event

Russian Foreign Policy and Domestic Challenges

Tue. February 25th, 2003
Washington, D.C.

IMGXYZ287IMGZYXMr. Margelov's presentation focused on Russian foreign policy with regards to the 'Axis of Evil' and the future of Iraq. First, Margelov cautioned against grouping North Korea, Iran, and Iraq under the common name, 'Axis of Evil,' for fear that such a label would effectively unite these states formally in their opposition to the West and America in particular. Russia would prefer to deal with these dictatorships through active engagement, by talking to them and attempting to integrate them into the world economy, which will in turn promote greater regime transparency. As Margelov emphasized several times during his remarks, Russia and the United States share common goals in their respective foreign policies, but currently see different paths towards the achievement of these goals.

On Iraq, Margelov emphasized that his country has no love of Saddam Hussein or desire to see his career extended. Unilateral action against Iraq, however, would engender resentment in the Muslim world and would be perceived as imperial aggression by the Muslim people. Margelov alluded to the Chicago mobster Al Capone to demonstrate his point, noting that while you can reach better results with good words and a revolver than with good words alone, you can't reach the best results with the revolver alone. Unilateral military action in Iraq would damage the best interests of both Russia and the United States.

Yet assuming that some sort of war in Iraq would occur, under whatever auspices, Margelov laid out Russia's foreign policy objectives for the reconstruction of Iraq. First and foremost, Russia sees itself as a bridge between Europe and the United States, able to understand certain aspects of both policies and thus mediate between the two. Russia views the burgeoning anti-Americanism in Europe as "dangerous," and does not wish to provoke it further. Margelov envisions a joint Russia-NATO council or some other institutionalized means of working together to address possible scenarios for reconstruction of the Middle East. As with Afghanistan, Russia expects to provide a high level of intelligence on Iraq. Russia seeks to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq, ensuring that the Kurdish minorities in Turkey, Iran and Iraq are unable to unite, and also to integrate Iraq into the world economy. This economic integration must take into account the interests of all the "big players," particularly with regards to oil, as well as the interests of the other Arab nations in the region.

Discussion:
The discussion dealt generally with the interaction between foreign policy and internal politics in Russia. Margelov explained former Foreign Minister Yevgenii Primakov's visit to Baghdad as an attempt to prove to the Communist party that Putin's government is doing all it can to avert a war. One participant asked whether Putin's renewed use of 'multipolar' language in recent days signified a step away from Russia's apparent acceptance of its status as 'junior partner' to the United States. He also asked Margelov to outline in more detail his plan for maintaining the territorial integrity of Iraq. Margelov replied that Russia had never accepted status as a junior partner to the US; rather it has always found the term insulting and untrue. Over the last two years, Russia and the US achieved a new relationship, not one of junior and senior partnership, but one in which each party learned to disagree with the other without becoming enemies. The recent language of multipolarity is not Primakovian, but an attempt to show the communists that all is being done to prevent military conflict. Though closer perhaps to the European position, Russia seeks to act as a bridge between Europe and the United States.

To preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq, Margelov argued that national administrative sectors not be established after the war, for fear that they might turn into quasi-states. Contemporary Iraq is home to a complicated mixture of nationalities, including Kurds, Sunnis, Shiites, Syrians, and Jews. The social structure is more complicated than Afghanistan, without a Hamid Kharzai, or any charismatic leader, to unite the Iraqi people. It is hard to imagine who might lead Iraq in the future, lending further impetus for the creation of a joint policy-planning group on Iraq.

Another participant suggested that many people might think that for Russia to take part in what happens after "the plane lands in Iraq, it should be on board when the plane takes off." Referring to Primakov's presence in Baghdad, Margelov replied that Russia had already arrived. He disputed the necessity of a 'brotherhood of arms' such as was undertaken by the "great allies of the United States, Bulgaria and Estonia," saying that he did not "think it important to show military unity in Iraq." More important is to think about what will be done in Iraq after Saddam, particularly concerning the humanitarian crisis that might emerge in Iraq after a war.

When asked how Russia would vote on a Security Council resolution calling for military action, and how it might respond to unilateral US action, Margelov replied that if Saddam Hussein fails to comply with the previous resolutions, military action under the umbrella of the UN would be considered, so as to preserve both the territorial integrity of Iraq and the political integrity of the Security Council.

Another participant asked whether Putin's stand on the Security Council vote had changed as a result of his trip to Paris. Margelov replied that Russia's stance remained consistent in its pragmatism, seeking to disarm Saddam Hussein and mediate between Europe and the United States.

The last questions concerned the relationship between Russia's internal politics and its foreign policy, and the creation of a joint policy planning council between Russia and the US. Margelov outlined domestic factors influencing external policies, including the upcoming Duma elections in December 2003. The President's Unity party will have to integrate a wide range of political forces from both the Communist and the SPS [Union of Right Forces] camps. Margelov denied that Primakov held particular sway with Putin, but noted that to achieve success in December the President had to send messages to the old style politicians. A new generation of political leaders is emerging, however, to which the United States must pay careful attention. Margelov noted that when Putin's name first surfaced, many Russia-watchers in the US had no clue who he was or how he came to power. America should not make such a mistake again, and should get to know the new political generation now. The Unity party is attempting to cast itself as a new Conservative Party, modeled on the Republican Party or a European style Conservative Party. The Russian Communists, meanwhile-unlike those in other former Soviet states-have not adopted Social Democratic ideas and remain true Bolsheviks. The Communist party continues to garner 30 percent of the vote. The only criticism Putin, who is a patriotic president and has reinstated the red star and restored the Soviet national anthem, awaits from the Communist party is on his foreign policy.

Margelov also explained his suggestion of a joint policy planning council, drawing primarily on the example of a similar German-Russian council already in existence. Putin and Schroder meet twice a year with a staff supporting their discussions composed of representatives from parliament, government, and the business sector. Margelov stated that a great need exists for a similar initiative between Russia and the United States, as the many discussions conducted by independent groups such as the Aspen Institute and the East-West Institute have not produced concrete results.

One participant noted that Margelov's suggestions seemed to resemble a sort of joint Marshall Plan, particularly with regards to activity in Central Asia. She agreed with the need for such a plan, but asked how, given that neither Russia nor the United States had done enough to support the transitions in Central Asia thus far, the two countries would work together now in the region without anyone pushing them to do so. Margelov replied that the Central Asian states must be more deeply integrated into the world economy, which will in turn encourage the Central Asian states to become more transparent. Russia should support such an economic expansion because it would benefit from it. She noted that Russia's recent gas deal with Turkmenistan, while economically advantageous to both Russia and the leadership of Turkmenistan, would neither integrate Turkmenistan into the world economy nor encourage greater transparency. Margelov replied that President Putin is an "evolutionary, not a revolutionary," and that immediate regime change would be inadvisable for the region.

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.