Constraints on the Russian Media

On October 7, 2003, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a meeting on media freedom and freedom of speech in Russia in light of the government's curtailment of independent TV channels. The speaker was Masha Lipman, a regular Washington Post columnist and editor of Pro et Contra. Dr. Lilia Shevtsova, a Senior Associate in the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment, moderated the session.

Ms. Lipman opened her presentation with a criticism of Russian president Vladimir Putin's recent statement to the effect that Russia has never had any press freedom to speak of. She noted that such freedom did exist in Russia in a real sense in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Mr. Putin is not aware of the extent of press freedom during this period, however, because he was, at the time, a KGB officer stationed in Germany. Thus, he did not see news-hungry crowds of Russians gathering around the Moscow News office, and also missed the period of healthy competition between various news outlets in Russia. The situation has changed for the worse, however, as the Putin government has significantly suppressed media freedom over the last three years.

Two examples of this suppression can be gleaned from recent television coverage of the thirty-fifth anniversary of the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia, and of the Chechen hostage-taking at the Dubrovka theater in Moscow. Two documentaries were shown on Russian television commemorating the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. One, broadcast by the state channel, RTR, failed to mention such key components of the Czechoslovak crisis as the Prague Spring, the popular movement for reform, Václav Havel, or the self-immolator Jan Palach. In other words, RTR viewers were not told that crisis was precipitated by Soviet opposition to expressions of political freedom in Czechoslovakia. Instead, RTR created the impression that the USSR intervened simply to halt the bickering between different factions in the Czechoslovak Communist Party. On the other hand, the Gazprom-owned NTV channel, which retains some editorial independence from the Kremlin, aired a "totally different", and much more truthful, version of the invasion.

This difference does not mean, however, that the Russian state promotes its own line in the channels it owns, but tolerates dissent in others. This fact is demonstrated by Mr. Putin's response to NTV's coverage of the Dubrovka hostage taking. After 129 hostages died when Russian security forces stormed the theater, an NTV investigation concluded that the cause of death had been nerve gas used by the Russian forces, as well as the lack of adequate medical care to the hostages after they had been poisoned by the gas. President Putin called NTV's investigation "business in blood", and declared that the channel was seeking cheap sensationalism. However, NTV's conclusions were corroborated by a similar investigation conducted by Boris Nemtsov of the Union of Rightist Forces (SPS). Mr. Putin, however, keeps holding to the line that the operation was "impeccable." As a result of the controversy, NTV's manager was fired, and a new one was appointed by the Kremlin.

Thus, although some "divergence of opinion," especially in matters not directly threatening Mr. Putin's image, may be tolerated, the Russian government has taken serious steps to reduce it. The state-owned gas giant Gazprom wrested control of NTV from the oligarch Vladimir Gusinsky in 2001. Following this, the state completed its takeover of important television channels by seizing TV6 in 2002 and TVS in 2003. The reaction of the public and the elites to the government's actions has been feeble at best. While the treatment meted out to Mr. Gusinsky caused "some public protest", the government's takeover of TV6 merely caused surprise. As for TVS, which had been owned by twelve oligarchs, its acquisition by the government went virtually unnoticed.

As a result of such coercive actions, the management of most Russian television companies has become compliant to the wishes of the state, to the extent that it coordinates editorial policy with the Kremlin and is loath to discuss violation of press freedom with a rapporteur on the issue. The Kremlin can arrange "appropriate" coverage of an issue, or stifle coverage completely. Thus, rumors have been circulating that Aleksandr Voloshin, head of the presidential administration, instructed television companies not to give too much attention to the Yukos affair, and discussion on the issue on television was practically halted within a week.

However, neither the Russian public nor the elites are concerned by these developments, because they see the choice in Russian broadcasting as being between state control and oligarchic control. They do not believe conditions exist in Russia for the establishment of a genuinely public television on the BBC model, and thus support state control as the lesser of the two evils. Ms. Lipman commented that such an attitude shows a lack of "public commitment to democratic values and freedom of the press."

Newspapers currently enjoy a much greater degree of freedom than television, because print runs are not large enough for the Kremlin to be worried about the consequences of press criticism. There is thus a healthy opposition press, but since there is no "political opposition to speak of" in terms of parties, the newspapers remain the platform of angry commentators rather than an engine of change. The Kremlin trades access for loyalty, and independent newspapers are reduced to quoting "sources close to the informed ones." In radio broadcasting, only Ekho Moskvy stands out as a genuinely independent news and analysis station, but it too is sometimes forced to be "cautious" in its reporting. On the Internet, the Gazeta.ru website attracts "thoughtful and wise" analysts, who discuss issues more freely than they do in the newspapers. However, neither the print media, nor certainly the Internet publications, have been able to hold the government accountable for its actions.

The recent media law has been a further impediment to freedom of speech in Russia. It curtails the media's freedom in reporting on the upcoming elections, and has thus reduced them to virtual silence on the issue. Three petitions have been filed to the Constitutional Court against the law, one of them backed by a hundred State Duma deputies. However, even if the law is overturned, this will only happen after the elections are held, because the court requires a substantial amount of time to deliberate.

Meanwhile, the Kremlin has not been as closed to the media as it is now since the late 1980s. There are no regular press conferences, Mr. Putin's press secretary hardly ever appears on television, while Mr. Putin himself holds only one press conference a year, which is more a public relations exercise than a true communications event. The press secretary has become so used to compliant Russian media that he recently asked US television companies not to ask Mr. Putin questions about Chechnya on camera.

The president rose to very high levels of popularity through the skillful use of television, and thus understands the power of this medium. Further, his KGB background encourages him to promote government control and secrecy, with the consequent results for media freedom. The situation is very similar in the provinces, whose leadership sees the Kremlin's attack on the media in Moscow as a green light for launching attacks of the same sort on the local media.

In Ms. Lipman's view, there is currently a high degree of alienation between state and society in Russia, of the sort that existed before Mr. Gorbachev's time in office. The public is becoming politically apathetic and cynical, and expresses protest through irony, as it did in the Brezhnev era. The difference with the Brezhnev years, however, is that nowadays political jokes are freely available in print and on the Internet. Further, journalists are not afraid of imprisonment as a result of government criticism. Despite this, the media has not been able to champion the public against the government.

Ms. Lipman is thus pessimistic about the prospects of the Russian media. She asserted that Russians had not fought to attain democracy, or, even if they did, it was not for very long. If it were not for Mr. Gorbachev, they would never have demanded democracy in any case. Thus, the Russian public can be expected to sink into deeper levels of apathy and cynicism in the face of the government's authoritarian measures.

Summary prepared by Rashed Chowdhury, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian program at the Carnegie Endowment.