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Sergei Rogov noted that for much of the last year, the controversy over Iraq has been the primary determinant of U.S.-Russian relations. For a time, it looked like the tension between the two countries might destroy their strategic relations. However, the St. Petersburg summit demonstrated that U.S.-Russian relations have not collapsed, and effectively marked a return to the status quo ante. Still, Rogov believes that there is considerable room for improvement in U.S.-Russia relations. The partnership between the two countries is excessively dependent on the fight against terrorism, and their full potential for economic, military, and strategic cooperation remains to be realized.
In spite of the underdeveloped nature of the U.S.-Russia military-strategic partnership, Rogov believes that some of the best prospects for cooperation lie in this area. In contrast to the Cold War relationship between the two powers, which revolved around arms control, U.S.-Russian partnership in the 21st century can cover a broader array of issues. Russia and the U.S. should look for new means of bilateral arms control, seeking to move beyond the doctrine of mutually assured destruction. Together, they should work to engage official and non-official nuclear powers in an international dialogue and induce them to accept basic standards regarding nuclear weapons. Finally, they should cooperate to reduce threats posed by weapons of mass destruction and terrorism, and to prevent further proliferation to countries like North Korea and Iran.
Robert Einhorn opened his portion of the program by remarking that ironically, the bipolarity of the Cold War reinforced the nonproliferation regime. Security guarantees provided by NATO and the Warsaw Pact obviated the need for Central and East European nations to acquire nuclear weapons, and both the U.S. and U.S.S.R. viewed the proliferation of nuclear weapons as contrary to their national interests. Now, however, Russia's weak economy and its national pride encourage proliferation, and it is often in disagreement with U.S. nonproliferation policy.
Einhorn continued that he is not optimistic that a peaceful solution to the North Korea crisis will be found. He believes that the contradictory and ambiguous statements emanating from Pyongyang are designed to relieve political pressure from North Korea as it continues its weapons design and production programs. These statements have also confused American policy makers, renting deep splits within the already divided Bush administration. He speculated that multilateral talks on the issue may well take place in Beijing before the end of the summer, but thinks that they will take a trilateral (U.S.-North Korea-China) form, in contrast to the six-nation talks that the U.S. favors.
Einhorn is slightly more optimistic about the prospects for reaching an agreement with Iran. The government appears to be on the defensive, and he is certain that the U.S. will push for a condemnation of Tehran at the IAEA's meeting in September. He noted that the Bush administration is as deeply divided on what to do with Iran as it is on North Korea. Still, he believes that Iran can be convinced to sign the IAEA additional protocol, particularly if the agreement allows for it to be supplied with nuclear fuel. Russia, which has sent mixed signals about its stance on Iran in recent months, could do much to promote the signing of the additional protocol if it decides to play a constructive role in the crisis.
Viktor Esin emphasized that no one in Russia wants Iran to be a nuclear power, but urged the attendees to remember that Iran is party to the NPT and has the right to pursue peaceful nuclear activities. He added that Putin has pledged that Russia will not supply fuel to Iran until it signs the additional protocol and agrees to transport all spent fuel to Russia. Indeed, Esin is skeptical that Iran has the resources to develop a military nuclear program; if Iran mined and enriched all of its uranium-which is found 300-500 meters below the surface of the earth, and is thus costly to extract-it could fuel only one reactor for four years. He acknowledged that Iran is known to have built 100 centrifuges, but he believes that it would need 5000 centrifuges to work for one year in order to construct one nuclear bomb. No matter how unlikely this scenario, Esin insists that it is important to guard against it. He supports the strengthening of the IAEA inspection regime, and hopes that Iran will sign the additional protocol. He urged Russia and the U.S. to sign it as well, which would place them firmly on the moral high ground.
Esin does not believe that North Korea currently possesses nuclear weapons, but it does have a more advanced program than Iran, as well as the capability to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear device. Nevertheless, Esin believes that the North Korean weapons program can be stopped. In order to do so, however, the Bush administration must move away from its anger over North Korea's betrayal, and must assemble a common front against proliferation with Russia, China, Japan, and South Korea. If these carrots do not prove sufficient, he urged the use of a stick-the creation of a U.S.-Russian special committee to deal with nonproliferation protocols under the aegis of the UN Security Council.
