Afghanistan and Beyond: The Challenges of Reconstruction

Speakers:

Marina Ottaway, senior associate and co-director of the Carnegie Endowment's Democracy and Rule of Law Project, is the coeditor of Funding Virtue: Civil Society Aid and Democracy Promotion (Carnegie Endowment, 2000).

Martha Brill Olcott, senior associate in the Endowment's Russian and Eurasian Program, is a specialist on Central Asian and Caspian affairs. She is the author of Kazakhstan: Unfulfilled Promise (Carnegie Endowment, February 2002).

Commentator:

Paula Newberg, Special Advisor to the United Nations Foundation, presently working with a special representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in Kabul.

Moderator:

Thomas Carothers, Carnegie Endowment vice president for studies and a noted democracy expert.

Ms. Ottaway's Presentation

In the wake of the Taliban's defeat, the installation of an interim government, and the de-escalation of violence in the country, the international community must now agree on what it hopes a post-Taliban, post-al-Qaeda Afghanistan will resemble. At the most basic level, the international community must make a choice between two competing images for Afghanistan-that of a vibrant, stable, and cohesive democratic state, or a more realistic one of a country that does not meet Western standards, but is markedly less dangerous and more hospitable for economic development than currently.

The choice is not a new one for the international community. When faced with previous predicaments elsewhere, the international community has consistently chosen the former option, and with largely disappointing results. This "democratic reconstruction model" is dangerous, in that it infuses high expectations onto difficult situations without providing commensurate resources for meeting such lofty goals.

The model emerging for Afghanistan is problematic. International plans are clearly well-intentioned: a loya jirga in six months followed by elections two years later; a concerted effort towards a seamless sequence of relief, rehabilitation, and reconstruction programs; and improvement of governmental capacity through construction of central, provincial, and local institutions.

However, such a model ignores the existing power structure in Afghanistan, where warlords, emboldened by their routing of Taliban and al-Qaeda fighters, are now significantly more powerful vis-à-vis the interim government, which draws its legitimacy almost exclusively from the international community. The existence of a highly decentralized, quasi-medieval system necessitates that the international community embrace the second, more realistic path to reconstruction in Afghanistan.

This reality requires that the international community embrace the following strategies:

1) Abandon the unrealistic idea of building a strong central government. Instead, define the minimal tasks that must be performed by the central government and accept that warlords and tribal leaders will control the rest. Provide an international presence to ensure Kabul's status as an open city.

2) Work with warlords, despite their odious nature, in a pragmatic way that acknowledges their firm entrenchment in the Afghan power structure. Formal structures to maintain liaisons between warlords and donors will be necessary to ensure, for example, that aid is adequately distributed in areas where the interim government lacks enforcement authority.

The situation in Afghanistan highlights a new reality that the international community will likely face with increasing frequency-working with non-government entities. If the war on terrorism is extended to other countries, including Somalia, that challenge will arise again.

Ms. Olcott's Presentation

Although challenges facing the Central Asian republics are certainly not completely exogenous in origin, the situation in Afghanistan has clearly exacerbated problems such as Islamic fundamentalism, economic stagnation, and drug trafficking. A lengthy reconstruction effort in Afghanistan, if undertaken without due consideration of realities in nearby states, could have negative effects on stability, security, and prosperity in the region.

The collapse of the Taliban has ameliorated some risks in Central Asia. Notably, funding for radical Islamic groups in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan has markedly decreased in recent months. Still, the campaign against the Taliban and al-Qaeda has exacerbated other problems in the region. For example, the interim Afghan authority lacks a capacity in counter-narcotic operations; the likely explosion in drug production and trafficking will certainly benefit radical Islamists and criminal elements. Additionally, while coalition actions have stanched the flow of funding to Islamic fundamentalists for the time being, the radicals themselves and their supporters still exist, and with time the latter will find new ways to aid the former. Finally, many governments in Central Asia are fearful that the success of Afghan warlords will empower similar anti-state elements in their respective countries.

In order to prevent such negative consequences in the region, the international community must act quickly and pledge substantial amounts of assistance to the following:

1) Drug control-Counter-narcotics operations must be a primary task in the reconstruction effort in order to insure security in the region. The relative success of Tajikistan's new counter-narcotics program demonstrates that international assistance can create results, but donor support must be sustained for such endeavors to be truly effective. Although demand-side strategies will likely not end the problem, crop substitution programs and other economic incentives could gradually decrease the region's drug problem.

2) Border controls-The region is in dire need of standard customs control systems, training, and improved technology to facilitate increased trade and reduce illegal trafficking.

3) Support for macroeconomic reforms-Regional crises are encouraging several states to strengthen their commitment to structural economic reforms, including Uzbekistan. However, such reforms will be painful, and the international community must be willing to supply adequate funds to alleviate shortfalls. Additionally, the opening of Afghan borders will facilitate trade and growth in the region.

4) Improved transportation infrastructure- Reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan create new incentives for planned improvements on the Europe to China transit corridor through the region as well as a renewed opportunity for a southern spur of this network through Turkmenistan to Afghanistan and then on to Pakistan and India.

5) Outsourcing jobs-The reconstruction of Afghanistan could create tremendous opportunities for employment in neighboring states and increased regional interaction. Instead of contracting relief and reconstruction services to European or American firms, the international community should allow Central Asian businesses to play a significant role in efforts.

If the international community ignores Central Asian republics as it pours billions of dollars into Afghan reconstruction, it not only runs the risk of increasing regional woes, but also of setting the dangerous precedent that only countries devastated by the bombs of the international community are eligible for major funds. A relatively small investment in Central Asia will yield disproportionately high benefits.

Ms. Newberg's Commentary

Ms. Ottaway's presentation and her piece with Anatol Lieven ("Rebuilding Afghanistan: Fantasy versus Reality," Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief No. 12, January 2002) make flawed assumptions about Afghans' loyalties and dangerously underestimate the potential for a centralized, cohesive Afghan state and nation to develop.

Conflict and instability, largely caused by the machinations of outside actors, such as Russia, Britain, and the United States, have at times caused Afghans to revert to primordial associations, such as clans, tribes, and ethnic groups. However, the characterization of Afghanistan as pre-modern and hopelessly fragmented is revisionist and ignores historical examples of a functioning state with strong citizen loyalties. Afghan identities are remarkably fluid, and any analysis that categorically assumes that Afghans will never pledge overriding allegiance to an Afghan state is flawed.

Ms. Ottaway also overestimates the power of the warlords. Such men have abysmally low popular support and are far from emboldened by the Taliban defeat, as Ms. Ottaway suggests; instead, they realize that they are the tremendously lucky beneficiaries of U.S. bombs.

Finally, the reconstruction plan suggested by Ms. Ottaway not only limits the possibility of a centralized Afghan state, but it also limits the possibility of a strong Afghan democracy. Afghans should not have to suffer for the mistakes of Kosovo, Somalia, and Bosnia, as the international community should not let failures in other areas lessen its resolve to create a vibrant democracy in Afghanistan.

While Ms. Ottaway's proposal is largely limited to providing emergency assistance to Afghans, such aid would only be the first step in a less limited-and therefore superior-model. The international community needs to encourage the creation of structures that allow for Afghan self-determination and a central state with fiscal, administrative, and political capacities. This state should expand its authority throughout the country and, in the process, absorb the power of the operating warlords. Finally, the international community cannot tolerate corruption, concessions to warlords, or sacrifice of any Afghan aspirations to democracy; Ms. Ottaway's analysis is guilty of all three.

A structure that favored warlords vis-à-vis a centralized state would undercut the proposals made in Ms. Olcott's presentation and piece ("Preventing New Afghanistans: A Regional Strategy for Reconstruction," Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief No.11, January 2002), since endeavors such as counter-narcotics, open trade, and regional stability would be jeopardized sans a viable Afghan state authority.

Discussion

Ms. Ottaway responded that, although a vibrant, democratic Afghan state is of course desirable, Ms. Newberg's vision is flawed for four primary reasons:

1) It would require an international force to occupy Afghanistan to allow a central authority to exert control and build capacity. International support for such a force is extremely limited.

2) It lacks any incentives for warlords to cede power. Any disarmament of non-state actors would require a UN effort, and such an undertaking has rarely, if ever, succeeded.

3) It assumes a much larger donor commitment than is likely.

4) It ignores the experiences of Bosnia and Kosovo, which show the international community's limited capacity to build democratic states.

Several participants and Ms. Newberg contended that Afghan warlords will be much less troublesome than Ms. Ottaway asserts, mainly because they lack support among the populace. Ms. Ottaway countered that the interim prime minister, Hamid Karzai, clearly disagrees and shows it by negotiating deals with warlords.

Summary prepared by Jeffrey Krutz, Junior Fellow with the Democracy and Rule of Law Project at the Carnegie Endowment.