Taiwan at the Crossroad: Analyzing the Presidential Election

The conference was an invitation-only event attended by approximately 150 individuals, including US officials, businesspersons, representatives of nonprofit organizations, local experts and academics, and the media. Four panels examined the impact of the election on: Taiwan's domestic politics, Taiwan's foreign relations (especially relations with the United States), cross-Strait issues, and the views of the three major Taiwan political parties (the Democratic Progressive Party, the Chinese Nationalist Party, and the People's First Party).

Panel members included Washington-based experts on Taiwan, U.S-Taiwan and U.S.-China relations, and a Prospect Foundation-organized delegation from Taiwan of nine leading scholars, led by former ROC Premier Vincent Siew. Premier Siew also delivered a luncheon keynote address. The conference was convened and presided over by China Program Senior Associate Michael D. Swaine and Arthur Ding of the Institute of International Relations, Cheng Chi University, Taipei.

The agenda of the conference is attached below and a formal report on the findings of the conference will be issued in the near future. Some initial observations include the following:

Although the razor-thin margin of victory achieved by incumbent President Chen Shui-bian in the March 20th Taiwan presidential election is being challenged by the Pan-Blue opposition led by Lien Chan and James Soong, most observers believe that the result will stand.

The outcome of the election, along with the highly divisive and rancorous election campaign and the ongoing dispute over the authenticity of the supposed assassination attempt against Chen Shui-bian and his vice-presidential running-mate Annette Lu, indicate that Taiwan politics---and the citizenry of Taiwan---have become highly polarized. Some panelists believe that the tactics and behavior of the contending parties -- and much of the public -- during the election campaign and with regard to the assassination attempt have eroded confidence in due process and institutional authority on Taiwan and reconfirmed the highly zero-sum nature of Taiwan politics. For these observers, Taiwan's democratic system remains highly immature. In contrast, other panelists stressed that the general absence of violence following the assassination attempt and the apparent willingness of much of the public to allow the legal and administrative system to sort out the various charges and counter-charges associated with both the election and the assassination attempt indicate the basic soundness of Taiwan's core institutions.

Chen Shui-bian and his Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), with the support of the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) led by former President Lee Teng-hui, are now confirmed as a major force in Taiwan politics and could in fact become the dominant political movement on the island, depending on the results of the upcoming elections for the Taiwan Legislative Yuan (LY) in December 2004. Indeed, the December LY elections were widely viewed by the conference participants as a critical indicator of the distribution of political power in Taiwan over at least the medium term.

If the Pan-Green alliance of the DPP and TSU utilize the momentum generated by the presidential election to overturn the narrow majority held by the Pan-Blue opposition in the LY, the latter could fragment or at a minimum would lose significant power. Control of both the presidency and the legislature by the Pan-Green alliance will likely permit an acceleration of this process.

The opposition Pan-Blue alliance (consisting of the Chinese Nationalist Party and the People's First Party) is thus under enormous pressure to develop a strategy to withstand or reverse the momentum generated by Chen and the Pan-Green alliance. Many panelists believe that this will require a new, more charismatic leadership more closely in tune with the bulk of the Taiwan public, a high degree of internal cooperation over issues such as the nomination of alliance candidates for the December LY election, and further movement by the Pan-Blue toward the middle of the policy spectrum on issues like domestic reform, national identity, and cross-Strait policy. But even if such actions are taken, some participants expect that the Taiwan public might nonetheless support the attainment of a Pan-Green majority in the LY, in order to end the political deadlock of the past four years.

Given the slim margin of victory attained by the Pan-Green in the presidential election, the failure of President Chen Shui-bian's two "peace referenda" to achieve the required threshold for validation, and the public and private criticism leveled by the United States prior to the election against Chen's alleged effort to unilaterally alter the China-Taiwan status quo, many observers have expressed the belief that Chen must strike a more conciliatory stance on a variety of issues affecting U.S.-Taiwan and Taiwan-China relations. However, the conference participants expressed a considerable difference of opinion over whether Chen is indeed moving, or will soon move, toward such a stance. Some participants pointed to Chen's recently unveiled peace and stability proposal and his avowed intent to avoid altering the status quo as indicators of a strong desire to open a dialogue with Beijing and to reduce tensions. However, most participants stated that Chen's continued desire to hold future referenda on such sensitive issues as a new constitution, combined with his definition of the status quo as an effort to consolidate Taiwan's "existing" independence and sovereignty as a nation suggest that he intends to continue what many regard as highly provocative behavior.

At the same time, many conference participants suggested that, despite his apparent intentions, Chen might remain highly constrained, even if he wins a majority in the December LY elections. For example, he will likely face considerable difficulties in altering the referenda law to permit a future referendum on a new constitution. And he will probably need to consult with and reflect the views of the opposition in determining the content of any referendum on a new or revised constitution. Moreover, it remains unclear as to whether the public would support a referendum on the constitution, given its apparent rejection of Chen's earlier referenda.

Some conference participants expressed the view that, during his second term in office, Chen will probably remain squeezed between his pro-independence political base and growing business sentiment in favor of opening direct commercial contacts with China. These pressures will likely result in occasional strident, pro-independence rhetoric alongside concrete improvements in cross-Strait relations, centered on the establishment of the Three Links. This largely optimistic viewpoint believes that tensions in the Taiwan-China-U.S. relationship will decline if the Three Links are indeed established, and Beijing continues to rely primarily on the United States to restrain Chen's most provocative actions. More important, this scenario largely assumes that Beijing will ultimately decide to ignore Chen's more provocative statements and acknowledge the constraints confronting Chen, while also adopting a more conciliatory stance on such issues as the Three Links.

However, other conference participants, perhaps a majority, strongly disagreed with this optimistic assessment. They believe that China will remain steadfastly opposed to a Chen government, will not undertake more conciliatory actions, and will not rely solely or even primarily on the U.S. government to restrain Taiwan. These participants believe that China will become more pessimistic about the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue and will thus accordingly intensify its military buildup. Although some participants argued that Chen's election confirms that China's policy toward Taiwan has failed and that a prudent course of action for Beijing would be to reassess its overall approach to Taiwan, few if any participants believe that this will occur. Such unlikely prospects, combined with the belief among some participants that Chen shows every sign of using his strengthened political position to press forward with his efforts to "consolidate" Taiwan's independence, resulted in calls for the United States to become more involved in controlling the Taiwan situation.

Yet no consensus emerged among the participants over what actions the United States should undertake to control the situation. Some of those participants most concerned with Chen's allegedly "provocative" and "irresponsible" behavior suggested that Washington must exert greater direct pressure on Taiwan while encouraging both sides to shelve the issue of sovereignty and move toward some kind of interim agreement. In contrast, those participants who are most supportive of Chen's actions as an expression of the democratic aspirations and will of the Taiwan people argued that the best way to control the situation is for the United States to encourage China to jettison its "obsolete" One China principle and to think more creatively about how Taiwan might achieve more international respect without provoking a military conflict.

Despite the above differences, and whether seen as an opportunity or a danger, all participants seemed to agree that Taiwan's recent presidential election was a momentous event and, depending on the outcome of the December LY elections, could significantly alter the prospects for continued peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

"TAIWAN AT THE CROSS ROAD?: ANALYZING THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION"
APRIL 6, 2004
CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE
WASHINGTON, DC

8:30 Registration and Breakfast

9:00 Welcome and Introduction
Michael D. SWAINE, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Arthur DING, Institute of International Relations

9:15 Taiwan Domestic Politics
Session Chair: Dr. Minxin PEI, Carnegie Endowment Professor CHU Yun-han, National Taiwan University
Professor Hsueh-wen SOONG, National Chengchi University
Joseph DONOVAN, US Department of State

10:30 Coffee Break

10:45 Cross-Strait Relations
Session Chair: Arthur DING, Institute of International Relations
Professor TUNG Chen-yuan, Institute of International Relations Professor Edward CHEN, Tamkang University
Ms. Bonnie GLASER, CSIS

12:00 Lunch

12:45 Luncheon Keynote: Vincent C. SIEW, Chung Hua Institute for Economic Research and former Premier of the Republic of China

2:00 Taiwan's Foreign Relations
Session Chair: Dr. Michael SWAINE, Carnegie Endowment
Dr. Joanne J. L. CHANG, Academia Sinica
Professor David M. LAMPTON, Nixon Center and SAIS, Johns Hopkins University
Mr. Alan ROMBERG, Henry L. Stimson Center

3:15 Coffee Break

3:30 Political Parties' View
Session Chair: Professor CHU Yun-han, National Taiwan University
Professor GER Yeong-Kuang, KMT
Professor YAN Jiann-Fa, DPP
Professor Edward CHEN, Tamkang University

4:45 Closing Remarks