A meeting attendee asked the panelists to elaborate on what inducements might be needed to convince the Iranians to give up their right-guaranteed under the NPT-to develop their civilian nuclear program. Einhorn suggested that the Bush administration must look beyond the nuclear issue and seek to establish a modus vivendi with Tehran. At the very least, this will require the U.S. to drop its support for regime change in Iran. Viktor Esin argued that multilateral action by the G-8 countries would help, disabusing Tehran of the notion that it is being unfairly targeted by Washington. Sergei Rogov added that the more important issue at hand is eliminating the advantages in the international system that come with the possession of nuclear weapons. U.S.-Russian cooperation in ballistic missile defense and exchanges of intelligence and information gathered from early warning radar-after consultation with China-would help work toward this goal.
Moving on to the broader issue of U.S.-Russian strategic relations, Pavel Zolotarev remarked that both countries are still struggling to determine the form and tenor of their post-Cold War relations. In the security establishments of both countries there is an understanding that the old notion of strategic stability-which relied upon nuclear parity as an assurance that neither side would use weapons against the other-must be replaced by a new conception of stability, based on the non-use and non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Although the Moscow Treaty is an important milestone, Zolotarev believes that the U.S. and Russia are far from achieving a new strategic stability for the 21st century. The Treaty fails to establish a funding schedule for the arms control agenda and lacks basic criteria for evaluating performance; its implementation remains dependent on Nunn-Lugar funding and the economic situation in Russia. More generally, Zolotarev sees a "restoration of the Cold War spirit" in the U.S. and Russian defense ministries. He fears that Presidents Bush and Putin, who are genuinely enthusiastic about arms control, have stepped too far ahead of their generals and bureaucracies on this issue.
In order to ensure the non-use and non-proliferation of weapons-and thus transcend the Cold War doctrine of mutual deterrence once and for all-Zolotarev suggested that both nations implement the steps outlined in a recent RAND report. The report advocates continuing reductions in nuclear forces, the installation of sensors on missile silos, and regular exchanges of information on the location of each side's nuclear submarines. Along with joint efforts on developing an ABM system, these steps would build trust among the U.S. and Russia and reduce the risks associated with their nuclear arsenals. In fact, Zolotarev even suggested that some of the measures mentioned in the RAND report might ultimately be applied to other nuclear powers. Mutual trust between the nuclear powers, combined with assurances against the accidental or unauthorized launch of weapons, might in the long run obviate the need for nuclear weapons altogether. Zolotarev closed his portion of the program by pointing out, however, that the first steps toward implementing the RAND recommendations must be taken at the presidential level, and he urged Presidents Bush and Putin to make discussion of this issue a priority at their September summit.
During the second question and answer session, a meeting attendee wondered whether the panelists' visions of seamless U.S.-Russian cooperation are realistic. He pointed out that since the golden days of cooperation in the early 1990s, command and control exchanges have become highly regulated and are often supervised-or prevented-by both nations' security services. Sergei Rogov acknowledged that there have been many setbacks in the past few years, but argued that the emergence of international terrorism has resulted in the convergence of U.S. and Russian security interests, creating an historic opportunity for cooperation. Rose Gottemoeller added that the U.S.-Russian contracts for military and civilian industrial cooperation that exist tend to yield successes.
Another participant wondered whether U.S.-Russian dominance of the international system is truly the way to achieve strategic stability. Einhorn emphasized that he does not advocate a return to Cold War-era bipolarity-if that were even possible-but rather hoped to draw attention to new possibilities for cooperation between the two nations. Gottemoeller added that as the chief adversaries in the Cold War, the U.S. and Russia have special expertise and responsibilities in managing global security issues. If a peaceful solution to the Iranian and North Korean conundrums is to be found, the cooperation of the U.S. and Russia will prove critical.
The meeting closed with discussion about tactical weapons, and how the continuing presence of these arsenals might affect the prospects for U.S.-Russian cooperation. Esin argued that it is time for the two countries to move beyond their 1991 unilateral obligations and to negotiate a legally binding agreement on tactical nuclear weapons. In order to do so, the U.S. must withdraw its tactical weapons from Europe, pledging to store this arsenal on its own soil. Rogov agreed that it is important that non-strategic weapons are included in discussions about nuclear arms control, but doubted that an agreement could be reached in the near future; Bush signaled to the Russians that the Moscow Treaty would be the last formal agreement on arms control. He also noted that new advances in technology will complicate the control of tactical weapons: should "bunker busters" be considered tactical weapons in future negotiations? Esin responded that an agreement on non-strategic nuclear weapons would take several years, but pointed out that it is precisely a strong cooperative relationship between the U.S. and Russia that will ensure strategic stability so long as the two nations choose not to discuss this difficult issue.
Summary prepared by Faith Hillis, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian program at the Carnegie Endowment.
