Regionalizing the Multilateral System: A Responce to Globalization

April 26, 1999

Dr. Shepard Forman, Center on International Cooperation

Dr. Shepard Forman began his talk by highlighting the work and mission of his newly established organization, the Center on International Cooperation (CIC), specifically highlighting CIC?s work on the role of regional and sub-regional organizations as public goods providers, particularly in the social and security sectors.

The Center on International Cooperation (CIC) is an independent institute, established at New York University in 1996, to conduct policy research and consultations on multilateral responses to global problems. Our work focuses in particular on the management and financing issues that advance or impede the fulfillment of multilateral agreements. Through that lens, CIC aims to enhance the capacity of the institutions and actors that animate the international public sector and to increase support for the body of norms, treaties, conventions and agreements that underlies it. They do this by wedding a case study methodology to direct consultations with policy makers and practitioners concerned with improving multilateral outcomes.

Currently CIC have projects underway in four sectors of global concern: international justice; humanitarian assistance; the Cairo Conference on Population and Development; and Pledges of Aid to countries emerging from conflict. They are also establishing an on-line data base covering various sectors of multilateral cooperation that fall under 8 major thematic areas: human rights, humanitarian assistance, international law, peace and security, international economics, economic development, science and technology and education and culture. These are all available on our web site at http://www.nyu.edu/pages/cic.

CIC?s work in each of these sectors has called attention to three cross-cutting phenomena: 1) the critical role played by the United States in the promotion of multilateralism and the effect of its unilateral manipulation on it ? we will in the coming months be launching a series of case studies on "Multilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy," in order to try to factor out the decision-making processes that lead the U.S. into constructive or renegade behavior with regard to global multilateralism; 2) the important role of the private sector, both NGO and corporate, in the provision of international public goods and services; and 3) the role of regional and sub-regional organizations as public goods providers, particularly in the social and security sectors.

In today?s talk, Dr. Forman will focus on the latter, because the role of regional and sub-regional organizations as public goods providers is of extreme importance in any consideration of the architecture of global governance. The CIC has begun this project by drafting a paper on "regional burden-sharing in the provision of humanitarian assistance in Africa." Now, CIC intends to undertake a comparative study of the actual and potential capacity of sub-regional and regional institutions to implement the delivery of socially relevant goods and services which was ascribed to the United Nations and the Bretton Woods institutions in the aftermath of WWII. The research will accomplish three things: first, it will clarify the nature and extent of socially relevant goods and services provided by selected regional and sub-regional entities. Second, it will examine the causes that promote the sub-global provision of international public goods. Finally, it will assess the implications that the global devolution and regional provision of international public goods has for the application of universal standards.

The study begins with a cataloguing of regional, sub-regional and trans-regional organizations, their memberships, mandates, financial and human resource capacities and their areas of functional activity. The matrix throws up a number of interesting questions on the timing and distribution of regional and sub-regional organizations, their history and functions. There is a sizeable international relations literature on the formation of regional organizations that proceed from diverse realist, functionalist, neo-realist, neo-functionalist and institutional perspectives, all of which ? depending on your angle of vision ? have some validity.

Dr. Forman continues by raising a long-standing question in a new light, what is the relationship between global multilaterals and regional and sub-regional groups? As more and more tasks are assigned to or taken up by regional and sub-regional groupings, what do we know about their capacity and appropriateness to assume an expanding set of political and social roles? The international relations literature only helps partially in an inquiry of this kind, which I believe has particularly practical implications. However, analogies to the regionalism vs. globalism debates in the trade literature help to focus attention on a number of critical issues resulting from the increasing activism of sub-regional organizations in the political and social affairs of their global neighborhoods.

The argument is relatively straightforward. First, you start with the assumption that the coexistence of sub-regional, regional, and global multilateral organizations has a very powerful impact on the efficacy and efficiency with which international obligations are and can be carried out. The simultaneous devolution of responsibilities on the part of global multilaterals and the assertiveness with which they are assumed by sub-regional organizations raises important questions of subsidiarity and complementarity in the global division of labor. More particularly, I am concerned with issues of relativism and universality in the application of the international Rule of Law, and with questions of quality and equity in the distribution of international public goods and services.

CIC?s focus is primarily on sub-regional organizations in Africa and Latin America. First, because they are far more numerous and far more dynamic than their proximal big brothers/ sisters, the OAU and the OAS. Second, because they evidence a growing pattern of organizations founded with primarily economic purpose taking on increased political and social functions. Third, because their proliferation and increased assertiveness is a consequence of the process of globalization itself and therefore has important implications for the ways in which this process is managed.

