Afghan War and the Pakistani Dimension

IMGXYZ128IMGZYXOn Thursday, October 25, Carnegie Senior Associate Anatol Lieven shared observations from his recent visit to Pakistan. Lieven, who covered Afghanistan as a correspondent for The Times of London during the Soviet occupation in the late 1980s reporting from both inside the country as well as from neighboring Pakistan, returned to the region three weeks ago in order to observe, first hand, developments since September 11th.

Lieven began his presentation with a sharp critique of recent comments by US officials expressing surprise at the perseverance of the Taliban government in the face of the current US-led bombing campaign. Lieven remarked that anyone familiar with Afghanistan and its inhabitants should be well aware of the Afghan ability to resist foreign military opponents. After all, these warriors have been waging an almost continuous war for the better part of the last two decades. Contrary to the belief of many American pundits, the Taliban are not some kind of foreign force imposed on Afghanistan. While they are indeed hated by many Afghans, they also have some deeply rooted support, which is fed both by religion and by Pashtun nationalism - and this support has if anything grown stronger as a result of the bombing campaign. No one should have expected a quick capitulation.

Lieven shared the criticism expressed to him by Afghan opposition figures including the late Abdul Haq, who felt that the whole bombing campaign appeared to have been cobbled together prematurely. These figures have expressed dismay with what they considered to be an opaque decision making process that left many sources of support within Afghanistan confused about both short and long-term US intentions in the region.

Criticism aside, Lieven covered two major themes in his opening remarks. First, he provided an analysis of the political situation of the ethnic Pashtuns in the region. As a people, the Pashtuns combine a strong sense of ethnic identity and resistance to outside conquest with a very weak capacity for spontaneous political organization - a combination also characteristic of the Chechens for example. It is this combination of traits which explains many of the events within Afghanistan during the 1990s. It accounts for the dominance of other minority groups within the post-Soviet, Mujahadeen government that ruled from 1992 to 1996, as well as the negative reaction on the part of most Pashtuns to that government and their subsequent support of the Taliban.

Historically, the call to a defensive Jihad in opposition to foreign occupation has served as one of the few forces capable of uniting the Pashtuns into a politically cohesive group. Very often, these Jihads have been called by outside religious figures who have taken refuge in Afghanistan - the British Empire in India had lengthy experience with this phenomenon. In light of this fact, the presence of Osama bin Laden within Afghanistan and the level of his influence among the Taliban is not without historical precedent. However, there are also a great many Pashtuns and even some members of the Taliban who resent the influence of bin Laden and his mainly Arab al-Qaeda group, and this gives hope that at some stage they may be betrayed by local Afghans and eliminated by US and British forces.

While it is possible that the Taliban could collapse, Kabul could fall to the Northern Alliance and al-Qaeda could be destroyed by precision air strikes, Lieven does not believe this is a scenario the US should count on - least of all before the onset of winter. Rather, it is more likely that the Taliban will put up a tremendous fight first for Kabul, then Kandahar and then retreat into the mountains.

Currently, the US effort to organize a viable Pashtun resistance to the Taliban in the south of Afghanistan and among the refugees in Pakistan is facing very serious obstacles - ones which were dramatized by the capture and execution of the anti-Taliban commander Abdul Haq. As Haq himself warned Lieven in Peshawar on October 11th, there is as yet no organization or center of power for would-be defectors to join. The US administration has been remiss in not hammering out a clear conception of what a concerted opposition to the Taliban should look like before launching the bombing campaign.

According to Lieven, this is something that should have been worked out before the start of military action, but it was not. The result has been a great deal of confusion and a series of missed opportunities to woo support from elements within Afghanistan. Lieven stressed that while the Pashtun alternative to the Taliban is still weak and divided - and still discredited by its leaders' failures and crimes when they were in power after 1992 - the Northern Alliance cannot possibly be considered a viable government for the whole of Afghanistan. The former King, Zahir Shah, may be able to play a certain role as a unifying figure - but he is acutely disliked by many Afghan commanders. As of September 10th, neither he nor his supporters would have been considered significant figures on the Afghan scene - and unfortunately, that goes for the rest of the anti-Taliban Pashtun groupings as well.

While US money will certainly be a very useful tool in building up these groups and weakening the Taliban's hold on the reins of power, it cannot work miracles. It cannot for example turn an 87-year-old Zahir Shah into a 57 year old one. Military success requires political success, political success requires local allies, and local allies need among other things a clear conception of the future shape of a US-backed settlement, that they can present to the Afghan people. Development aid is essential, but equally important is the role the US can play in clarifying what elements of both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance will form the government of different parts of Afghanistan. Moreover, Lieven emphasized that Pakistan must be included in efforts to build a Pashtun opposition to the Taliban. This will be a long-term project that will require patience from the West.

When it comes to short-term military strategy, Lieven suggested that the US aid the Northern Alliance in its drive towards Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat, but discourage the Alliance from moving on Kabul. During the winter, the US should scale back the air war to focus on exclusively non-urban military targets that would support the Northern Alliance while avoiding civilian casualties; while also continuing raids by special forces to try to kill or capture Al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders. If Osama bin Laden and some of his top lieutenants can be killed or captured, then the present military operation should be suspended in favor of political and financial measures against the Taliban.

The top Taliban leadership for its part is determined, courageous, and solid; but if it can be destroyed, there is nothing to replace it from the lower ranks of the Taliban. With them gone, there would be a good chance that, in the words of the late Abdul Haq, "Every Taliban soldier would take his rifle and his blanket and go home". There would also of course be an excellent chance that more junior commanders would start fighting among themselves, and many would turn to the US for support in return for getting rid of Al-Qaeda. However, we have to recognize that knocking out the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leadership in this way will take not just good intelligence but also a lot of luck.

In the meantime therefore, the US should devote the bulk of its attention, together with Pakistan, to building up anti-Taliban Pashtun forces which could move into Afghanistan from Pakistan in the Spring, supported by massive US airpower and in conjunction with a Northern Alliance offensive. If these offensives were to fail and the Taliban remain in control of most of Afghanistan, then most unfortunately the US and Britain will have no choice but to introduce their own armies.

Regarding the situation in Pakistan, Lieven presented a somewhat more optimistic evaluation. The rioting in Pakistan has been relatively small in scale and limited to mainly Pashtun regions. General Musharraf seems to be holding the line with enough Pakistani opinion by using two persuasive arguments. Musharraf has argued that his acquiescence in the US war on terrorism was vital in preventing an alliance between the United States and India which could have been fatal to Pakistan. Second, the President has emphasized the great economic benefits that Pakistan will receive in exchange for its cooperation. Certain significant steps have already been taken: for example, US sanctions imposed on Pakistan after the successful test of a nuclear weapon in May of 1998 have already been removed. However, much more needs to be done, especially given the very severe economic consequences of the present war for Pakistan.

Also, as a preventative measure, General Musharraf moved to consolidate his position by removing from office two powerful hard-line generals who opposed cooperation with the United States. As a result of all this, the situation in Pakistan so far has remained relatively stable. Above all, the general mood in the Punjab - the key to Pakistan with more than 60 per cent of the population and 70 per cent of the Army - has been quiet.

With opinion polls showing 83 per cent of the population sympathizing with the Taliban in this war, there is of course no reason for complacency. Even the English-speaking elites, while most of them hate and fear the threat of islamic revolution within Pakistan, are also deeply unhappy with US strategy and tactics. Only the Shia minority has real sympathy with the US war, mainly because it has suffered so badly over the years from Taliban-backed anti-Shia terrorism.

Over the longer term, General Musharraf is at risk of becoming politically isolated. He has failed to create a solid base for his government and his continued exclusion of Pakistani political figures could present a serious problem. These people in the end can do much to discourage public discontent in their own districts, but they need state patronage to maintain their positions; otherwise, there is a risk that they will be gradually overtaken by the islamist parties. Despite the extremely depressing record of the civilian politicians when in power in the 1990s, extensive sections of Pakistani civil society have called for their reinstatement into the government, and the US should subtly encourage Musharraf in this direction. As a possible paradigm for a stable Pakistan, Lieven presented the Turkish model of government in which the military acts as a fundamental guarantor of the political system while civilian politicians are given control of day-to-day operation of the country. US support of such an evolution in Pakistan would also help to narrow the yawning and somewhat ludicrous gap between US policy towards the military regime before and after September 11th.

 

Question and Answer

The first questioner asked Lieven to speculate on what exactly the US should do if it gets its wish and a viable Pashtun led anti-Taliban opposition does emerge? Could there be a unified Afghanistan or would the US have to settle for some sort of de facto partition of the country?

Lieven responded that a de facto partition between different ethnic areas is not merely likely but virtually inevitable, though it should not be recognized de jure. He then proposed a strong role for a Muslim-led UN force that would be responsible for securing Kabul in order to prevent a return to the continual savage fighting for the city which occurred after the fall of the Communists in 1992. A safe, neutral Kabul is also essential as a base for a grand national assembly (Loya Jirga) which presents the only chance for even the outward appearance of a consensus government for the whole of Afghanistan, and the avoidance of conflict between different regions and warlords. Lieven added that this force should by no means try to extend its mandate beyond the city and should not attempt to secure the entire country - something which is beyond anyone's powers including most emphatically that of the US. In the long run, if Kabul remains neutral under UN control and the Pashtuns are able to organize themselves politically, then perhaps a deeper and more extensive settlement covering the whole country may be possible, though this will take many years.

