Russia: Before and After the Elections

RUSSIA: BEFORE AND AFTER THE ELECTIONS.

Remarks by Dr. Grigory Yavlinsky, Chairman on Russian Democratic Part "Yabloko"

Moderator: Martha Brill Olcott, Senior Associate, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Washington, D.C.
Thursday, February 26, 2004
3:30 - 5:00 pm

Transcipt by:
Federal News Service
Washington, D.C.

MARTHA BRILL OLCOTT: (In progress) – is going to speak to us on Russia before and after the elections. The timeliness of today’s meeting could not be more dramatic, given all the events that have happened this week in Russia, and we’re all really eager to hear Mr. Yavlinsky’s take on what is going on.

Truly there are very few people who need as little introduction to an audience like this as Grigory Yavlinsky, whose accomplishments over the past 15 years have really been synonymous with economic and political reform in the Soviet Union and in Russia. He is an author of both 500 Days and The Grand Bargain, and he served in the Russian Duma from 1993 until the most recent elections, having headed the Yabloko bloc from its creation in 1995 until the end of the last Duma term.

It’s really an honor to invite Mr. Yavlinsky to the podium. Thank you so much.

(Applause.)

GRIGORY YAVLINSKY: Thank you very much. I’m really extremely thankful for such a possibility to speak to such a special audience on the issues on the further development of my country.

From time to time, approximately once in two years, I am making a speech about Russia at the Carnegie Endowment, and I have a privilege to share my views with the most experienced people in the United States, and maybe in the Western world, who are interested in the issues of Russia.

I was a little bit surprised several days ago when I was making several lectures for the Harvard people because at the beginning I was warned that there is no big interest about Russia at the moment, nobody cares, so don’t be disappointed if the number of the people will not be so big, and so on and so forth. Now I have the lectures for 250 and 310 people in the audience. So it’s not true that people don’t understand the importance of the developments in Russia and don’t understand the special period in which we are staying just now in Russia.

Certainly I have a lot of will and a lot of topics to share with you, but I think that the best way to communicate today would be to go with a short introduction about a very big country, then I would like you to ask as many questions as that would be possible because I’m very much interested in your questions. Through your questions I would know what is the most important topics for you about developments of Russia. So don’t hesitate; whatever questions you think would be interesting, please ask me.

I would start with some special preliminary remarks. My friends and I, looking at Russia as a country which in 20, 25 years must be a part of Europe -- our perception of Russia, that this is a country which in this 20-25 years has to cover the very big, very long distance which took other countries hundreds of years, and to be in this period of time, in 20-25 years, a country which would be a full member of all major European institutions – in that sense a European country. Because in the sense of culture and history, Russia certainly is a European country, and has always been. I mean the political institutions of Europe, I mean the economic institutions, I mean security institutions, military institutions, all the issues.

From that point of view I want to give my analysis. Why is it so important? Because if simply to look at Russia that it was a threat, let’s say for the Western world and for the United States, and now it is not a threat and that’s it, then it would be a different perception, and that would be a different criteria, and that would be a different logic. And now I’m trying to explain the logic from where I am starting.

I would start with the most important features of the Russian current system, which primarily was created in the last eight years, since ’96. Certainly in general it started in ’91, but the most important changes, which now are the basic elements of the political and economic system which we have in Russia in a very clear way started in the middle of ‘90s, especially politically, from the elections of Yeltsin – last elections of Yeltsin.

There are six major features of Russia which must be taken into account today. First, today Russia has no independent judicial system – independent justice. Secondly, since December, Russia has no elements of independent parliament. Third, Russia has no any public or parliamentary control on secret services and law enforcement structures. Fourth, Russia has no, at the moment, any politically important, politically influential independent media. Fifth, elections in Russia are a very big influence and a very substantial pressure from the authorities. And the last, but very important, Russia has an economic system which in fact is a 100 percent merger between business and authorities. That means that every single important bureaucrat in Russian government or Russian administration is at the same time deeply involved in businesses or represents their interests, and is paid from the businesses in the incomparable amount, if to compare what his salary is. So it’s the most important features to understand, what is going on in Russia.

I want also to make a very important historical analogy. Such a system was created, this exactly system, or this system was created in middle ‘30s in Russia. This is not a new – qualitatively new kind of a political system. This system was created in the middle ‘30s. The major feature of this system is that the most important elements of the state and the society are managed from one room. Whether it is press or it’s security services, or it’s legal issues, or it is all kinds of information, all kinds of justice – all elements of justice. That’s why in the parliamentary election we made a statement that what we have got in Russia at the moment is kind of capitalism with Stalin’s face. That’s why we made this statement; now I’m trying to explain what that means.

Including economy, at that time it was really a planned economy, it was a centralized economy, which was managed from one room, and this room certainly wasn’t Kremlin, as it is clear. Now it’s not certainly a planned economy at all; it’s a kind of a business, it’s a kind of a semi-private economy, but it’s also managed, and we had a very visible and very explicit example how it’s managed: by repressing measures, by the way, as well, from the top of Russian authorities.

So I would say it this way: before in Russia we had a kind of a system which you well know, with the world: gosplan. Now I would call it “gosclan.” So it’s almost the same, with some slight differences.

What happened in the last four years – and why I said that started in ’96, because in ’96 it kind of was such system, the elements of the system were created in order to make from 2 percent, which Yeltsin had in February, to 56 percent, which he got in July. So it was made especially just to concentrate everything, to take back all the tools and all the resources, information resources and all kind of resources, in order to create this operation – successfully to finalize this operation.

And after that, people decided that it’s a very comfortable system. They all said that it’s a great system because it’s giving an opportunity to manipulate the society once again. It was manipulated by the Communist Party and the Politburo and now it is possible to manipulate the society in a modern way with your own interests. But in the last four years, after the 2000, there was a big progress in this system, and it is necessary to say that what Putin’s government made in the last four years was very substantial. The substance was that he neglected or liquidated all kinds of autonomous elements of the society, which appeared in Russia after 1991.

First was attack on the regions. In the regions after 1991 appeared some elements of the autonomous regional leaders. They were members of the Council of Federation. So it was kind of a balance in that sense. So the first attack was on the autonomous elements in the regions. The second attack was on autonomous elements in the press. It was NTV story. The third attack was on autonomous elements in business. That happened half a year ago. And the fourth one, it was an attack on political parties and creation of a one-party parliament.

So that four steps created completely new atmosphere in Russia because it pushed back the most important elements of the civil society which appeared in the last 10 years.

That brings us to the new situation in which – I want to say this especially seriously – the preconditions for political opposition in terms of Western politics, or in terms of the United States or Europe, at the moment in Russia completely disappeared. What do I mean? In order to create a political opposition you need at least three very important things. First you need independent court or independent justice who’s going to – just to implement the laws or to take care of the implementation of the laws. The second element is the independent press, which can bring the ideas of opposition and the ideas of your criticism to the public. And the third, the ability to create independent financing, which is absolutely crucial to creating political – any kind of political opposition.

None of these three preconditions exist just now in Russia after this last four years. All those three preconditions disappeared. This is one of the important explanations why, for example, my Party and I declared that we are not going to take part in the Presidential elections, which is now on the – just now declared. Because you can’t take part in the Presidential elections if you have no independent arbitrage in the elections, if you have no independent financing in the elections, and if you have no independent media in the elections.

I was taking part, as you know, in the Presidential elections in ’96 and 2000. At that time it was or was not a fair elections, but if to give the comparison I will try to do it in such a way: can you imagine soccer – I’m afraid to say football in America so I’m saying about the soccer. In order to play soccer you need at least gates. You need playground and you need a ball. If you have these three elements you can try to play the game. It was so in ’96 and 2000. Certainly I had a gate which was 100 meters, and Yeltsin had a gate of 5 meters. Of course I had on my playground 3 players and Yeltsin had 55 players. The same was with Putin in 2000. But at least it was a game. It was a playground, it was a ball, it was whatever gates. Now no gates, no playground, no ball, only score on the table. (Laughter.) So you are heartily invited to come to the stadium to look at the score.

That’s why they have worried so much about the turnout. That’s why they understand that people wouldn’t come. That’s why he fired the government, because he wants to make whatever political story at the moment. It has no other sense. First of all, he wants to draw attention in the different direction because it’s simply no substance in the election. There is no fight. And the respond was very special. My Party, in 10 days after the elections, declared that this is not the elections and we aren’t going to take part. But maybe the most interesting reaction came from the best friend of Kremlin, Mr. Zhirinovsky. He presented his bodyguard as a comparator to Mr. Putin. And then Mr. Kharitonov found profound collective farmer from the deep Siberian region and said, that’s my representative. Okay? Then Mr. Berezovsky came up with something strange, and that is the picture of our elections. That is the picture of the elections. Why that happens? That happens because of the creation of such a system, which I’m trying to display to you.

What is the agenda? This is the most important thing. Now I’m going to speak – what I describe to you is simply for understanding what is going on. The most important thing, what is the agenda, what is necessary to be done – first some preliminary remarks.

I want to say that Russia’s problems are very deep and systematic. It’s not simply just a kind of a step back; it’s a very serious situation. We have very deep and very systematic problems. Our problems go well beyond having imitations of elections and making nice liberal speeches. Imposing the democracy instead of Potemkin village in Russia and implementing real private property rights must be once again as it was from the very beginning and was not realized, must be a priority. Democracy and private property rights are once again a main priority.

