable model in the long run. In order to respond to new geopolitical challenges and counter the weaponization of everything, a reformed institutional setup is necessary. It should provide legitimacy by connecting the lead role of smaller groups to the rest of the union through a security council. And by bringing the EEAS and the commission together, it should ensure that foreign and security policy is thoroughly integrated with the instruments of external economic relations.

Faced with today’s dangerous and fast-moving crises, the majority of EU countries appear prepared to accept bigger countries with greater capabilities taking the lead in foreign and security policy. However, this readiness will depend on a functioning feedback mechanism linking the vanguard to the rest. The so-called E3 countries—the UK, France, and Germany—lead in the negotiations on the 2015 Iranian nuclear deal, to which the then high representative was closely associated: They have shown how this can be done.

Andrius Kubilius, the EU’s defense commissioner, has recently proposed a European security council that could provide political leadership in acute security crises and contribute to overcoming the fragmentation that stifles the development of common defense. Beyond military security, such a body could also assume a leading role in foreign policy. Being smaller and more agile, it could respond more rapidly to crisis situations.

The council would be composed of the so-called E5—Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Poland—and a rotating small number of other member states. The UK and Ukraine would participate on the basis of a special status. Including Kyiv could confirm its crucial role in dealing with the Russian threat and signal a strong European commitment at a time when full EU membership cannot yet be achieved. Initially, the security council could be established informally. Any decisionmaking powers would require an intergovernmental treaty similar to the one underlying the Schengen area.

Furthermore, foreign policy initiatives will lack clout and substance unless they can draw on the EU’s collective financial, economic, trade, and development instruments. The EEAS was originally conceived as a coordination platform between foreign policy and external economic relations, but that has not worked out in practice. As a hybrid entity between the council and the commission, it has neither the authority to coordinate effectively nor the clout to drive the policy process in the council. In the meantime, the commission under President Ursula von der Leyen has enhanced its profile in foreign and security policy, taking the lead in a number of areas. It is the commission that now offers the best chance of bringing the various instruments of external economic relations and foreign and security policy together behind a coherent approach.

Merging the EEAS into the commission would clarify responsibilities, reduce duplication, and could be accomplished in a way that preserves the involvement of member state diplomats in the union’s foreign policy.

Ursula von der Leyen and High Representative Kaja Kallas are currently working on a new EU security strategy. It is to be hoped that they understand that a more effective security and defense policy must go hand in hand with a better foreign policy, and that existing structures and procedures are no longer fit for purpose.