The Political Situation in Ukraine Before the Presidential Election

On March 29, 2004, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a discussion on the state of Ukrainian politics with Borys Tarasyuk, Chairman of the People’s Movement of Ukraine (known as the “Rukh”), a deputy chairman of Our Ukraine, and a member of the Verkhovna Rada. Roman Zvarych, another Our Ukraine member of parliament, also took part. Dr. Anders Åslund, Director of the Carnegie Endowment’s Russian and Eurasian Program, chaired the meeting.

Ambassador Tarasyuk began by noting that the forthcoming presidential election would be the third-most-important event in the history of domestic Ukrainian politics, after the restoration of independence in 1991 and the adoption of a constitution in 1996. It would have immense implications for the region, and for Europe as a whole. Ukraine’s membership of the European Union and NATO depends on the outcome of this election. Should a member of the current regime take power, Ukrainian integration into these structures would be set back eight or ten years.

The effects of the forthcoming presidential election will perhaps be felt for 50 years to come. A recent Democratic Initiative survey indicated that 84 percent of Ukrainians consider the election to be “very important.” Thus, its importance is understood by the public, and not overstated by politicians.

After independence, power to Ukraine went to nomenklatura holdouts and the “red directors” of enterprises, who tried to institute autocracy in the country. The presidency became an institution that gave power to an unpopular person (Leonid Kuchma, with about 7 percent support) surrounded by clans concerned with their own economic interests.

Center-right political forces enjoy the support of the public, but are in opposition. Thus, Our Ukraine, which is the largest faction in the Ukrainian parliament, the Verkhovna Rada, with 99 deputies or more, is in opposition to the ruling regime. If Viktor Yushchenko wins the presidential election, Our Ukraine’s presence in the Rada may increase by 50 to 100 percent. So far, whatever government has been in power in Ukraine, except for Mr. Yushchenko’s, its policies have been the same.

Recently, a process of constitutional change has begun, aimed at changing Ukraine from a presidential-parliamentary republic to a parliamentary-presidential one. Such a system would not be bad in principle if it ensures the prevalence of democracy, and establishes a system that would prevent a repetition of the Kuchma phenomenon.

However, the aim of the constitutional reform package is not better governance, but rather the usurpation of power by the current regime. The authorities are not acting sincerely. Civil society, the media and rule of law are all under attack. The opposition wins elections, but others remain in power. The regime is not accountable to the people’s will, and, furthermore, distorts and manipulates public opinion. Political scandals do not seem to affect those on top of the system. Major Mykola Melnychenko’s tapes have not had a significant effect. The regime killed Heorhiy Gongadze, Vyacheslav Chornovil, and Ihor Aleksandrov, and has gotten away with it.

The state machine is being used to suppress the opposition. Businesses sympathetic to the opposition are under attack. Ukraine finds itself in a deep political crisis, despite a GDP growth rate of 8 percent. The major business clans are accumulating wealth by operating in the shadow economy and using their closeness to President Kuchma to avoid taxation. There is a growing gap between rich and poor in Ukraine – one of the greatest in Europe.

There are two distinctions between the presidential campaigns of 1999 and 2004. In 1999, the regime used Yevhen Marchuk as a Trojan horse to destroy the opposition. The Communist leader, Petro Symonenko, became the opposition candidate, which was precisely what Mr. Kuchma wanted, because Mr. Symonenko was easy to beat. Now the authorities are using a different tactic: they have started changing the electoral rules. They are trying to switch powers from the president to the prime minister, who would be elected by a parliament under their control. This would keep power in the hands of the current regime, and allow the regime to replicate itself later.

The current reform proposals run counter to Mr. Kuchma’s prior endeavors. The president has been toying with the idea of constitutional reform since 2000. However, he sought greater powers for himself since coming into office in 1996. The quest for such powers has been a consistent policy line for him. Even as early as 1993, Mr. Kuchma wanted greater powers for the post of prime minister when he himself occupied that position. In his newer proposals for constitutional reform, he floated the idea of a two-chamber parliament, where powers would mostly move to the upper house, which would be controlled by him. Thus, Mr. Tarasyuk does not believe in President Kuchma’s sincerity in the constitutional reform process.

The new version of reforms has been dubbed the Medvedchuk-Symonenko package. Everybody has accepted this name, even though Viktor Medvedchuk is not a member of parliament, but rater Mr. Kuchma’s chief of staff, and is thus not supposed to propose legislation.

The desire to undermine the constitution has been so strong on the part of the regime, that proper parliamentary procedure has not been followed regarding the constitutional reform issue. On December 24, 2003, the reform package was approved in the first reading by a show of hands. The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) declared this move to be contrary to the Ukrainian constitution. The December events became possible when the communists left the opposition and joined the so-called majority in parliament. In February 2004, the Socialists participated in an effort to legitimize the December vote. If the authorities continue down the unconstitutional road they have taken, the constitutional amendments may be adopted by next month.

The communists and socialists lent their support to the regime in exchange for the regime’s support for a proportional system in parliamentary elections and a new local election system. Last week, considerable change was introduced through the new electoral law, which mandates proportional representation with a 3 percent threshold. However, monitoring of the elections by NGOs was banned.

Meanwhile, the opposition has shrunk from four parties to two: only Our Ukraine and the Yuliya Tymoshenko Bloc are still in opposition. The EU sent a strong message to Ukrainian authorities on January 28, 2004 condemning its tampering with the constitution. The PACE sent a similar, but more detailed, report on January 29. The European Parliament also approved a resolution condemning the Ukrainian regime. Unfortunately, nothing similar has come from the United States.

Turning to the subject of possible candidates in the upcoming presidential election, Mr. Tarasyuk noted that Vyktor Yushchenko has been the most popular politician in Ukraine for the last three years, his support ranging from 24 to 27 percent. He is followed in popularity by the current prime minister, Vyktor Yanukovych, with 14 percent, Petro Symonenko with 11 percent, and Yuliya Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Moroz, with 6 percent each. Another poll asked whom voters would elect if Mr. Yushchenko were the single candidate of three opposition forces (Our Ukraine, the Tymoshenko Bloc, and the Socialist Party). In this scenario, around 30 percent would vote for Yushchenko, and about 14 percent for Mr. Yanukovych.

A majority (53 percent) of those surveyed wanted President Kuchma to resign. Further, 45 percent said they would oppose any successor nominated by Kuchma. According to a poll taken last month, 73 percent would not vote for Mr. Kuchma. The same survey indicated that, in a second-round face-off between Yushchenko and Yanukovych, 40 percent would support the former, and 23 percent would vote for the latter.

When asked to name the greatest current opposition leader, most people chose Mr. Yushchenko. The situation was different even six months ago, when many were complaining that Mr. Yushchenko was not visible enough as an opposition leader, and did not oppose the regime strongly enough. Yuliya Tymoshenko was the more noticeable opposition leader at the time. Now, however, the public perception of Mr. Yushchenko has changed. At the same time, the regime is trying to push him far to the right and depict him as an extremist; if it succeeds, Yushchenko would lose public support, because the Ukrainian electorate favors moderation.

A new development in Ukrainian politics is the attack by President Kuchma on the elected mayors of several cities, namely Odesa, Mukachevo, Krasny Luch, Romny, and, most recently, Ternopil. Mr. Tarasyuk saw these moves as the regime’s rehearsal for the elections. They are trying to see what the reaction would be if opposition candidates, such as Mr. Yushchenko, are disqualified. The low-key international response to the attack on mayors is a wrong signal to send to the regime. The regime backed off on previous occasions when the international response was stronger.

Nowadays, Our Ukraine bears the brunt of anti-opposition attacks. There are rumors of an $80 million fund to buy off Our Ukraine deputies. The coalition is a major obstacle in the path of unlimited rule by the regime.

