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Speaker: Emil Pain
Emil Pain is the director of the Center for Ethnopolitical and Regional Studies (INDEM Foundation). He is a leading scholar of ethnic conflicts, nationalism, and ethnonationalism and served as advisor to President Yeltsin on Nationality issues. In 2000, he was the first Galina Staravoiteva Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center.
Pain's presentation covered three topics: the risks for the United States in Afghanistan, how to avoid these risks, and the limitations on the use of force. Pain compared and contrasted the U.S. action in Afghanistan with that of Russia during the two Chechen wars. While there is some overlap between the situations, the U.S. actions in Afghanistan appear to be avoiding many of the pitfalls suffered by Russia in its military intervention in Chechnya.
The first risk for the United States is one Russia has experienced in Chechnya: failing to locate and neutralize terrorist leaders. It is worth remembering that the first phase of both Chechens wars was successful for Russia; it consisted in the first three to four months of the conflict where the primary goal was advancing through enemy lines and establishing a formal zone of control. It was not until after the first phase of occupation ended that the subsequent guerrilla wars began after rebels had regrouped and local opposition coalesced. While the U.S. military force may be ten times better prepared to track down terrorist leaders, the geography of Afghanistan is twenty times larger as well as more difficult to deal with than Chechnya's.
A second risk facing the United States is the danger of mission-creep. For the moment, the U.S. mission appears exclusively anti-terrorist. There is no indication that the U.S. seeks to occupy or annex Afghan territory in the long term nor are there signs that the U.S. is seeking even a permanent presence for its military forces. However, as the first stage of the Afghan conflict concludes, the U.S. may be tempted to expand the functions of its forces or take on additional tasks. Given the desire to establish a pro-U.S. administration in Afghanistan, the U.S. may well be tempted to take on less overt military tasks
To avoid these risks, Pain posited that four principles should be followed: (1) refrain from any intervention unless there is a high degree of confidence that the operation can be concluded in under one year; (2) refrain from the use of force if the cost of failure is greater than the cost of inaction; (3) Intervention is not justified to simply punish or teach a lesson to terrorists; and, (4) regime building should not be mixed with anti-terrorist operations.
In Russia's case it has failed in observing all four of these principles: it has been bogged down in Chechnya for years; its failure to crush Chechen rebels has encouraged other regions to think that they might secede and get away with it; and, Russia has increasingly had to take on regime building functions.
Pain also made the point that the type of terrorism the U.S. was fighting against was what he termed 'inner-directed'. Its object is consolidating its own forces by provoking a chain reaction of retaliation. Interestingly, terrorists most likely see the Israeli actions against PLO Chairman Arafat and the U.S. actions in Afghanistan as being linked. Both could serve to unite Islamic radicals.
The discussion then turned to the situation in Chechnya and possible analogies between the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Pain believes that Maskhadov wants to play the role of the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan. He wants the international respect and legitimacy that such a role would provide him. Several discussion participants pointed out that unlike the Northern Alliance, Maskhadov has not openly condemned Chechen terrorists like Khattab and Shamil Basaev. There was debate as to whether such a stance by Maskhadov could help his image in the United States. Pain believes that it is tactically impossible for Maskhadov to condemn Khattab and Basaev given the current situation, but points to Maskhadov's many statements condemning Wahhabism and terrorism more generally.
Next the discussion focused on what is the least Maskhadov could accept from the Russians and what is the most the Russians are prepared to offer him. The point of the question was to determine if there was any chance of negotiations leading to an end in the conflict. In general, Pain believes the recent negotiations between emissaries of Maskhadov and General Kazantzev are not serious and just a form of public relations by Russia to appease the Europeans and others who oppose the war. When pressed Pain stated that Maskhadov could being given de facto control over the Chechen territory with a provision that Russian military could operate in Grozny, protect pipelines, and have transit rights through the country. Unfortunately, no official in Russia is willing to deal with any Chechens seriously, and there is not much pressure on Putin for peace.
In essence, Pain does not believe peace is possible during the short-term. However, there are steps that Russia could take in the short-term to make peace possible in the long-term. First, Russia needs to identify a person or group with which it can do business; Kadyrov was the wrong choice. Second, Putin or those who desire peace could work on changing the opinions of the elite to be more open towards a negotiated solution. When asked what role American policy could play in assisting Russia, Pain said that the U.S. should not allow the Russians to deceive themselves into thinking that the U.S. action in Afghanistan legitimized their own actions in Chechnya.
Summary by Marc Fellman, Program Associate with the Russia & Eurasia Program.