The MGI Seminar Series opened with a stimulating analysis by Wolfgang Reinicke of the relationship between globalization and sovereignty. As I understood Wolfgang?s presentation, which in some ways parallels an interesting analysis of regional economic organizations by James Hawdon (Greenwood Press, 1996), the state performs both inward and outward functions. Put simply, and at risk of a grave injustice to Wolfgang?s analysis, on the one hand the state seeks to maintain control over political and social processes within its borders while, on the other hand, opening them up to trade and investment. Wolfgang suggests that the resultant tension leads to two possible outcomes: the realignment of economics with politics, either through the imposition of protectionist measures or through deregulation and tax incentives, or by the realignment of politics with economics through accession to intergovernmental organizations and processes of global governance. In either case, the state is reacting to the challenges posed by globalization to its sovereignty over public policy, but is outpaced by the skills and capacity of the corporate sector that drives it. The solution to the dilemma is to outsource the state?s activities to multilateral governing institutions and to the private sector in a set of public-private partnerships that Wolfgang defines as functionally-based public policy networks.

In my view, Wolfgang?s analysis is right on point, but I fear that the solution he offers may be premature. As I see it, the world as a whole is not quite ready for the conversation on global governance. Developing and transitional economies are extremely reticent about public/private partnerships in which the rich states and their multinational corporate engines will inevitably dominate. Moreover, many countries continue to be wary of the ability of non-governmental organizations and citizens? groups to influence public policy, particularly in the security area that states insist is their exclusive domain. U.S. reactions to the International Criminal Court and the Treaty on Landmines make this abundantly clear.

Rather, I wonder if we are not heading toward an interregnum in the trend toward globalism in which regionalism and sub-regionalism will for a time be the organizing principle for multilateral action. The emergence of sub-regional organizations is in part a response to the failure of global and regional multilaterals to respond to local needs. However, it is also a response to the globalization/sovereignty dilemma that Wolfgang defined. States ? particularly weaker states -- find smaller, more like-minded fora more preferable than distant, rich-state dominated global institutions. Membership in sub-regional organizations enables them to increase their economic strength and bargaining power while maintaining political control over the unstoppable intrusion of unwelcome standards and values and, in some cases, the non-state actors who promote them.

In this sense, Wolfgang?s analysis of the realignment of politics with economics might help to explain why these essentially economic organizations ? and as the matrix I distributed demonstrates -- the great majority of sub-regional organizations have been created with either trade or economic integration objectives ? take on substantial political and social tasks. Labor standards and environmental protection are understandable "additionalities" in trade negotiations; however, these sub-regional organizations are extending their mandates far beyond these issues to include a range of social and political goods and services. Security, purportedly sanctioned by the U.N. Security Council, has always been a purview of regional political organizations, but the role of regional and sub-regional economic organizations in managing a broad range of public goods and services is relatively new. In the interest of time, two examples will have to suffice: ECOWAS? peace-keeping intervention in Liberia and MERCOSUR?s political intervention in Paraguay. I was particularly struck during a visit to Rio de Janeiro in December that the agenda of the heads of MERCOSUR states then meeting there emphasized at least publicly issues of governance, human rights, the status of women, and health over the basic question of trade.

In part, this expansion to non-economic activities reflects an increasing devolution of responsibility from the global multilaterals to regional and sub-regional groupings. Global multilateral institutions are increasingly on the verge of irreversible financial crises, and their ability to finance the provision of international public goods is obviously curtailed by the lassitude with which members of the world body meet their commitments. The UN is one prime example, but recent discussions regarding increased subsidies to the IMF prove that the UN is by far not alone among global multilateral organizations facing financial shortages.

However, the devolution does not alone explain the proliferation of new organizations nor the assertiveness with which they are assuming their extra-economic functions. At least some part of the explanation lies in the space created at the end of the Cold War when Western interest in non-strategic parts of the developing world began to wane and local actors began to fill the gap by creating or reinvigorating a number of sub-regional groupings.

These new sub-regional arrangements suggest that the demand for international public goods continues to be very high even while their supply may be changing in shape and composition. This is the first set of questions that our proposed research will seek to answer. What are the precise tasks that regional and sub-regional organizations are now assuming and how well equipped are they to provide them? An important issue here has to do with the possible redundancy between those organizations established as regional branches of the United Nations or the World Bank and those that are organized independently within the regions themselves. For example, an examination of the functional divisions of the UN Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) and the recently established African Economic Commission (AEC) raises questions about bureaucratic and programmatic duplication.

Furthermore, it is important to know whether the goods and services that these sub-regional organizations provide are being conceived and delivered in accordance with universal norms and standards. Does the regionalization of humanitarian assistance give rise to different standards of implementation (e.g. the possible exclusion of women from social and educational services in some Islamic situations)? Might regional human rights courts begin to differentially apply human rights laws and covenants? And will nationally focused ad hoc war crimes tribunals acting in place of an International Criminal Court sustain universal principles in the Rule of Law?

A second set of questions relates to the implications of regionalism for global governance. The question of regionalism vs. globalism is, of course, an old debate, one that has been revived in recent years in heated discussions about whether regional trade organizations promote or impede globalization. Do these regional trading organization increase competition or ? through inter-linked membership ? serve as building blocks for the globalization of trade?

The parallel question for our inquiry is whether regional and sub-regional organizations can serve as building blocks to a broader system of global governance or whether they will serve to formalize the fragmentation that is occurring post Cold War. It is now painfully evident that the management of the global system is well beyond the capacity of any single nation, even if the leadership should be in place to try to do so. The resulting decentralization can be relatively constructive and orderly, as the multinational corporate sector has demonstrated, or it could disintegrate into regional and sub-regional competition with potentially frightening consequences. This could especially be the case if the convergence of economic and military power, as in the case of ECOWAS, were to continue to occur without some careful thought to its consequences. The way in which sub-regional organizations are incorporated into the global architecture will make a profound difference in outcomes.

Which brings me to my last point, a broader concern with regard to the application of international law under which the various regional and sub-regional arrangements should operate. The prerogative of the UN in security matters has been seriously eroded in recent years as reporting has become more perfunctory and acquiescence rather than approval of the Security Council has become the norm. Of course, the Kosovo case presents us with an interesting paradox -- an armed intervention in the interest of universal principles of human rights and humanitarian law carried out by a regional organization without the sanction of the Security Council, that is with a certain disregard for international law.

Let me close with the hope that regional and sub-regional organizations can become, in the words of one analyst, building blocks rather than stumbling blocks in the effective management of the global system. That will, however, require us to pay closer attention than we have to date to the way in which the various levels and agencies of inter-governmental organization relate to each other and how they measure up to the universal principles and norms now established in international law.

There is a great deal of talk at the present time in the international policy community regarding where international activity should be located. It takes the form of discussions on regional burden-sharing, local ownership, subsidiarity, complementarity, and what might comprise an effective international division of labor. Across the board ? in areas as diverse as economic development, humanitarian assistance, peace-keeping, even the management of financial crises, a discussion is proceeding rather quickly on the devolution of responsibility from the global to the regional/sub-regional level. In part it is driven by the lack of resources in global institutions, compounded by a failure of political will and leadership in countries that have the capacity but lack the vision to see and act on the convergence between national and larger global interests. In part it reflects the new assertiveness of regional and sub-regional organizations still struggling for a post-colonial/ post Cold War place in the sun. In either event, the current interregnum between the Westphalian system and global governance is dangerously undefined.

The effective involvement of regional and sub-regional organizations in the management of global affairs could hold substantial promise for the more equitable distribution of international public goods and services. However, simply shifting the burden of responsibility to regional and sub-regional organizations will not work. Rather, a real partnership in the pursuit of common goals will need to take place to ensure that regional and sub-regional organizations have the capacity not only to act, but to act in appropriate ways.

That means two things. First, regional and sub-regional organizations will need to have the resources necessary to adequately meet the responsibilities they are assuming. They will require the cash and commitment of wealthy nations who are increasingly shying away from the obligations and responsibilities of global multilateralism. Otherwise, divergences and inequities are likely to increase in the provision of international public goods and services between rich regions and poor ones, with calamitous social consequences. Second, we will need to demonstrate real leadership by way of example. The inherent dangers and risks of sub-regionalism demand a reassertion of universal principles and values and strict adherence to international law. That will require us to reinforce the relationship between the United Nations, as the auspice of standard-setting and law-making, and regional and sub-regional organizations, as the purveyors of goods and services. If we are really intent on ensuring sustainable peace and development, we need to reexamine the current global architecture and think hard about how to build its future on the twin pillars of universal principles and international law.

Prepared by Elaine French, Junior Fellow.