How Durable is the New U.S. - Russian Partnership: A Perspective from Moscow

On December 12th, Dmitri Trenin spoke at the Endowment on the nature of the new relationship that has arisen between the U.S. and Russia in the wake of September 11th. Trenin set out to qualify what sort of partnership has been created. The United States and Russia are currently engaged in deep 'geostrategic cooperation' against the Taliban that includes serious intelligence sharing. But beyond this, it is difficult to describe precisely what this new partnership is. There has really been much talk about a new relationship but very little substance to support its existence.

Trenin remains optimistic that current rhetoric could turn into a lasting relationship given the nature of the post-9/11 security environment. In Trenin's words, "September 11th drew a line between the present day and the end of the cold war, making the cold war not simply history, but ancient history." In effect, September 11th provided President Putin with the maneuverability to implement an entirely new foreign policy strategy for Russia that had been germinating for quite some time but would have been otherwise impossible to carry out.

It is still unclear what motivated Putin to throw his support behind the United States. In Trenin's view, the argument that Putin acted out of pure pragmatism is convincing. Putin may simply have calculated that there was no other winning option, no way to keep the US out of Central Asia and thus decided that cooperation would bring the most benefit. In the end, the U.S. has done what Russia itself had already contemplated doing; it had removed the Taliban from Afghanistan and bolstered the position of Russia's client, the Northern Alliance. Now Russia has a buffer zone along its southern frontier. Likewise in Chechnya, it is possible that Putin realized the failure of the military campaign to date and decided that assuming the mantle of world leader in the fight against terrorism could prove expedient.
|
Pragmatism aside, Putin is very serious about Russia's 'European vocation,' Trenin pointed out. If anything, Putin's actions since 9/11 have highlighted his commitment to integrating Russia with Europe and it is likely that this commitment is what has been motivating Putin. Unfortunately, this drive towards integration also brings with it certain risks. In Trenin's words, "Putin is on a very slippery slope," as Russia will have to abandon the last vestiges of its superpower status in favor of regional integration. There is little conceptual backing for this in Russian society and Putin may find himself out on a limb. Currently the structure of the country precludes the development of strong opposition to the President in the near term, but this is no long-term guarantee.

Future Challenges

Irrespective of the character of the new relationship that is forming between the U.S. and Russia, there are some serious challenges the two sides will have to face in the near future. Trenin predicted that Russia will have to deal with three issues: U.S. withdrawal from the ABM treaty, possible U.S action against Iraq and the expansion of NATO to include the three Baltic States.

On the issue of the ABM treaty, it seems likely that the Russians have rightly concluded that abrogation will be solely a unilateral American decision and therefore there is little use in expending resources to counter it. Moreover, it is probable that the Russian government has satisfied itself that whatever system the U.S. attempts to put in place, Russia's strategic forces will not be seriously challenged for at least the next twenty years. U.S. withdrawal from the treaty will likely have little effect on the overall Russian-American relationship. In the end, the proposed warhead cuts will be made and the strategic dialogue will continue.

The issue of U.S. intention towards Iraq hinges on what course of action the U.S. decides to pursue. Should the U.S. limit itself to air strikes, it is probable that Russia would be able to accommodate itself with a minimum of complaint. Should the U.S. decided on ground intervention, then Russian reaction will be much more serious. In the case of such action, Trenin argued that concerted U.S. action would be required to nullify Russian concerns. But, in the end, these concerns are primarily financial. In Trenin's words, "Iraq is not a sentimental issue," but a 'pocket-book' issue. Thus what is at stake in Iraq is not a fundamental conflict of interests, but a question of appropriate financial compensation.

The question of Baltic membership in NATO presents a more philosophical problem. According to Trenin, Baltic membership would be a serious affront to Putin. However, the Russian government has learned from the experience of the first round of NATO expansion that loud and forceful opposition doesn't serve the interests of the country. Thus it is unlikely that even this development would be allowed to derail the favorable progression of U.S.-Russian relations.

From the American perspective, there are quite a number of things that Russia might do to cause friction. Among the issues cited by Trenin was a broadening of Russian military action in the Caucasus that could include incursions by independent-minded Russian generals into parts of Georgia; greater restrictions on the freedom of the Russian media; an attempt by President Putin to extend his stay in power and the destabilizing effects of an economic slowdown produced by falling oil prices. All of these scenarios are possibilities and each would sour relations in their own way, but none are insurmountable. In each case, it would be up to the U.S. to voice its concerns and attempt to steer Russia on a better course while trying to preserve the ground already gained in relations between the two countries.

In summation, Trenin concluded that there is much reason for optimism. President Putin's power stems from his popularity with the people. This popularity is based on a perception of hope about the future, not on the basis of past accomplishments. An economic setback could seriously jeopardize Putin's political security. But even if the situation within Russia should change, hope can be found in the fact that the decisions made by President Putin since September 11th have all been fundamentally in Russia's interests. The commitment of Russia to arms reduction and military reform indicate that it is no longer thinking about global war and the proposed reinvention of NATO-Russian relations stands to fundamentally alter the nature of the Russian armed services for the better. All this indicates that although a rocky road may lie ahead, Russia's interest lies in integration with Europe and this will continue to be the foundation of a new U.S.-Russia relationship.

Question and Answer

The first questioner asked Trenin to describe the foreign policy outlook of the new elites of Russia. Trenin responded by observing that Russia is still a work in progress and that it continues to change constantly. Of all the new elites that have risen over the past ten years, none is probably more western-oriented than the oil concerns. These companies and the people that run them are major supporters of further integration with the West and they are enthusiastic about the possibility of U.S. cooperation in the exploration and development of Caspian Sea basin reserves. In Trenin's view, many of these individuals are fed up with what they see as the excessively cumbersome geostrategic considerations of the political establishment.

Turning to address the impact of possible U.S. victory in Afghanistan, Trenin concluded that the military brass of Russia has probably turned green with envy. The predominant feeling in Russia is that the U.S. has done everything right in its campaign to date and this is not an easy thing for the Russian military establishment to accept. On the one hand, a U.S. victory will alleviate the security concerns emanating from Russia's southern border that had become an increasing source of worry. On the other, the decisiveness of U.S. victory strengthens Putin's hand in pushing through military reform by removing the ability of its opponents to make excuses. Trenin evinced certainty that the lessons of this latest Afghan war would not be lost on Russia.

Responding to concerns that the current rhetoric surrounding the U.S.-Russian partnership resembled that which had been criticized during the Clinton administration, Trenin explained that as of yet partnership is nothing more than a promise and not a reality. There will be setbacks along the way, and a positive outcome is not assured, but Trenin dismissed the fear that the term 'partnership' is being over-used.

Summary prepared by Karlis Kirsis, Junior Fellow, Russia & Eurasia Program.