Putin's Support: A Mile Wide, But How Deep?

On November 20, 2002, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a presentation entitled "Putin's Support: A Mile Wide but How Deep?" by Professor Richard Rose, Director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde. Rose presented some of the findings included in his most recent book, Elections without Order: Russia's Challenge to Vladimir Putin, which he co-authored with Neil Munro. Rose also discussed the results of public opinion surveys conducted in Russia by the Centre for the Study of Public Policy and the Russian Center for Public Opinion and Market Research (VCIOM), which are available on-line at http://www.russiavotes.org/. Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment, chaired the presentation, which was followed by a question and answer session.

Putin's Popularity, and the Political Climate of Russia
Rose opened the meeting by noting that opinion polls conducted in Russia elucidate three particularly interesting aspects of the "Putin phenomenon." First, support for Putin has proven consistently high. The percentage of Russians approving of their president's performance has barely contracted since Putin came to office with a 79% positive rating. Indeed, VCIOM's most recent poll, conducted during the weekend that the Moscow hostage crisis came to a controversial end, found Putin's approval rating to be an astronomical 77%. Second, contrary to the expectations of many commentators, these numbers have not proven "too good to last," and Putin's approval rating has remained stable throughout his presidency. Strangely, Putin's popularity has not served as a "coattail" for Duma or government officials, however; the approval ratings for the Russian government spiked at only 45% last month, while the all-time high rating for the Duma is lower still, at 27%.

Predictably, the majority of the Russian populace would vote for Putin if the election were held in the next week. Surprising, however, is the fact that in spite of the Communist Party's drooping popularity in recent years, a communist candidate might manage to garner as much as one quarter of the vote in the next presidential election. Rose argued that the ideal Putin opponent would be a politician like Yevgeny Primakov, for instance-someone who is not a hard-liner, does not subscribe to Gaidarian economic principles, and is not tainted by Chubais's money, yet still has the resources to support an expensive campaign.

Where is the Russian Electorate?
Rose's data reveals that a plurality of Russians hold no strong allegiance to formal parties, or even to particular ideologies. One-fifth identify themselves as communist sympathizers; 18% as democrats; 2% as patriots; and 7% say they support whatever party is in power. By contrast, 40% of Russians see themselves as belonging to none of these categories, and another 10% aren't sure how they would characterize themselves. Rose pointed out that fully half of those who admit to having a strong ideological preference do not identify themselves with an organized party. He also mentioned that even among those who support "the party in power," there is considerable confusion about what that phrase means. Half of those surveyed could not identify the party that controls the Kremlin. This testifies both to the extent to which Putin's personal popularity is independent of his party affiliation, and to the fact that the "inside the Beltway" maneuvering that resulted in the formation of the "Unity" bloc is neither transparent nor relevant to most Russians.

Psychological Transformation and Economic Reform
Faced with immense political, social, and economic changes in the last decade, Russians have had little choice but to adapt to the new conditions. It is true that considerable nostalgia for the old regime remains, but overall, Rose's data indicates that the majority of Russian citizens have completed, or are in the process of completing, a psychological transformation. Last month, 51% of those surveyed responded that they and their family had already adapted to recent changes, up from 32% in July 1999. Another 18% indicated that they will be able to adapt fully in the "near future." Only 27%-down from 45% in 1999-believe that they will never be able to adapt. As Russians increasingly feel that they can keep up with the changes happening around them, the number describing their material condition as good or passable has also risen in the past several years, from 45% in July 1998 to 60% in September 2002. The percentage that considers its economic situation "bad" or "very bad" has fallen precipitously, from 54% in 1998 to 38% today. Rose argued that these numbers show that most Russians are now integrated in the twenty-first century world, adding that few Russians are truly destitute. One-third of Russian citizens now own video recorders, and 10% regularly surf the Internet. Nearly 90% of Russians have at least heard of the Internet, which Rose considers an unequivocal sign of material, psychological, and intellectual progress.

Chechnya
Public opinion polls continue to show that the Russian populace is deeply split over the war with Chechnya. Though only 15% blame the Russian government for the recent hostage crisis (compared to 45% who blame Chechen terrorists), Rose was struck that over one-third of Russians accuse the FSB, which they believe has shirked its duties, of bearing the primary responsibility for the incident. Nearly one-fifth of Russians have had a friend or family member serve in Chechnya, and as a result, the preponderance of public opinion supports extricating Russia from the Chechen quagmire, even if it requires accepting losses. Less than one-third of Russians believe that the conflict will be settled on terms favorable to Russia; 14% believe it will ultimately result in "enormous losses on both sides," while 37% fear that the war "will spread to other parts of the North Caucasus." In August 2002, 47% of those surveyed believed that the war would last for at least another five years, and Rose speculated that public opinion has become more pessimistic still in the wake of the hostage crisis. At the same time, however, Rose noted that the general expectation remains that Russia should stay involved in Chechnya, and he deemed the protracted conflict "a condition, not a war."

