U.S.-Russian Strategic Partnership in the Run-Up to the St. Petersburg Summit

U.S.-Russian Strategic Partnership in the Run-Up to the St. Petersburg Summit

On May 21, 2003, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a seminar entitled, "U.S.-Russian Strategic Partnership in the Run-Up to the St. Petersburg Summit." The discussants included Vadim Razumovsky, Director of the Moscow-based Institute for Applied International Research (IAIR), and Yuri Fedorov and Andrei Zagorsky, deputy directors of the Institute. Rose Gottemoeller, Senior Associate at the Carnegie Endowment, chaired the meeting.

Rose Gottemoeller opened the meeting by noting that many in Washington expect that the June 1 Bush-Putin summit in St. Petersburg will be a "grip and grin" event-little more than a photo opportunity devoid of substantive discussion. Still, she argued, the meeting presents an occasion for governmental and non-governmental leaders in both countries to evaluate the current status of U.S.-Russia relations and to outline possible new arenas for cooperation. Gottemoeller hopes that the summit will also challenge the security community to evaluate trends in the U.S.-Russian strategic partnership. In particular, she believes that it is important to examine why, more than a decade after the fall of the Soviet Union, both U.S. and Russian nuclear doctrine are based more on deterrence and dominance than on cooperation. In this spirit, the Carnegie Endowment and IAIR launched a joint project in February 2003 to explore how to encourage Russian and American leaders to move beyond the doctrine of mutually assured destruction toward an effective partnership. A draft working paper considering these issues was circulated at the meeting, and Gottemoeller hopes that the report will be released in its final form in the summer of 2003.

Vadim Razumovsky opened his portion of the program by stating that in spite of the current fragility of U.S.-Russia relations, the two countries still can develop a partnership based on transparency, trust, and cooperation. He acknowledged that a variety of factors are hindering progress toward that goal: in addition to the fact that many in the Russian security establishment continue to view the world through a "cold warrior" mentality, the large bureaucracies of both countries slow attempts at innovation. Nevertheless, he maintained, change is possible. Non-governmental organizations, themselves a relatively new feature in Russian political life, play a crucial role in encouraging debate and promoting unconventional solutions. He pointed out that some of the recommendations included in the Carnegie/IAIR report-encouraging bilateral discussions on military doctrine and transparency measures, for example-are often mentioned as measures that can improve U.S.-Russian security relations. Other suggestions in the report, including the joint development of ballistic missile delivery systems, are wholly new, however. A vigorous debate full of fresh ideas and the inclusion of as many voices as possible will pressure both governments to stake out common ground on security issues.

Yuri Fedorov acknowledged that the war in Iraq plunged U.S. security doctrine and international organizations into a serious crisis. It also exhibited that U.S.-Russia relations are fragile, and that they remain hostage to political developments. Yet he insisted that the international rifts laid bare in the months leading up to the war need not negatively impact U.S.-Russia relations in the long-term. Though serious, the crisis over Iraq was also short, and the upcoming Bush-Putin summit will mark the end-or at least the beginning of the end-of the divide between the two presidents. The impending reconciliation of Bush and Putin will be driven by more than emotion or expedience: engaged in battles against disorder and extremist regimes, each leader recognizes the other as a critical partner in the war against terrorism.

Indeed, U.S.-Russia efforts to promote stability could become the single most prominent feature of the international security system. Fedorov sees an unprecedented convergence in Bush's and Putin's threat assessments, both of which highlight the dangers associated with terrorism, the proliferation of WMD, and regional instability. Particularly now, as U.S.-French and U.S.-German relations seem to have reached a nadir, the U.S.-Russia partnership could become more significant than more traditional transatlantic partnerships. It is fully possible that working under the auspices of the UN, the U.S. and Russia might form a "coalition of the willing" to resolve the nuclear threats emanating from Iran and North Korea. Fedorov admitted, however, that these scenarios remain theoretical; in order to transform these possibilities into reality, the two countries must focus on developing an "infrastructure for partnership." The first step in this direction would likely entail shifting the focus of U.S.-Russia relations from emotion and rhetoric to results.

Andrei Zagorsky addressed the more technical elements of the Carnegie-IAIR report. Psychological and bureaucratic resistance are not the only obstacles that must be overcome in order to move away from a doctrine of mutually assured destruction, he argued; Cold War-era material and technical systems-from the weapons themselves, to security systems, to nuclear doctrines-are another stumbling block on the road to a more effective U.S.-Russia partnership. For example, the current nuclear postures of both nations include the possibility of massive first strikes and counterstrikes that could obliterate the earth in an hour. Although the U.S. and Russia no longer expect first strikes from each other, the continuing presence of this Cold War-era nuclear doctrine could spell disaster in the case of an accidental launch. The need to reduce the alert levels of strategic strike submarines, which can approach a target undetected and launch a missile with minimum flight time, is also particularly urgent. A number of potential solutions to this problem, many of which center around an exchange of information about submarines' location and their strike capabilities, are outlined in the paper. Although Zagorsky suspects that the governments might not welcome these measures, he emphasized that it is important that both the numbers of nuclear forces on alert and the composition of these forces be addressed.