Mr. Yushchenko would like to transform his nine-party coalition into a single party. However, it is already too late for such a move, and to undertake it now would amount to political suicide. Human and other resources would have to be diverted to this reorganization from the coalition’s major aim, which is to win the presidency. As the leader of Rukh, Mr. Tarasyuk thought that Our Ukraine could eventually lead to the formation of two strong parties.

Currently, the authorities are trying to muzzle the free media in preparation for the presidential election. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Deutsche Welle and the BBC have been taken off the local airwaves. Silski visti, a large-circulation newspaper, has been closed. The regime has been trying to close the independent Channel Five television station.

The government uses fairly honest economic statistics, and the macroeconomic figures look good. However, the price of basic goods is rising. The minimum wage has been reduced from 237 hryvnias to 205. In a democratic country, a government that reduced the minimum wage would not survive. However, the Ukrainian government does not care about the reality that people have to deal with. Moreover, it has been trying to hide 10 billion hryvnias from the public.

As a result of the regime’s policies, the image of Ukraine in the eyes of the EU is low. The EU has sent Ukraine negative signals about prospective membership, and the NATO Istanbul summit is unlikely to have a positive outcome for Ukraine. The United States is busy with other things, and thus does has not been paying much attention to Ukrainian affairs. However, there are signs of a changing attitude in Washington. Mr. Tarasyuk concluded that democracy in Ukraine is in jeopardy. Compared to Belarus or the Central Asian states, however, Ukraine is democratic, but those countries are not the example to follow.

In the question and answer session, Mr. Tarasyuk noted that the Ukrainian Constitutional Court passed a ruling contrary to the constitution when it said that Mr. Kuchma could run for president again if he so wished. A court in Kiev recently gave the judge who defended Ms. Tymoshenko a two-year suspended sentence. There are strong law schools in Kharkiv, Kiev, Odesa and Lviv, but these are either co-operative with the regime, or they are ignored. There is now an imbalance between the three branches of government, with the executive dominating the other two. This state of affairs has been criticized by the PACE.

Mr. Zvarych added that the December 24, 2004 vote on constitutional amendments was taken in a seven-minute extraordinary session, despite the fact that the Constitutional Court had ruled in 2001 that constitutional amendments could not be discussed in an extraordinary session. However, the court stayed silent about this violation of its own ruling.

Regarding the Communists and Socialsts, Mr. Tarasyuk said that Mr. Moroz seceded from Our Ukraine because of personal ambition. There is no likelihood of his supporting a united opposition candidate in the presidential election. As for the Communists, they are being used by the regime, just as they were in 1999. They were thus never truly in opposition.

When asked about what methods the United States could use to pressure Ukraine in favor of democracy, Mr. Zvarych cited Mr. Yushchenko’s suggestion that the U.S. implement a policy of “escalating linkage.” In Mr. Zvarych’s own opinion, the NATO summit would be an excellent venue to criticize Kiev. The United States could also take issue with Ukraine’s entry into a Single Economic Space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, because such a space, which is meant to lead to a customs union, could impede Ukraine’s accession to the World Trade Organization. The recent remarks of U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage signaled a move to “balanced criticism” on the part of the United States.

On a different question, Mr. Zvarych noted that the regime wants Ms. Tymoshenko to run for president, but her bloc has come to an understanding with Our Ukraine, whereby they will coordinate strategies and resources.

In conclusion, Mr. Tarasyuk observed that the authorities were trying to buy off the security forces in preparation for the election. The salaries of interior ministry forces, the police, the security service, and the armed forces, have been raised. There has also been a minor rise in pensions. Although it seems that important reforms have been made in the parliamentary election process, Mr. Tarasyuk believes that these will be watered down dramatically before the next parliament is elected.

Summary prepared by Rashed Chowdhury, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian program at the Carnegie Endowment.