In a follow up question, Lieven was asked about the potential cost, in human terms, of bringing about such a settlement. Specifically, under what scenarios could a de facto partition be achieved with a minimum of bloodshed?

According to Lieven, in order to bring about an interim solution with a minimum of bloodshed, two things must be avoided. First, the type of battle that was waged for control of Kabul after 1992 must not be repeated. Second, ethnic conflict must be avoided at all costs. It was precisely in reaction to such bloodshed and anarchy that the Taliban was able to get started in Kandahar in the first place. Ethnic conflict between Pashtuns and others can only serve the interests of the Taliban and whatever Taliban diehards and successors remain after the top leadership is eventually removed.

Taking it a step further, Lieven noted that removing the Taliban from Kandahar may not be a realizable military goal short of an assault by the US Army. The anti-Taliban Pashtun forces may prove too weak, while a Northern Alliance advance deep into Pashtun territory will not weaken but strengthen the Taliban because of the upsurge of Pashtun rage it is likely to produce. In all circumstances, as long as the Taliban retains a strong force, any attempt to take Kandahar will meet fierce resistance, and could result in a protracted battle in an urban setting with severe loss of life.

In response to another question, Lieven remarked that Pakistan cannot and will not oppose a strong role for the Northern Alliance in a future - in any case largely theoretical government of Afghanistan. Pakistan however does not want to see the Northern Alliance controlling or dominating such a government or the city of Kabul, and that also appears to be the position of most Pashtuns.

Northern Alliance control of any part of southern Afghanistan could cause a new exodus of Pashtun refugees into Pakistan, adding to the destabilizing pressures already being exerted by current refugees. On the other hand, a purely Pashtun government in Afghanistan would also be completely illegitimate and would not even serve Pakistan's interests. In the end, some sort of balance will have to be struck between the different ethnic, political and ideological groups. Russia too must not be allowed to insist on the exclusion of all former Taliban elements from power - to allow this would make splitting the Taliban impossible and vastly complicate the US military campaign.

Continuing the focus on Pakistan, the next questioner asked Lieven to expound upon some of the conflicting signals currently emanating from Pakistani society. Specifically, Lieven was asked to explain the apparent dissonance that seems to have developed within Pakistani society that has resulted in opposition to the US led air campaign on the one hand and reasonably solid support for Musharraf on the other.

In fact, Lieven noted, these two different trends are not contradictory. Most Pakistanis are thinking about what risks they, as a nation, can avoid, and what benefits they can derive from the present war. This has led most people to focus in the end on the threat from India and the financial bottom-line of cooperation with the US. While they may oppose the air strikes and, in fact, have very little faith or confidence in US strategy, they are very aware of the economic benefit that Pakistan stands to gain. However, they will still need to see proof of this benefit. If the Pakistani economy does not improve as a result of its support of the US, then the US will be blamed and Musharraf's problems could grow enormously. This threat is of course especially great in the context of the global economic downturn.

Returning to the issue of the Pashtuns, Lieven was asked to lay out their political goals. But, according to Lieven, there is very little agreement on this issue. The Pashtuns as a collectivity - and one equally divided between Pakistan and Afghanistan - are extremely confused and don't really know what they want. In recent times, only the Taliban has been able to create even the appearance of unity in Afghan Pashtunistan. Most of the Afghan Pashtuns aren't separatists, they are not pushing for a Pashtun state. Many ordinary Pashtuns would like a return to the monarchy that was seen as favoring the Pashtuns despite the fact that it was led by a Persian-speaking king. But this is a nostalgic vision not a concrete program.

In continuing the focus on Afghanistan's internal dynamics, Lieven was asked whether or not any standard political dynamics still apply? What is the conflict in the country about and can any of the factions be bought off?

The answer to the second question is most certainly yes, certain factions can be bought off. Lieven proposed the case of a local warlord, former anti-Soviet islamist commander, and current Minister of Tribal Affairs under the Taliban, Jalaluddin Haqqani. According to Lieven, Haqqani wants guaranteed long-term control over his own region and a share of influence at the center. This involves a guarantee that the US will not back local rivals against him - for no warlord or regional leader in Afghanistan goes unchallenged in his own area, they all have internal sources of opposition to face.

If the Taliban were removed, Haqqani might well seek co-operation with the US in pursuit of these goals, and offer in return help against Al-Qaeda. But all the indications are that like other figures within Afghanistan, Haqqani would be very unwilling indeed to be seen to betray the Taliban at the behest of Western infidels who are bombing his country. Even huge amounts of US money would not compensate him for the utter moral humiliation involved in such a step. Hard cash however may at least persuade him and others to step to one side, as it were, and while continuing to pay formal allegiance to the Taliban, not in the end to give them strong military support. However, it seems likely that if either Northern Alliance or US troops were to advance into his territory, Haqqani would have to fight.

In the long run, Afghanistan will remain explosive unless some form of economic development takes place. According to Lieven, the key to this development lies in the restoration of the traditional flow of trade that has passed through the area. This is a basic feature of life that could be secured and could, in the end, do more than any grand reconstruction scheme.

Next, the topic of conversation switched to a consideration of the role the states of Central Asia could be expected to play. Specifically, the question of the longevity of US involvement in the area was raised as well as a query as to the potential for cooperation with Russia, Turkey or even Iran.

With respect to the role of regional actors in the future of Afghanistan, Lieven advanced the likelihood of tacit spheres of influence developing. Uzbekistan will exert influence over the ethnic Uzbek militia in Mazar-e-Sharif while Russia could expect to have influence in the areas dominated by the Tajik forces of the Northern Alliance, and Iran to dominate the Hazara (Shia) areas.
Relations between Uzbekistan and Russia, and equally importantly between Uzbekistan and its smaller Central Asian neighbors, could be a long-term problem. The Karimov regime clearly has ambitions to play the role of America's "regional policeman" in this region, and such a role has indeed been advocated by certain unwise elements in Washington. The problem is that such Uzbek hegemony would be utterly unwelcome not only to Russia, but to Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan as well, and must therefore be kept firmly in check if regional solidarity behind the US campaign is to be maintained. Uzbekistan's odious human rights record - according to Human Rights watch, it has more political prisoners than the whole of the Soviet Union in the last years of Brezhnev - also makes it a most unappetizing partner.

In bringing the discussion back to its fundamental purpose, Lieven was asked to explain what effect, if any, changing the government in Afghanistan will have on the war on terrorism?

On this point, Lieven offered that a change of government, while helpful, would not guarantee victory in the war on terrorism. The question is, can al-Qaeda continue to find refuge in Afghanistan? Getting rid of the Taliban helps but this will not eliminate the problem. Terrorists do not require a large area from which to operate, and could remain active in Afghanistan despite a change at the top as long as local populations are prepared to provide them with safe havens. Rather, according to Lieven it is the support and active participation of local forces that will be key. It is the Pashtun tribal leaders who will have to be convinced to oust al-Qaeda themselves. Even then, there are other places in the world that these men can hide in. Above all, the US must be careful to do its utmost to make sure that the campaign in Afghanistan does not contribute to the fall of a friendly Muslim state elsewhere - for whatever the outcome of the Afghan War, that would still be a US defeat.

Drawing Lieven back to his original comments, the next question asked him to explain what he had meant when he called the bombing campaign premature. Wouldn't postponing the campaign have made things more difficult?

Lieven clarified that his initial criticism of the campaign had been based on similar remarks he had heard from all anti-Taliban Pashtun leaders he met while in Pakistan - and since as he has argued that Pashtun support for the US campaign is essential, he took their views very seriously. These leaders have said that the bombings have made rallying support against the Taliban among the people of Afghanistan more difficult and, in many cases, have actually increased support for the Taliban. Also, Lieven explained that he was not proposing that there should have been an indefinite postponement of action, simply a longer waiting period, until maybe March.

In the meantime, strikes by Special Forces to try to get the top leadership are necessary, as is air support for the Northern Alliance in taking Mazar-e-Sharif and Herat. It is the urban fixed target bombing that is causing the real problems because of the certainty of civilian casualties. Moreover, these targets aren't even very militarily important and they are most certainly are not the source of Taliban strength. In many cases, we seem to be bombing them for the sake of bombing something.

The final question asked Lieven to switch his attention north and address the position of President Putin of Russia. In response, Lieven observed that it really was not as much of a stretch for Putin to support the West as some have been claiming, given Russia's longstanding hostility to the Taliban and support for the Northern Alliance. What's more, there is a genuine feeling of support for and kinship with the American people in the wake of the September 11th attacks, which Russians can well imagine happening to them. However, there is still a feeling in the Russian elites that in return for this help the West must do much more to integrate Russia and help the Russian economy. This could cause grave disappointment in future if the West pushes ahead with NATO enlargement without creating new security institutions involving Russia, and does not act generously with regard to debt restructuring.

Much bigger problems of course would emerge if the US campaign extended beyond Afghanistan to Iraq or elsewhere. To ensure Russian support for future operations where its interests are not so closely involved as in the struggle against the Taliban, it is extremely important that the new mood in US-Russian relations be anchored in new common institutions, and that the US tendency to play zero-sum games against Russian influence in the former Soviet Union be replaced by a search for genuine co-operation.