For my Party, and for people of liberal democracy, part of the society which is supporting the liberal democracy, the task is not just to find the way – and that’s what I want to stress very strongly – not just to find the way to liberalize, or for liberalization of the current regime, but the most important thing is to be able to impose long-lasting solutions. We must prevent, once and forever, to be in the position of the liberal advisors, because to be, just today, a liberal advisor, it’s all the same as to be a deputy of the tsar for resolution. It’s a rather interesting but politically senseless exercise. No?

So for that you need to make several very important steps. One of the biggest problems for all democratic forces in this period of time since 1990, since 1991, that they have always positioned themselves as liberal advisors, which are asking the tsar to make a little bit of revolution – not so much but just in a very limited way.

So the first task, what is necessary to do, is the dismantling of the oligarchic system which was created in the last 10 years. That means that it’s necessary to adopt the package of laws which would be to some extent like a public court between the old parts of the society about the criminal privatization which was realized in Russia in the middle ‘90s. We created the concept of this accord, and I was trying since July last year to debate this approach with President Putin and with other leading politicians in Russia: instead of putting people in prison, selectively using the law and repressive measures against representatives of the business. At the moment, the President and his team took a completely different direction. They are just moving in the direction I explained just now, instead of trying to find public accord.

What are the key elements? I would be very certain that the first element is to amnesty the old kind of offences linked to privatization process with exception of murdering and other violent crimes. Together with this must be adopted a package of laws together – it’s all one package. Another part of this package of laws is regulations which would separate business from politics and would implement in Russia absolutely new rules in the relations between business and the parliament, business and the government, business and administration, including open and transparent financing of political parties, including implementing in Russia for the first time in its history kind of a public television which would be independent from the government and from the oligarchic systems in Russia in the same time.

The third part of this package would be really serious number of decisions on antimonopoly and antitrust legislation, which would be enforced and realized in practice. It would be also the elements of limitation of taking part in the politics – the people who were deeply engaged in criminal privatization in the middle ‘90s.

So it’s a big thing. This is what would turn Russia from a vicious circle, which we have at the moment, which is very much based on the events which were happening in the middle of ‘90s.

The next step must be implementing the law and adopting the law on public control on the security services and law enforcement structures. Today is a real disaster because no one can explain, what are the purposes with what security structures are operating? No one can explain what methods they are going to take. No one can explain who is giving commands to them, so that is a very serious issue. You would never, ever make Russian economy effective or Russian business really competitive, and that would never work if you would not solve this very painful, for Russia, problem. Third step is a real division of power and protecting civil liberties in Russia.

And one more issue: without proper acts about the war in the Northern Caucasus, especially in Chechnya, Russia would never give the possibility to the people in the country to live in the atmosphere which would give them a chance to create a modern society, modern economy, whatever. This is one of the most painful issues in current Russian politics. And our suggestion in that area is first of all to understand that if Russia wants to be in the Caucasus, then Russia should start from absolutely another corner than that. It’s necessary, in my analysis, to give about 8.5 percent of GDP every year to create jobs, to develop modern communications, to develop modern society, security system for the society, and things like that. This is the principle. All the other measures, like security, military measures, war with the terrorism, it’s the next part.

It’s also necessary, but that’s a different story. If you are going to do first, then it is explainable what you want to do in the military area. If you don’t want to do first, then the second part would be endless. It would never have any end. It’s a qualitatively different story than there is in Afghanistan or somewhere else – for Russia, for example.

As I already said, that all this elements and all the steps are also directed to realize once again the idea about the guaranteeing private property rights in Russia, which is just now very far from that. Economy itself certainly needs a lot of improvements, but every economy – I think every economy in the world needs all that. Now it is not a period of the 500 days for economy. This time passed. Now you should improve the tax system, tax administration; you should improve the banking legislation because Russia still has no banking system reliable. Now you have to do many, many things in the economy but all of them are absolutely necessary but not a decisive thing. The changes may come only from this important political, much more even than economic, steps.

So main problems of Russian economy at the moment are in Russian politics because, from our point of view, the people who are frightened; the people who are manipulated; the people who have no information – real information – about what’s going on. The people who don’t feel themselves free can’t create modern economy of the 21st century. It’s impossible. It was possible with such people to come from agrarian country to industrial, and we have the experience of Stalinist Russia and we have experience of some other countries in the world, but with one or two exceptions, which only justifies the rule, it is possible to say that through the same means – totalitarian, authoritarian; the means of a police state – you would never create a modern economy and you would never, ever give Russia a chance to be a European country, and you would even more – you would not be able to protect the longest border – (audio break).

That’s what I want to tell you. Now I’m ready for your questions. Thank you.

MS. MARTHA OLCOTT: Do you want to take the questions standing or sitting?

MR. YAVLINSKY: Yes, I’m going to answer the questions standing.

MS. MARTHA OLCOTT: Okay, that’s fine.

Okay, if you would identify yourself when you’re recognized.

Q: Jonathan Terra, Stanford University and the Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education in Prague. People in a lot of countries want to redefine the relationship between business and politics, including the U.S. What are your concrete ideas for that type of reform?

MR. YAVLINSKY: Sorry, I didn’t get you. A little bit slower.

Q: People in many different polities and societies want to redefine the relationship between business and politics. What are your concrete reform proposals?

MR. YAVLINSKY: I can’t be concrete enough, only in the example with Russia, because it’s very difficult to say about all kind of other countries, but general rule I can explain as far as I understand it.

I will say it this way: business, for example, and economy are completely different things – different things. There is a big difference between the business and the economy. Business is type of activity to make money and not to be in prison. Big business wants to make big money and not to be in prison for a long time. (Laughter.) Small business wants to make small money and not to be in prison for a small period of time. Economy is a different thing. Economy is a welfare, is the politics to create a welfare of the state, of the society even more than state – of the society. If the economy is organized in the right way and the government is smart, it’s giving a lot of possibilities for the business to be very rich and not to be in prison, and at the same time to serve the society, to move the society up.

If the government is bad, then it is not giving business a right and possibility to make a lot of money and it is not giving a lot of chances of the society to move up. But the very bad government is the government which simply is a business government itself, which is making simply money and not pushing the society forward.

So the kind of a policy which must be implemented in this area is a very national thing – for every country must be special. But the general idea is that the vital interest of business is different from the vital interest of society. If the society can put business inside, then the business would be a driving force.

And last observation here: maybe you remember the book which was written by Karl Popper. He was speaking about the open society and its enemies. He was saying that fascism and communism are the bigger enemies of an open society. From Russian experience I can tell you that capitalism, or business capitalism, which is not limited by civil rights, by civil society, by trade unions, by culture, by education, by all the civil institutions, is one of the other enemies of an open society.

That maybe not just a precise answer to your question, but that’s what I think.

Q: (Off mike.)

MR. YAVLINSKY: Oh, giving money to parties, it’s a very simple thing. Very specifically I can say I would be happy if parties – for example, very specifically – I would answer very specifically: if a party like mine would get from every voter $1 a year, I would be happy. And that’s it. I’m ready to be transparent. I’m ready to show how I’m using this money, and it’s absolutely enough for me. And I think it’s enough for any party. It’s the German system of financing parties. If for every voter I would have $1 a year, that will be okay. Then I can take some more money from businesses for elections – for the elections. Or to take for the election year $2 from every voter, which was coming from the budget, which is transparent and you can take control of that. This is a specific example.

MS. MARTHA OLCOTT: A question over here.

Q: Andrei Sitov from TASS from Russia. To follow up on that, why should every voter, why should you give you a dollar a year?

MR. YAVLINSKY: Sorry?

Q: Why should I give your Party a dollar a year, as a Russian voter? I mean, liberal democracy is very nice sounding, but in a country like the United States, it’s based on grassroots. And the democracy here, as you know, is in a great degree populism, or a variation of populism: an attempt to cater to the interests of the populace.

Can you describe to us the attitudes of the Russian population towards your Party in view of your results in the elections over the years, and why do you think that the population needs to give your Party a dollar a year in the future?

MR. YAVLINSKY: Okay, thank you very much.

First of all I want to say that you are not – you personally can give your dollar to Mr. Zhirinovsky and that will be much easier, and that will be the right answer. Or if you would not be so brave you can give your dollar to Mr. Putin. He also will be very happy.

Now, to explain, I have 2,700,000 voters. That’s what I have at the moment, according to official data. And I think that 2,700,000 people are ready to give $1 a year in order to have their representatives in the parliament and in Russian politics. That’s the very simple answer.

Q: What about the attitudes over the years? How has it progressed? And why is the Putin support so strong?

MR. YAVLINSKY: Putin’s what?

Q: Why is the Putin support so strong?

MR. YAVLINSKY: Why Putin is supported so strong? Because Brezhnev was supported very strongly, because every Russian leader who is in such a lonely position on the screen would be supported. If you don’t see any other politicians on the screen, and no one have any possibility to speak, then the people have to vote and to support this person which they see. This is a simple like this.

Secondly, Putin is so popular because he is a hope. He is the only hope. There is no other hope in the country because he is the only one who is giving everything. He is giving pensions, he is giving jobs, he’s promising the strong military, he’s promising everything. There is no other politicians; there is no even other political structures in the country.

So what people can do? People have only once chance: to support this person. And that’s why they are saying in the polls very often that they are not supporting his policies but they are supporting him because the policies are a little bit of a different story.

Now, another part of your question: what happened with my Party during the years, I can say not only about my Party – I can say even more. I can say like this. In ’93, the total vote for the Democrats in Russia was 41 percent, including my Party, which got at that time about 8 percent – 41 percent. In ’95 the vote was 18 percent – one-eight. In ’99 the vote was less that 14. Now the vote is less than 10, for all the Democrats – I mean, single mandate, all kind of the parties, all that.

That is the most important issue. Why that happens? It happens because of the failure of the reforms. The failure of the reforms, which were made under Yeltsin and his government, which was named at that time the most democratic force in the world; not only in Russia, but in the world. Yeltsin was the most prominent Democrat in the world and all the leaders of all Western states were just supporting him in this quality and giving him most – the best nominations in the democracy. Yes? But on behalf of so-called democratic forces, which I include Mr. Yeltsin and his government, the government of Chernomyrdin and Mr. Chubais, people saw something absolutely different. They suffered very much from the reforms and they can’t accept this reform and they think that these are reforms that are not acceptable for them.

But I simply want to say that it was not a democratic reform. That's another story. And that governments were not democratic governments and that was the problem of many think-tanks and institutions and the governments in the world. They were not able to understand at that time that this is a post-Soviet – just simply a post-Soviet nomenklatura, but not Democrats and not the liberals at all.

I failed to convince the majority of voters that democracy can be clean, can be limitedly populistic as you said – limitedly populistic, and the market is something which would bring people prosperity. How that happens in Poland, in the Czech Republic, in Hungary, and in Europe, nothing to say about other Western developed democracies. It was my failure that I was not able to explain to the majority of Russian voters – not to 2 million people, but not to explain – not to 5 percent of people, but I was – it was necessary for me to explain to 35 percent of people that that is possible to have a different democracy. And I didn’t fulfill this task. It’s my personal failure. I didn’t do it.

And I have no partners for that because all the world was saying that the genuine democracy is what Mr. Yeltsin, Mr. Chubais is doing. That is the real democracy. And Russia paid for that.

Now the final stage of my answer: Russia paid a terrible price for that. The price is two wars in 10 years. One is still there. I mean the war in Chechnya. Hyperinflation in ’92. Default in ’98. Almost beginning of a civil war in ’93 in Moscow. Those were the elements that brought Russia to the current situation. Those were the elements that brought Russia to the position that Russians just now don’t want to vote for democrats, and they are right in that sense, but certainly if you would come to a person on the street and you would say, tell us, do you want to reelect President every four years? Almost every Russian citizen would say certainly yes. Do you want to be able to say what you want and not to be in prison? He would say yes. Do you want to read in the press about the corruption? He would say yes. Then do you want to have your account in Sberbank, don’t make him threaten – don’t speak about private property, but the account in Sberbank which nobody would touch – you would say, certainly it’s mine. It’s private. I want it. But that means that you are a democrat. No, he would say. I am whoever, but I am not a democrat.

Because democrats in the last 10 years made everything opposite to that. They were never been really, not even liberal democrats, they were not democrats at all. That is the philosophy of the current situation in Russia. That is true. But the problem is – I’m sorry for such a long answer, but the problem is that the policy of Mr. Putin, which I can call derzhavnaya politika, would never bring Russia to the future. That simply wouldn’t work. It’s not a case whether he’s a good man or bad man; simply the policy. I don’t know if this English word – by the way nobody knows. I was asking everybody how to say in English “derzhavnik;” nobody knows. Status is something different, but the substance of this is that he thinks that the state is much more important than an individual and that an individual is serving the state.

This policy in the 21st century in Russia would never take Russia to the future. It would stop Russia. That is the differences between my views and his views for the moment. I think that only policies based on freedom, human rights, and liberal economy and market economy and competition would bring Russia to the future. Derzhavnaya ideology would never bring that.

Q: Angela Stent from the National Intelligence Council. You laid out a very clear roadmap for the direction in which you think Russian should develop, so I have a two-part question for you The first part is, how in a practical way do you think the democratic forces should organize themselves in the next Putin administration to pursue this agenda? And the second part of the question is, can the outside world have any impact on this agenda? Can it do anything to help?

MR. YAVLINSKY: Okay. First of all about democratic forces. So the main problem or task is to find those forces, okay? The problem is that it’s not so easy. At the moment in Russia we have only one organized and structured democratic institution – one – and the task of this one party, which is the Russian Democratic Party Yabloko, which has 80,000 members by the way, is to organize around as many democratic forces as we can find in Russia. And this is the task and this is what we are going to do, but that would not be easy after such a history of the last 12 years it would be very uneasy to do that.

Now, what about the outside world? So, the short answer on the first question, we would have – we would protect the Party and we would try to make all kind of alliances – all kind of alliances – to strengthen this element of the political life in Russia and to be prepared for the next elections. This is the task.

Now, what about the outside world? I would try to give the short answer. For the outside world I see the main task to put your house in order, okay? (Audio break, tape change) – because when Russian people see the problems – I would be very soft – of the Western policy, and they see the conflict between Europe and the United States, when they see the conflict inside NATO, when they see the double standards policy very often, when they see the hypocrisy, when they see all these elements, which one can find just in Western policy at the moment, that’s created big problems for Russia – for Russian democratic development.

I can explain that on one, it seems to me, important example. The example is about Kosovo. It was the beginning of very painful period of time when NATO decided to isolate Yeltsin from NATO’s plan how to put the Kosovo in order, and it was a very big mistake. When Yeltsin understood that, he immediately realized a very strong contra-intrigue and he started to support Milosevich, and it was autumn ’98 when it was absolutely necessary not to make a television show in Rambouillet, but to come to Moscow and to speak to Yeltsin and to put him inside of this decision and to avoid bombing and all this story. Instead of that, half a year on Russian television and in Russian media was anti-Western propaganda which was very strong and very serious and it was very difficult to find any kind of justification of such things. And in May, ’99, when the ground operation was almost inevitable, finally Western leaders came to Yeltsin and Yeltsin – and Russia played its role and the ground operation was not needed and Milosevich stepped back and all that.

So this is the example, but since that time to be an openly pro-Western party, as Yabloko is for example, became a big problem. It was very difficult to justify such approach and such things. I’m not just now speaking about the substance of the event; it is another story. I am speaking about how it was realized – in what way. How the West can make some problems and certainly now, for example, now one more problem: what would happen in Iraq if the United States is going to leave Iraq? That will be a big, big problem for Russia. That’s another story whether it was necessary to go to Iraq or not – it’s a different story. It’s already finished. This page turned. Now, to leave Iraq in the situation it is now means to replace Saddam Hussein and to put in his place a group of Bin Ladens, which I would not – don’t think it would be very smart.

So there are a lot of elements of politics that are important for us. If you really want to show what means liberal democracy which is based on values, which is based on principles, which is based on all the things that appeared in world politics after the Second World War, that will be the best support and best help for Russian democracy because Russian change in ’91 came not from economic difficulties, but it was – it happened because people wanted the quality of life and type of living that they saw in Western Europe and in North America. And when they have disappointments from time to time in that, that’s the most serious problem for Russia.

Q: Svetlana Savranskaya, the National Security Archive. You described the sad tendency with support for democratic forces in Russia and you also described the situation with no independent media and no independent judiciary, and I’m wondering what is your strategy? How would you make the idea of liberal democracy attractive again in Russia? How – what channels do you use? How do you make it attractive specifically to young people – to the new generation in the system where it’s very hard to use any independent outlets? What are your views on that?

MR. YAVLINSKY: To say about channels, I wouldn’t say something new. It’s kind of newspapers, it’s kind of seminars, it’s kind of education, it’s kind of communication. But if to speak on the most serious level, then I would say it’s not me, the life would bring the country to that direction. I am only an element which can help and my Party is a structure which can help. It’s just now a structure in a very complicated position, but if we would be able to protect it, then it would come the time when that would work, but it’s not for human beings to do such things. It’s for life. Life would bring that direction because nevertheless there are all these limitations which I explained to you. If Russia wants to survive in the 21st century, if Russia doesn’t want to collapse in the 21st century, then that’s the only way.

Q: Bill Maynes, Eurasia Foundation. I wanted to push you a bit further on your statement that a top priority is – (inaudible) – the system of oligarchs that developed in the mid-‘90s. Antitrust – that could range form trying to prevent price collusion all the way to breaking them up. Where do you stand on that scale? Would you break up the companies that have been formed? What does antitrust mean?

MR. YAVLINSKY: Antitrust laws means that it would implement the – such rules for the economic development that the new hungry groups, which are very much the element of this troubles which we have, would not be in a position to fight for these very big companies again. Do you understand what I mean? There were the groups which created very big pieces of property. Now, the class which you see in the Russian internal politics from this point of view is a class which is based on the fact that the other groups which were not so successful at that time want to take these big companies to themselves, but my idea is to stop that. To say that no one except those who just own that, but in the conditions of competition then the situation would change. Once again can have such big pieces to control, let’s say, 12 percent or 15 percent of Russian oilfields or something like that.

Antitrust legislation as you had in the beginning of the previous century. This is absolutely crucial for us because it’s the basis of corruption. I was not speaking about the corruption today at all, but corruption is still one of the most difficult problems for Russia. Certainly corruption was created with the big help from the Western world, so it was a joint venture because as far as I know Russian corrupted officials are not keeping their accounts in Saddam Hussein’s banks or in the banks of North Korea. The accounts of our corrupted officials are – I’m not going to say in which countries and in which cities. So if you had not been so prepared for that 10 years ago, we would not be so successful in developing corruption.

But once again, just answering the same, try to be the example. That would be very helpful. But in case of antitrust laws, it’s very important to go in the same direction the United States did at that time.

Q: (Inaudible) – Georgetown University. Mr. Yavlinsky, I wanted to ask you why Yabloko refused the proposal of SPS to go with the common bloc to parliamentary elections and considering then one of the purposes of parties – to take the power – do you think that going as a common bloc could change at least a little bit the outcome of your percentage?

And my second question – very short – before the parliamentary elections we saw some trends, some quite dangerous trends, in Russian foreign policy in Near Abroad by a conflict with Ukraine, by the conflict – some problems in Moldova, some problems in Georgia. Do you think this was just some pre-election trends of Russian foreign policy, or it’s just a long-term trend and the post-Soviet states really have to prepare for a new wave of more active, let’s say, like this Russian foreign policy?

Thank you.

MR. YAVLINSKY: Russia – Yabloko rejected the proposal of SPS because we are absolutely different parties with absolutely different views. That’s it. Because SPS was the party which conducted all these policies, as a result of which the people don’t want to vote for democracy. So what – if I would make a merger with SPS, I would lose three fourths of my electorate immediately in the same second. This is absolutely unacceptable. Among that, SPS has in its list the most hated people in Russia. It’s very difficult to find a politician who will be prepared to – just to be married to that. What is the purpose?

Political arithmetic and arithmetic are two different things. In arithmetic, four plus four is eight. In political arithmetic, four plus four may be two. So I would recommend SPS to go its own way. It’s the right party which is based on protection, big property, huge property, which is linked to the state. And we have different views. We are liberal democratic party. We were not supporting Putin in 2000. We are not supporting Putin at the moment. The congress of SPS in fact supported Putin and didn’t support Khakamada for example. Yes? We were not supporting the war in Chechnya and SPS said that it’s a revival of the Russian military in Chechnya. We were not in favor to close NTV. We were not in favor to close TV6 and the other – and the other – and I already forget it – TVS. All these television stations which were private and independent we were not in favor to close them. They were closing them.

So if you – are you for freedom of speech? Then you must be consistent. If you are against the war, you must be consistent. If you are against oligarchy, then you must be consistent. And it is not enough to say simply, I am for democracy and market. Everybody is for democracy and market – everybody. By the way, President Putin’s speech which he made two weeks ago is an excellent liberal-democratic speech. And so what? That’s why we didn’t go together. It’s different parties with different views.

Now, what about our neighbors – whether they must be concerned. Yes. Always. (Laughter.) Best regards.

MS. MARTHA OLCOTT: There’s a question over here. Right behind you.

Q: Peter Trofimenko, Emerging Markets Management. I was fascinated with your analogy with the mid-‘30s specifically in the context of not only the government being corrupted by the business and being one together with the business, but also by the absence of control over security services in Russia either from the parliamentary or from the political, or say public, bodies.

Could you make projection? I know that you’re saying that Russia has no future under Putin’s government and the way it behaves, but what do you see will happen? If history is a guidance to us, the prospects are frightening. You know, mid-‘30s it was just before the war and then we all know about the Gulag thing and a lot of other things that went badly wrong in Russia. What do you expect Russia and the political situation and economic environment in Russia to do in the next, say, 20 years?

MR. YAVLINSKY: If what?

Q: No. No if. As it is now, with the lack of public control –

MR. YAVLINSKY: Ah, you ask me what would happen.

Q: What would happen, yes.

MR. YAVLINSKY: The answer is everything. Everything can happen. It doesn’t meant that the situation would be changed. It’s not the system which would exist as the system of the ‘30s for 70 years. No. No. This system is not so strong. It would be changing. It would be changing not only under the pressure of liberal democratic forces or whatever; it would be changing on its own internal reasons. It’s not stable. It’s very unstable system.

For example, what is the type of relations between Putin and his party, which is just now in the Duma? It’s the type of relations like between Mr. Khrushchev and Soviet party apparatus. It’s not a political grouping. So while they are friends, everything is okay. If they would break the friendship for some reasons – if this all contradictions which certainly exist in such structures would be developed, then it would be all changing. And by the way, a year from now it would be a new adult entertainment in Russia looking for the successor. It’ll be a new story. You can imagine what would happen inside.

So I want to say that this system is not stable. It would – why I am saying that there is no future? Because the system itself in the 21st century under the information technologies with such developments of the world and so on and so forth, it is not stable. So I am not prepared to give you the forecast for 20 years. First of all because I am not a Hitchcock and secondly because I think that many things would be changed. And I believe – I strongly believe that in two, three, four years Russia is going to come back on this – on the track which was the choice at the end of ‘80s.

Q: Larisa Glad, Voice of America. It’s a follow-up question. If Mr. Putin will – if you – like you compared it to the ‘30s; maybe he will come up with a new economic policy, something like NEP, and in the process actually have someone who would come as the next President – prepare someone for that role. Is that possible?

MR. YAVLINSKY: I don’t know. I don’t know. The only changes I see if Mr. Putin would really understand that trying to create the vertical of power and the elements of a police state and trying to operate business from the top and trying to use repressive measures in order to dismantle oligarchic system, trying to operate with the judicial system, trying to operate all media, and so on and so forth, that that wouldn’t work.

Maybe he would come to such conclusion, and then that means that the system is going to be changed. He can take in other people, he can make another steps. That can happen. I don’t believe in that, but that can happen. That’s the only think I can say. It’s very difficult. Many time in many newspapers and everywhere it is said that Russia has stability. Russian stability today is uncertainly. We are stable every second in understanding that we are uncertain. In that sense we are absolutely stable.

Can you imagine such a stable government which is coming to the meeting with the President and while they are moving in the cars to the Kremlin the television is saying that they’re fired? That’s what’s happened. All the Russian newspapers are saying about that. They came to the meeting with the President for innovation policy and no one of them was aware that they all fired. And the journalists were meeting them at the doors and asking, how do you feel yourself? Hello. They were saying, we’re okay. And what? We want to know, how are you? Why? They said, because you are fired. That were the ministers who were coming in the room. So this is the kind of stability. And you’re asking me what would happen tomorrow.

Russia is a country with unpredictable past, not only with unpredictable future. (Laughter.)

Q: Jonathan Terra, Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education in Prague in the Czech Republic. In a room full of democrats, Vladimir Putin makes a very easy punching bag. What good has he done for Russia and Russians since he rose to power?

MR. YAVLINSKY: Putin made a very good thing for Russia – very important and very good. When he took the right – conceptually right policy after the 11th of September of 2001. That was very important, and since that time my Party and I were supporting him in that by all means because it was a very serious crossroad. If the – if at that time he would have made a wrong decisions, then many things which I am discussing just now would be simply senseless because, seriously saying, influence of the world – of the Western world on Russia development is very huge, very important – very important especially now when we have problems with the press and so on and so on. It’s very important. So from that point of view, Putin made a very serious, serious step.

I can find some other things, but I’m speaking today in the principal – on the principal issues. Seriously speaking, the problem that my Party didn’t cross 5 percent – it’s not a problem. The problem was and is why my Party was fighting for 5 percent, not for 35 percent. That is the problem. 5 percent – if you want in Russia have a 6 percent, you have to fight for 35 percent, then you would be guaranteed about 6 percent. Okay? If you try only to balance for a long time about 5 – 6 percent, this is not an influence. This is an advisor on liberal matters with a totalitarian leader, you know? You are an expert for that disease which is called liberal democracy and he can ask you something what to do with this or with that.

That is our problem, but this problem is rooted, especially because you are from the Czech Republic I want to tell you, because in your country at the end of ‘80s was a real democratic revolution and in Russia, no. In ’91 there was no democratic revolution. It was two days of revolution – literally two days – 18 and 19 of August, and then 21 of August it was a revenge or kind of a – (unintelligible) – or without blood certainly. When the members of the Politburo came to power and led the country. And why that – and in 10 years in Russia – in 10 years of all this democratic reforms, we have 10 Prime Ministers. All of them, with no exception, were the members – the representatives of the Central Committee of Communist Party of the representatives of KGS/FSB. All except one young man who was a young Communist League officer which created in two months default and disappeared. All the others were the Central Committee, Communist Party, or KGB people.

Why that happened in Russia? Because in your country revolution started in 1968, in Hungary in 1956, in Poland in beginning of ‘70s, and in Russia it started at the end of ‘80s, absolutely unexpectedly, because Gorbachev gave freedom. It was not the fight from the grassroots of the society. It was simply historical accident. That’s happened in this way. That’s why we are still in post-Soviet transition period, and our democratic revolution is ahead if the time would give us a chance.

MS. MARTHA OLCOTT: I think on that note I’m going to thank you very, very much for a really brilliant tour de force.

MR. YAVLINSKY: Thank you.

(Applause.)

(END)