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Russia's Higher Police: Continuity of the Russian Intelligence Elite

Tue. January 29th, 2002

As Russian President Vladimir Putin consolidated his grip on the Kremlin, his increasing reliance on members of the Russian state intelligence services to fill key posts became striking. Former intelligence officials have extended their reach into the political world on both federal and regional levels. The consequences of this are as yet unclear, but this is by no means a historically unique phenomenon in Russia. In order to provide some insight into the motivations and self-conceptions of the intelligence elite, Clifford Gaddy, Fellow at the Brookings Institution, spoke with a small group at the Endowment on the history of the intelligence services in Russia and the lessons these new leaders of Russia have drawn. His presentation was drawn from research that he has engaged in jointly with Laurent Murawiec of the Rand Corporation.

This newly minted intelligence cum political elite has emphasized pragmatism, efficiency and realism, as opposed to the hallmarks of Communist rule - cumbersome ideology, heavy-handed repression and inefficient fumbling. Putin and his fellow Chekists have cast themselves as uncorrupted servants of the Russian State. According to Gaddy, this stems from this group's perception of themselves as an "Enlightened KGB," or "higher police" whose history stretches back to a nearly two centuries' old tradition rooted in pre-Revolutionary Russia. In effect, this group has created a selective interpretation of their history, a myth, to bolster their claim as 'true' servants of the Russian state.

The genesis of the myth of the "Enlightened KGB" can be found in the aftermath of the Decembrist Revolution, when elites in the nobility established for the Tsar what they called the "Higher Police." This was the "Third Section of His Imperial Majesty's Chancellery," created in the 1820s under the direction of General Count Benckendorf. The heart of the 'Third Section' was devoted to sociological research and analysis. In the Third Section, the best and the brightest of the nobility were tasked with studying the state of the country in the service of Russia and Tsar. In Gaddy's words, the aim of this "Higher Police" was nothing less than "social engineering" on a grand scale.

It was not long, however, before this "Higher Police" moved beyond simple research towards more proactive means of influencing the development of Russian society. In the early 1880s, a new secret police, the Okhrana, was established under the leadership of General Prince Loris-Melikov combining a repressive apparatus with the existing research-manipulation arm. Its Special Section, what Gaddy and Murawiec have coined the "Lower Police," created and controlled the entire Russian trade-union movement, and a large degree of influence over all left-wing and revolutionary organizations, including the Bolshevik Party. In Gaddy's view, the subsequent history of the Russian intelligence service is marked by an oscillation between 'Higher Police' and 'Lower Police', in which one function may be emphasized over the other, but each remains fundamentally inseparable from the other.

In the selective interpretation of history favored by the "Enlightened KGB" of Putin's government, the role and primacy of the "Higher Police" has been emphasized while the function of the "Lower Police" has been all but disavowed. Focus has been placed on building a perception of continuity with the traditions established under Benckendorf. To this end, the once demonic figure of Lavrenti Beria has been rehabilitated and history rewritten to cast him as a pragmatist who worked for the good of the Russian state. In revisionism, Beria has emerged as a champion of Russian science, the father of the country's space and nuclear programs and a gifted policy analyst who, in Stalin's dying years, established a string of think-tanks to devise new policies characterized by efficiency rather than brute force. The work then accomplished by these institutes was used directly to inspire some of Khrushchev's policies of "thaw," the very partial economic decentralization of Kosygin, but especially the perestroika sponsored by Andropov and continued by Gorbachev.

In Gaddy's opinion, this revised history is the key to understanding what motivates the former intelligence officials now in government. As Nikolai Leonov, former deputy head of the 1st directorate, has observed, the reason there are so many FSB agents in government is that history has recruited them for a special mission: to serve and restore the Russian state. Above all, an officer of the intelligence service is a servant of the state, who relies on intelligence and strength of will to achieve his goal, the glory of Russia. The "Enlightened KGB" of today consciously models itself upon this tradition. It conceives of itself as the great manipulator, comprised of the best and the brightest who alone know where and how to steer Russia back to "greatness." However, being only an elite, they have to partner with another force in order to reach the masses. That other force, present within Russian society, the body politic, and the secret police, continues to believe that repression and control are the proper means of rule in Russia. Gaddy observed that over the past decade, in the eyes of the Higher Police, democrats, former Communists, and oligarchs have all had their chance to govern the country and have failed. The Higher Police feel now that history has called them to take the reigns of power in the country. The key question is whether the Higher Police can succeed in establishing order and growth in the country and with what tools they will attempt to do so. If historical precedent is any model, the rise of the secret police to power in Russia should be a cause for concern; in the past two centuries of Russian history, they have yet to prove themselves able wielders of power. As was pointed out in the ensuing discussion, such social engineering never works, and the idealistic revisionism of the FSB may simply be the veneer by which a new corrupt elite uses power for its own enrichment. If this is the case, then their rise to power will mean little more than a continuation of the status quo, albeit with more repression and stagnation.

Summary by Karlis Kirsis, Russian & Eurasian Program.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.