Gottemoeller acknowledged that some of the measures outlined in the report are unconventional. The joint development of missile launch technologies, for example, is likely to be controversial. Russian technical experts insist, however, that if U.S. and Russian strategic and industrial forces are to be merged, such activities would be both logical and necessary. Gottemoeller added that the summit agenda should include extensive discussion on uniting the U.S. and Russia in a non-proliferation partnership. As both nations seek to resolve the Iranian and North Korean nuclear dilemmas, she believes that the 1994 agreement that removed nuclear arms from Ukraine can serve as a model. In that case, Ukraine received security assurances, economic assistance, and energy assistance-all three of which the U.S. government has hinted are possible for North Korea if it cooperates-in exchange for agreeing to disarm. Recent revelations about the extent of Russia's support for Iran's developing nuclear program have embarrassed Putin, so she also believes that an opportunity for progress on that issue may soon arise.

The question and answer session opened with one of the meeting attendees agreeing with the panelists that nonproliferation should be the central organizing principle of the Bush-Putin summit. For one thing, he argued, it is a topic that should be dealt with on the presidential level; for another, it would be provident for both presidents to look forward to the upcoming G8 summit at Evian, which immediately follows the St. Petersburg meeting. Should Bush and Putin manage to come to Evian united in their determination to continue the work started by the G8 at Kananaskis, they could strengthen their partnership and do much to improve international security.

Another meeting participant asked the panelists what the Russian government hopes to gain from the St. Petersburg summit. Fedorov responded that like Washington, Moscow has a genuine interest in fighting terrorism and hopes to consolidate as much foreign support as possible. He also speculated that Russia is eager to work with the U.S. to resolve the current problems on the Korean peninsula. Razumovsky stressed that he has no inside knowledge of Putin's aims, but suspects that his top priority is to move beyond the Iraq crisis. Zagorsky agreed that Putin is eager to maintain the impression that the Iraq war has not become a long-term liability for Russia. In addition, he argued, Putin should strive to promote a positive agenda for global partnership. Although the G8 commitment to nonproliferation reached at Kananaskis is a promising step forward, the first year of the ten-year initiative has been consumed by the planning process. Putin should seek to secure Bush's help in receiving sustained commitment and increased funding from the other G8 partners.

One attendee challenged the report's conclusion that strategic warning systems should be de-emphasized, arguing that monitoring is necessary to promote greater security as long as nuclear weapons exist. Zagorsky agreed that improved surveillance and monitoring mechanisms are needed, and contested the notion that he was promoting the "degradation" of warning systems. He clarified his position as supportive of a change in the mission of warning systems; the manner in which this technology is currently used bolsters the doctrine of deterrence, making it more difficult to achieve greater transparency and trust. Zagorsky does not believe that early warning systems should be abolished immediately, but he looks forward to the day when changes in the U.S. and Russian nuclear posture might make them altogether unnecessary.

Other questions asked covered a wide range of issues. One meeting participant wondered whether Russia and the U.S. have a clear plan for the reconstruction of Iraq and the reconciliation of the international community, while another asked what impact China's increasing power would have on the nuclear postures of both countries. Another inquired whether a real constituency eager for improved relations between the U.S. and Russia exists in Moscow beyond Putin and his inner circle. With regard to the first question, Zagorsky expressed uncertainty that Bush and Putin agree on a single plan for moving beyond the Iraq crisis. However, he believes that the very fact that the two will meet in St. Petersburg demonstrates that they are eager to mend their relations. Next, Zagorsky asserted that China's ability to change the international security system in large part depends on its integration in the world economy, which remains far from complete. Fedorov agreed, noting that contemporary China reminds him of the Soviet Union in the early days of perestroika. A number of scenarios remain possible for China: Beijing could embrace democracy, or work to restore totalitarianism, or the country could disintegrate altogether. He added that no country in the world has managed to combine market reforms with central planning and political totalitarianism, and he doubts that China's leaders will be able to overcome this historical precedent. On the question of which constituencies might support the changes outlined in the Carnegie/IAIR report, all three panelists agreed that the business community is committed to improving U.S.-Russia relations. Fedorov suggested that the defense industry might also welcome the changes proposed in the report.

Rose Gottemoeller added that policy makers should not simply take these constituencies for granted, however; the Russian business and defense communities must be engaged in the processes outlined in the report. One means of doing so which has recently been discussed in Moscow is using uranium processing to partially fund the dismantlement of submarines. She also noted that continued intelligence sharing between the U.S. and Russia, critical in executing the war against terror, can also strengthen trust and encourage collaboration between the two sides. She concluded the meeting by addressing one participant's claim that some in Ukraine feel that they accepted too low a price for the 1994 removal of nuclear weapons from that country. Despite the complaints that have arisen from some Ukrainian constituencies, the agreement was fulfilled, and the strict deadlines it contained were met by all parties. Gottemoeller believes that a similar arrangement is necessary to resolve the nuclear crisis in North Korea. As U.S. and Russian leaders consider how to move forward, however, they must better define their goals vis-à-vis North Korea, clarifying whether the ultimate aim is the disarmament of North Korea, regime change, or a unified peninsula on the model of South Korea. And even after a deal is struck on North Korea's nuclear program, she warned, many important diplomatic, political, and economic issues will remain to be resolved.

Summary prepared by Faith Hillis, Junior Fellow in the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment.