Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Security

Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Security

On May 23, 2003, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a seminar by David Mosher and Lowell Schwartz of the RAND Corporation. Mosher and Schwartz discussed the findings of their recent report, Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Safety and U.S.-Russian Relations, which was funded by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and published by RAND. Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment, chaired the meeting.

David Mosher opened the meeting by noting that ten years after the end of the Cold War, two interrelated problems continue to undermine international security and constrain the development of U.S.-Russia relations. First, due to the nuclear postures of both countries, an accidental or unauthorized nuclear launch threatens to set in motion a chain of disastrous consequences. Although both sides have reduced the size of their arsenals since the height of the Cold War, their nuclear forces remain on alert, ready to be launched on only a few minutes' notice. Furthermore, U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrines continue to focus on the other side as a potential aggressor.

Second, the nuclear dimension of U.S.-Russia relations remains prominent, even as the pace of progress in this sphere lags behind advances in the political and economic fields. Russia's economic problems and the weakness of its conventional forces have increased its reliance on nuclear weapons, at least in its declaratory policy. (Several years ago, for example, Russia announced that it would consider nuclear retaliation an appropriate response to a cyberattack.) Reductions in the size of Russia's nuclear arsenal and detargeting initiatives, though positive developments, have eroded the survivability capability of its forces. If Russia should experience a nuclear strike today, it is possible that only 20-200 warheads would survive-a fact which might provoke its leaders to launch rapid counterstrikes if they perceive that an attack is underway. Finally, Russia's early warning system has become considerably less robust in recent years: Russia has no satellite coverage of oceans and many regions of the world, and the one satellite it has tasked to North America can view U.S. missile fields only 25% of the time. There are also several wide corridors in Russia through which submarine-launched missiles could travel undetected.

The U.S. nuclear posture only exacerbates the security problems created by Russia's rusting military infrastructure. The fact that U.S. defense capabilities have continued to grow while Russia's have withered does not promote a spirit of mutual trust; nor does the fact that much of this new technology seems to pose a direct threat to Russia. Superior U.S. technology would allow an American attack to obliterate leadership targets with unprecedented force and accuracy, and missiles launched from Trident submarines trained on Russia could destroy hard targets within ten minutes. In return, a blind, vulnerable Russia could launch counterstrikes quickly in a crisis based on incomplete or erroneous information. Indeed, it is conceivable that a nuclear device could detonate in Russia without the leadership being able to ascertain its origins-a situation that could contain the ingredients of a "perfect nuclear storm" if it occurred during a period of U.S.-Russia tension or mistrust.

Bearing in mind these nightmare scenarios, the authors of the RAND report sought to find means of moving beyond Cold War patterns of deterrence and dominance. They considered a wide range of solutions-ranging from unilateral to cooperative measures, and from the reduction of technical risks to the improvement of U.S.-Russia relations more broadly-and looked at the consequences of verifying versus not verifying each of the measures. The report also analyzes ten specific options: the improvement of Russia's early warning system; the installation of sensors on missile silos; an immediate stand down of all nuclear forces to be eliminated under the Moscow treaty; the withdrawal of Trident submarines from the waters around Russia; the removal of attack submarines from the waters around Russia; the removal of super-accurate W-88 warheads from Trident missiles; a reduction in the launch readiness of 150 silo-based missiles; a reduction in the launch readiness of all forces; the installation of Destruct After Launch mechanisms on warheads; and the deployment of limited U.S. missile defenses.

Of these potential solutions, Mosher discussed one that he finds particularly compelling: the installation of sensors on missile silos. The report envisions deploying some combination of sensors-e.g. heat, noise, motion, video, etc.-around ICBM launch silos. The sensors would be connected to a data collection module that would gather information from the silo and transmit it through a redundant network of land and satellite lines to a monitoring center in the other country. Mosher argued that this system would be both inexpensive and inherently robust. It is a natural verification system, and the presence of several varieties of sensors and modes of data transmission would protect against the catastrophic failure of the system.

Although several of the solutions examined in the report have promise, Mosher emphasized that no one step alone can eliminate the dangers associated with the current nuclear postures of the U.S. and Russia. He also acknowledged that some of the report's recommendations challenge decades of doctrinal orthodoxy and are bound to cause controversy. For both political and technical reasons, then, he noted that they must be implemented slowly and carefully. On the other hand, he argued that the political and technical components of these solutions cannot be divorced for one another, and stressed that it is important for the leaderships of both countries to discuss both facets of these options seriously and in tandem.

Lowell Schwartz added that the phased approach advocated by the report is another one of its strengths. The report suggests that the U.S. jumpstart the process of transforming U.S.-Russian nuclear relations by taking unilateral steps in the near-term. In the first six months to one year, the U.S. could stand down its forces to Moscow Treaty levels, pull SSBNs away from Russian territory, reduce launch readiness to 1/3 of silo-based ICBMs, and commit to deploying sensor mechanisms on launch silos. As their relations gradually improve, the U.S. and Russia could pursue a mixture of unilateral and cooperative improvements over the next several years, including the elimination of Moscow Treaty forces and the removal of W-88 warheads from Trident submarines. The report envisions that the U.S. and Russia might achieve a fully cooperative relationship within ten to fifteen years, reducing the number of SSBNs, negotiating verification measures for reducing the alert level of their forces, and jointly developing a missile defense system. Mosher sees the ultimate goals as either an extensive monitoring system and global dealerting or the evolution of U.S.-Russia nuclear relations into something which resembles those of Britain and France.

Schwartz concluded the presentation by summing up the contributions made by the RAND report to the global debate on nuclear security. He asserted that the report is unique in drawing a clear connection between nuclear security and U.S.-Russian political and economic relations. Although its ultimate goal-the de-nuclearization of relations between the two countries-may seem a grand one, it takes a pragmatic approach and provides an easy to read roadmap for progress. He acknowledged that the steps outlined in the report will not be quick or easy, and emphasized that the initiative to enact them must first be taken on the presidential level. Still, he asserted, the RAND plan offers a unique opportunity to address the continuing risks associated with the accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons.

Rose Gottemoeller opened the question and answer session by asking Mosher and Schwartz what impact Russia's withdrawal of its START II ratification-which will permit it to keep SS-18 and SS-24 missiles operational longer than anticipated-will have on the survivability of its nuclear arsenal. She also noted that the report's recommendation that SSBNs be pulled back from Russia would not be welcomed by the Navy, and inquired whether the authors had considered how best to broach this topic with U.S. military planners. With regard to the first question, Mosher responded that SS-18 and SS-24 missiles were included in evaluations of Russia's survivability capability in 2002. However, he noted that they are currently kept in garrisons rather than on mobile trains, which prevents them from having a major impact on survivability. On the second question, Mosher agreed that the Navy would not voluntarily withdraw SSBNs, and he reiterated that this measure could only be achieved through presidential initiative. Schwartz added that if the major goal at hand-ensuring that Russia and the U.S. no longer view each other as potential nuclear adversaries-is achieved, then the Navy would have fewer compunctions against withdrawing SSBNs from the waters around Russia.

Another meeting participant asked about the timeline recommended by the report. Mosher argued that given adequate attention on the presidential level, the initiative could move considerably faster than expected. But he also added that for both technical and political reasons, implementation of the solutions he outlined cannot be a speedy process. The authors of the report intentionally provided adequate time for new systems to be developed and tested; in the case of mechanisms such as sensors, it is critical that all parties have confidence in them and that they do not result in false alarms. On the political side, building enough trust between the parties to convince them to invite each other into their missile silos, for example, may take many years. The initiative described in the report seeks not only to develop new verification mechanisms, but also to build mutual trust.

Another attendee inquired whether the authors had considered the impact of Russian and American efforts to modernize their nuclear arsenals or to develop conventional ICBMs. Mosher responded that the study had not considered the influence of some new technologies-bunker busters, for example-on the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship because he believes that such weapons would not be so controversial if the two countries managed to reduce the level of tension in their relationship. The development of missile defense systems, however, may have a bigger impact. Mosher believes that the consequences of U.S. efforts to deploy such a system are not yet clear: on one hand, any missile shield would have to be large enough to be functional; but on the other, military planners wouldn't want it to be so large that Russia sees it as capable of counterbalancing its entire military. Mosher dismissed the utility of conventional ICBMs, arguing that ICBMs are so expensive to build and deploy that it makes little economic sense to arm them with conventional warheads. Gottemoeller added that one area in which the U.S. and Russia could work together in a cooperative manner is the improvement of early warning systems; she has recently heard Russian defense experts argue that Russia, which boasts superior ground-based warning systems for regional launches, could assist the U.S in developing similar mechanisms. In return, the U.S. could share its knowledge of satellite-based monitoring.

The meeting closed with one participant observing that the core problem in U.S.-Russia nuclear relations seems to be the continuing prominence of the doctrine of deterrence. He wondered at what point Mosher and Schwartz believe that this might be overcome. Mosher argued that the possibility of counterstrikes is the key element underpinning the doctrine of deterrence. The U.S. and Russia can only move beyond Cold War postures and mentalities once they start thinking of nuclear arsenals as an existential deterrent rather than a guarantor of effective counterforce. Schwartz described the thought exercise he found most helpful while trying to envision the contours of a post-Cold War nuclear order: imagining what the U.S. nuclear posture might look like if it did not consider Russia. Every step the U.S. takes toward making this possibility a reality can only be positive, he concluded.

Summary prepared by Faith Hillis, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment.