Chechnya: Beyond the Headlines

On May 18, 2004, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a meeting on "Chechnya: Beyond the Headlines." Dmitri Trenin, Senior Associate and Deputy Director of the Carnegie Moscow Center, addressed the assassination of Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov on May 9, 2004 and the implications of the bombing on the future Russian policy in the region. Carnegie Senior Associate Anatol Lieven served as a discussant, and Carnegie Senior Associate Martha Brill Olcott chaired the meeting.

Trenin argued that the assassination of Chechen President Akhmad Kadyrov on May 9, 2004 was a major blow to the Russian policy of “chechenisation.” Under this policy Putin wanted to put the region in Chechen hands giving it some autonomy but not independence. Kadyrov was willing to engage in peace talks with Russia. Putin appointed Kadyrov the head of the provisional administration of Chechnya in June 2000. On October 5, 2003, Kadyrov was elected president of the Chechen Republic with 80 percent of the vote, however, he was killed in a bomb explosion during Victory Day celebrations in Grozny. Chechen rebel Shamil Basayev claimed responsibility for the attack. Basayev considered Kadyrov a traitor for abandoning the rebels and allying with the Kremlin in late 1990s.

While some political experts claim that Kadyrov’s killing marked the end of the policy of “chechenisation,” Trenin argues that while the assassination was a serious blow to the policy, it was the unsustainable one-person dependent “policy of kadyrarization” that was defeated in Chechnya. Although in danger, “chechenisation” as a policy remains valid.

Several solutions to the Chechen conflict have been offered, including immediate Russian troop withdrawal, Chechen independence, a UN mandate, and an international aid package for Chechen reconstruction. Trenin doubts that such proposals are realistic solutions to a “deadly cocktail of armed separatism, terrorism, and common banditry.” The return of Russian military rule is more plausible and will depend on the scale of future terrorist attacks carried out by Chechen rebels.

With Kadyrov’s assassination, “Putin lost a buffer and will have to engage himself more personally for the fist time in the last four years,” Trenin said. In fact, Putin has already begun doing so by paying a surprise visit to Chechnya on May 11, 2004. During this clandestine trip, Putin met with the local officials and promised to strengthen the efforts to rebuild Grozny.

New presidential elections in Chechnya will take place in early September 2004,until then Sergei Abramov will serve as the acting president. There have been speculations that Kadyrov’s son Ramzan will become the next president. The Chechen constitution requires that the president be at least 30 years old. This bars 27-year old Ramzan Kadyrov from running in the September elections, thereby preventing a father to son succession of the presidency in Chechnya. Most likely Putin will nominate a local Chechen with a KGB/FSB background as a successor. Trenin stressed that the upcoming presidential elections, the second under the new Chechen constitution, will be key to Chechnya’s future if they are free, fair, and contested.

Trenin pointed out three main challenges that Putin faces as he “tries to get Chechnya off the headlines” before the summer of 2006 when Russia is expected to host the G-8 summit in Moscow. The Russian president has to win a broader support for the Kremlin policy among the Chechens that is crucial to the success of the “chechenisation.” Putin also has to overcome the suspicions of the Russian military who do not approve the presence of former rebels in the Chechen administration. Finally, it is important to reduce corruption and bureaucracy within the Russian government with regards to Chechnya. Currently, despite the large sums of money allocated to Chechnya, reconstruction efforts have failed due to high levels of corruption. “Chechnya is a commercial enterprise with many people profiting on both sides,” Trenin explained.

Lieven agreed with Trenin that the Russian government is committed both to “chechenisation” of the Russian side of the conflict and the restoration of the Chechen economy, promoting future growth and the stability in the republic. Lieven also agrees that Western proposals to solve the Chechen conflict have not been realistic, but added that the restoration of direct Russian military rule “would be a disaster.” Concerning U.S. criticism of Russia’s record and behavior in Chechnya, Lieven expressed the hope that the setbacks the U.S. is now experiencing in Iraq would lead to a less arrogant and more sympathetic approach. Above all, just as proposals for a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq should be accompanied by serious suggestions for what kind of order can replace the U.S. presence, so the same should be true with regard to calls for a Russian withdrawal from Chechnya.

Olcott argued that Putin’s visit to Chechnya was both courageous and brilliant, casting him as a much stronger leader. Putin faces the task of creating cohesion among the divided population in Chechnya to prevent a civil war and unite the republic for reconstruction. The ability to recruit troops and sustain civilian casualties has a potential to undermine Russia’s position in Chechnya in the future. Another challenge is the Russian military’s capacity to build security mechanisms.

Lieven and Olcott discussed a parallel between Northern Ireland and the conflict in Chechnya. Both conflicts have continued for many years with regular terrorist attacks. A key difference however has been that the British faced an enemy, the IRA, that was strongly organized and disciplined with its own hierarchical leadership (something that was also true of the Sri Lankan government faced with the Tamil Tigers, and in the 1990s, Israel and the PLO). That allowed the two sides eventually to reach a settlement, which the IRA has been able to make stick. The Russians, on the other hand, face a fragmented resistance with no discipline, structure, or political organization. That greatly reduces the chance of reaching an agreement, since there is no one on the side of the Chechen insurgents who could make an agreement stick. Chechen society has not generated a political party or modern political structures, nor, unlike other national areas, did it have a cemented communist elite during the Soviet times, due above all to the deportations of 1944-57 and Soviet distrust of the Chechens.

In conclusion, all three speakers agreed that while a large scale guerilla war is coming to an end, they foresee no true end to the conflict in the near future. They all described the Chechen conflict as a fundamentally national struggle, but one which like other such conflicts around the world (Palestine, Kashmir, the Southern Philippines) has to some extent been “colonized” by the forces of international Sunni extremism and terrorism.

Summary prepared by Kate Vlachtchenko, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian program at the Carnegie Endowment.