The State of Russian Society
Rose argued that most Russians, tired of the many upheavals which they have experienced, now desperately want to live in a "normal" society-a condition which 93% of those surveyed feel that their country has not yet achieved. Americans typically see historical legacies as encouraging or hindering the attainment of social normalcy, Rose pointed out. Russians, by contrast, see their present problems as the chief barriers preventing the improvement of their society. When asked to name the two biggest obstacles to Russia becoming a more normal society, 66% identify Russia's weak rule of law and government corruption, while half blame low wages and unemployment. Surprisingly, only 15% blame the transition to a market economy. Rose asserted that these data indicate that Putin need not look far afield when planning reform; rather than focusing on the grandiose task of transforming society, he should strive to improve the functioning and increase the transparency of his own government.

Prognosis for the Future
One of the most striking findings of public opinion surveys, mentioned Rose, is the Russian public's patience. Only 11% of respondents doubt that recent hardships will ever give way to positive results. Seven percent expect to see improvements in the next five years, 19% in the next ten years, and 63% "eventually"-later still, that is. The long-term vision of Russians is a stark contrast to the myopic political scene of America and Western Europe, where politicians think in units of months, not years, and where citizens expect instant results. Another heartening sign is the overwhelming support of young Russians for free-market principles. Two-thirds of young respondents favor a market system over state controls, compared to only 23% of those over 55.

Bringing the discussion back to where he began it-Putin's popularity-Rose argued that the president has already taken important steps toward establishing a more normal society. Like a western politician, Putin has managed to energize a broad support base, even if the diverse nature of his champions precludes profiling a paradigmatic Putin supporter. Russians' low expectations for their leaders' performance has endowed Putin with considerable power, for even barely passable performance distinguishes him from Yeltsin in the minds of many Russians. Rose fears, however, that low expectations might embroil Putin in a "low-level equilibrium trap," dissuading him from making potentially positive-but potentially risky-reforms. In this case, Russians' patience, on which their hopes for the future rely, might prove dangerous; if they are too accepting of a slow pace of reform, the impetus for change might disappear altogether.

Question and Answer Session
In response to a question about whether recent improvements in the economy have translated into increased support for Putin, Rose responded that Putin's approval ratings have remained stable and thus seem to demonstrate little dependence on the health of the economy. Putin's numbers started off high in 1999, for instance-even as the economy continued to struggle in the wake of the 1998 financial crisis-primarily because Putin was seen as an "anti-Yeltsin." Even if the economy experiences a crisis, Rose expects that Putin will remain a popular leader, not least because challenging a sitting president in Russia entails overcoming substantial bureaucratic and financial barriers. Pressed to elaborate on the basis of Putin's popularity later in the session, Rose also argued that future attacks by Chechens would have little impact on the president's approval ratings. In general, the factors underpinning Putin's popularity seem not to be political. Concomitant with the increase in Putin's support, Russians have become older, poorer, less educated and more "proud to be Russian;" now, they place more trust the FSB, want to see Russia regain its prestige, rely on state television for their news, and support stability above all else. Barring a major disaster, it is likely that the growing number of voters with these characteristics will propel Putin to an easy victory in the next round of presidential elections.

Another attendee wondered whether Rose had detailed demographic information on the 40% of Russians who choose not to align themselves with any particular ideology, and if he believes that they might be mobilized to support a candidate who is interested in building a strong party. Rose replied that he does not have a demographic profile of this group, and therefore could not make an accurate prognosis regarding its role in future elections. The Chair asked Rose whether he had data dating back to 1991, which might elucidate the impact of Putin's presidency on Russian public opinion. Rose did not have these figures immediately available, but speculated that the Putin years will be remembered as an era of "settling down," when Russia attempted to return to some type of normalcy.

The session closed with a debate about the depth and breadth of Putin's popularity. Despite his high approval rating, Rose argued that Putin's support base is weaker than it may appear, pointing out that the "broad and consensual" constituency that Putin has cultivated is composed of disparate groups. Major policy changes-and even Russian support for U.S. action against Iraq-could undermine Putin's power base. When questioned about this assertion by meeting attendees, who pointed out that Rose's presentation seemed to demonstrate how effectively Putin had managed to build a coalition of diverse supporters, Rose acknowledged that for now, at least, Putin is all but assured "broad and stable support." However, he warned that it is important to remember that Putin's champions form a coalition-and that coalitions can disintegrate with astonishing speed.

Summary prepared by Faith Hillis, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment.