Russian Federal Reform: Implications for Security, Civilians and the State.

Anatomy of the Reforms
Two and a half years after Putin initiated his ambitious program of federal reforms, it remains difficult to understand what the reforms have meant for Russia. In one of the first serious moves of his presidency, Putin created an intermediary step between the federal government and regions-districts. The new district bureaucracies are overseen by Presidential Envoys-many of whom have been pulled from the ranks of the military or FSB-who report to the Security Council. Fifty to sixty federal agencies have now established offices in the districts, including almost all of the "power ministries," with the notable exception of the FSB. A stream of senior officials have poured out of Moscow to oversee the reforms, resulting in a reversal of the typical patterns of bureaucratic promotion: whereas federal servitors once moved in to Moscow as they advanced up the ranks, they are now moving out of the capital en masse.

The atmosphere of secrecy surrounding the inner workings of the new federal system complicates ascertaining how affairs are conducted on the district level. Although federal envoys to the districts report to the central Security Council twice a year, their briefings are not made public. Even the FSB generals who oversee the Moscow and St. Petersburg districts-the political, journalistic, and intellectual centers of Russia-have prevented their staffs from speaking openly about their duties. Not all federal representatives in the districts are so guarded, however. The Presidential Envoy in the Urals district, Pyotr Latyshev, has assumed a particularly prominent role, publicly sparring with Sverdlovsk oblast governor Eduard Rossel. A civilian Envoy, Sergei Kirienko of the Privolzhskii district, has cast himself as a proponent of western-style transparency, initiating open hiring procedures and innovative social projects. For the most part, though, Presidential Envoys have taken a low profile, and many, like Far East Envoy Konstantin Pulikovskii, have in fact proven quite ineffective. The Kremlin's frustration with the inefficiency endemic to provincial bureaucracies has led to numerous personnel shake-ups at levels below that of the Presidential Envoys; almost half of Chief Federal Inspectors, who are charged with overseeing federal reform at the regional level, have been replaced in the last two years. Putin has largely overlooked the lack of efficacy on the part of Presidential Envoys, however, leading Petrov to believe that their role as cogs in the state-run public relations machine takes precedence to their role as potential policy makers.

Functions of the Reforms
Many Russia-watchers have argued that Putin implemented the reforms with four major goals in mind. First, he sought to bring regional legislatures in line with federal legislatures. Putin hoped to eliminate contradictions between the Russian constitution and those of the Republics of Tatarstan, Tuva, and Bashkortostan, for example. (The last of these contained forty-two separate contradictions to the Russian constitution.) Petrov argued that Putin's solution to this problem was non-sensical, however, as this task could have been accomplished with greater efficacy from the Moscow prosecutor generals' office. It was also somewhat redundant, considering that when faced with federal-regional conflicts, federal courts invariably side with Moscow. Finally, Petrov pointed out, the creation of federal districts did little to solve the original problem; the new Bashkortostan constitution, rewritten under federal pressure, now contains fifty-five contradictions with the Russian federation's constitution-thirteen more than before the reform. Furthermore, each district was directed to deal with similar contradictions separately, meaning that hundreds of municipalities are now struggling to amend thousands of clauses in their charters that conflict with federal law.

The second aim of the reform was to coordinate the efforts of federal agencies and provide overarching guidelines for personnel management. Representatives of major federal agencies at the district level have recently been absorbed by kollegiia, which are charged with these two tasks. Petrov noted that it is difficult to say whether this innovation amounts to centralization-reclaiming functions from regional leaders-or decentralization-stripping functions from the center. The relationship between Moscow and regional leaders has long been marred by competition, but the empowerment of regional agency chiefs has created discord even between the center and its regional representatives.

Thirdly, Putin saw in the reforms the opportunity to reorganize the powers allotted to federal, regional, and local authorities in a more systematic manner. Over the 1990s, regional leaders had capitalized on the weakness of the central government, usurping many of the federal government's functions, including the ability to appoint the regional heads of power ministries. A 1996 change in election laws-which mandated that regional governors be elected rather than appointed-further reduced Moscow's control over the regions. Putin's reforms have strengthened the center's powers in both of these respects; presidential envoys now oversee personnel appointments, and Chief Federal Inspectors represent Moscow in the provinces. Finally, Putin hoped the reforms would help to attract investments and jump-start the development of small- and medium-sized enterprises beyond Moscow and St. Petersburg. Anti-corruption campaigns and foreign presentations about the investment climate in Russia have already been organized on the federal district level.

What is most striking about these goals is that all of them could have been accomplished without the creation of federal districts, leading Petrov to believe that these four tasks were not the only force driving the reforms. Many have argued that the real aim of Putin's federal reform project was to establish an infrastructure in the provinces that could take marching orders from Moscow. This "construction" project is nearing completion, and an extensive bureaucratic infrastructure controlled by Moscow is now well-established in the provinces. Since learning more about the inner workings of the power ministries and the connection between military-administrative and federal reform, however, Petrov now believes that the primary aim of the reforms was to reestablish presidential control over the power ministries, both in the regions and in Moscow. Indeed, the district-level appendages of ministries have become veritable FSB branches, controlled and operated by those whose loyalty to Putin is beyond doubt. The same concern for loyalty and manageability motivated Putin's attempt to centralize the armed forces-previously split between fourteen different agencies-under a single loyal authority. Likewise, he has recently streamlined the police command, charging the municipal police with local, ordinary crimes; the criminal police with federal crimes; and the federal guard with the protection of the new federal districts.

Assessing the Reforms
Although the reforms got off to a slow start, Petrov argued that they have melded into the political system at the district and regional level. The changes have allowed the center to regain control of personnel oversight and training in the regions. The reforms have also served as a "universal matrix" for the reorganization of federal agencies; Putin loyalists now dominate high-ranking positions in the civilian and military bureaucracies. Petrov likened the reforms to "bypass surgery," arguing that they will not resolve systemic problems in Russia's command and control apparatus and will not eliminate the corruption that has become endemic to the bureaucracy. They are useful to Putin, however, as a "political instrument" to extend his control of the policy agenda beyond Moscow. According to the maxims of "bureaucratic logic," the very existence of federal districts-and the new policies associated with them-endows Putin's project with substantial inertia. Considering how quickly the changes melded into the Russian political system, Petrov expects that the new system will remain intact for many years.

Recent Events
The future of the reforms is still far from pre-determined, however, and it remains to be seen how an important recent development will affect Russia's state and society. In an attempt to streamline the "vertical of power," Putin has implemented obshchestvennye priemy-or, public reception rooms-on the district and regional level. Modeled after KGB reception rooms, this initiative is designed to coordinate communications between localities and Moscow; the regional deputies appointed to head them are the subordinates of Chief Federal Inspectors. The rooms also serve a more populist and civilian-oriented function, gathering feedback from local citizens about their communities and informing the public about what is happening at the center. Over six hundred rooms-with a capacity to employ a total of 20,000 people-are already operational, and the planned expansion of the program to the municipal level will entail the creation of 3000 more rooms. Yet the mission and internal workings of the rooms remains unclear: a conference to determine what role that they should play was cancelled due to the October hostage crisis in Moscow.

It is also interesting to note that many of the rooms are financed by local business elites. Eager to invest in Putin's "vertical of power," they have created an obvious conflict of interest in supporting these public institutions. Additionally, reports from St. Petersburg indicate that the Kremlin used the reception rooms-which opened on the eve of local elections-to attempt to sway the electoral process in favor of the candidates it endorses. Petrov believes that the merging of the multiple goals and tactics present in the reception rooms lays bare Putin's "mega-project"-achieving control over every level of government and society in the "vertical of power." In aiming for ultimate manageability of the federal apparatus, Putin has created a military-like order in the bureaucracy and an increasingly functional "state machine." The primary question now is in which direction that machine will run-and whether it will plow over Russian society en route to its final destination.

Question and Answer Session
The first question to Petrov addressed to what extent the FSB has worked to infiltrate the "vertical of power" in order to gain control of other federal agencies. Petrov responded that there is no smoking gun to implicate the FSB in an organized plot, although Moscow has clearly relied on military and semi-military structures to restore its control over Russia's regions. The FSB's preeminence at the district level may indeed be a conscious effort to realize Halford Mackinder's precept that he who controls the heartland controls the world. But Petrov indicated that a composite response to this question might ultimately be the most judicious: even if the FSB does not consciously intend to turn Russia into a "semi-police state," its infiltration of regional and district power structures may nevertheless have that effect. In response to a query about how much power had actually shifted hands since the reforms, Petrov reiterated that Putin's policies have led to substantial personnel turnover at the local and regional level. The FSB and Putin loyalists have benefited from new patterns of appointments, but Petrov suggested that the Kremlin itself had profited the most, because the reforms have allowed it to undermine (and in some cases, purge) its most formidable regional opponents. Pressed further about how much control presidential envoys and district officials actually exercise over localities, Petrov insisted that Putin's appointees at the district level enjoy considerable power. This is particularly true within the military, which now vests substantial power in representatives appointed by the center.

In response to a question about how federal reform has affected the state budget, Petrov indicated that the changes have resulted in a huge windfall for the center. Although tax codes specify that taxes should be distributed equally between Moscow and the provinces, the Kremlin now claims about 63% of the funds collected. The reforms have also allowed the presidential administration to gain more control over regional expenditures; money apportioned for salaries at the regional level, for instance, cannot be spent for any other purpose. Another meeting attendee wondered how the creation of public reception rooms in particular-had affected Putin's anti-corruption campaign, and the state of Russian civil society. Despite Putin's lofty rhetoric, Petrov charges that the federal government-perhaps the most corrupt institution in Russia-has done little to eradicate corruption in its own ranks. When anti-corruption campaigns are launched in the regions and districts, he added, they are often used merely to "provide trump cards in a blackmail game between the center and regional bosses"-or, in effect, to monopolize corruption. With regard to civil society, Petrov mentioned that several new reports highlight the relatively dense concentration of voluntary associations in certain regions of Russia. These figures are misleading, though, because they obscure the subservience of these organizations to the state; come election time, he noted, it is often difficult to find groups not supporting candidates favored by the Kremlin. Like Grazhdanskii Forum, the Kremlin-created group designed to encourage civil society development in Russia, public reception rooms will only subject society to increased government supervision, and thus, weaken it.

Frustrated with the seemingly unremitting cycle of reform and reaction in Russia, another meeting participant wondered about the prospects of Russia ever developing a "normal" society. Petrov responded that it is indeed true that Russian liberals tend to think differently than western liberals, and can simultaneously support totalitarian political styles-which they view as a way of ensuring manageability-and economic and political reform. Petrov ended on a positive note, however, pointing out that Putin's reforms are part of a broader evolutionary process of the post-Soviet state. Although Putin has depicted himself as the successor of the revolutionary Peter I, he may bear more resemblance to Paul I, who worked more slowly to overturn the reforms of his predecessor, Catherine II. Putin's attempt to slowly dismantle Yeltsin's heritage with the federal reforms may not be "the best achievement of democracy in the world." Despite the menacing features of the new federal reforms, though, Putin may have grasped a crucial point: in Russian history, revolutionary change has more often proven a disaster than a remedy.

Summary prepared by Faith Hillis, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment.