How Much Has Federal Power Increased under President Putin?

Dr. Petrov began by noting that the consolidation of federal power in Russia has weakened democracy. He examined the means used by the Kremlin to gain control over the regional governors, and concluded that the resulting expansion of the vertical hierarchy has made the government dangerously inflexible.

In his second term, President Vladimir Putin has continued the transfer of power from the regional to the federal level. Putin is a manager, a type of technocrat, and although he is not directly anti-democratic, his dislike for uncertainty and instability has led to the creation of a "managed democracy" in which the Kremlin’s power has increased at the expense of Russia’s other democratic institutions. In the future, this effort to consolidate power is only likely to intensify. After the Beslan attack, Putin stated that to fight terrorists Russia must be reunified.

Over the past four years, a major redistribution of power occurred within the Russian government. By constitutional design, the federal government is strong in Russia. For example, the President appoints all judges, and federal officials outnumber local ones by a ratio of two to one, or even three to one. Despite such federal powers, during President Boris Yeltsin’s reign, regional leaders possessed almost total control over local courts and federal agencies in their regions.

The purpose of the first federal reforms started in 2000 was for the Kremlin to take back control over its agencies. Helped by the economic recovery, the Kremlin increased funding for local offices and judges. Old federal agents were replaced with new ones loyal to the Kremlin. Personnel changes in the FSB, the Minister of Interior, and the regional prosecutors’ offices ranged from seventy-five to one hundred percent. Additionally, a new system of horizontal rotation was instituted that made it impossible for federal agents to have a successful career in a single region. Before a major promotion, a rotation in Moscow is required, followed by an appointment to a different region than the original.

The Kremlin needed to establish control over the law enforcement agencies before confronting the governors. A campaign said to bring federal laws to the federal level was used to appoint loyal prosecutors. Once appointed, the prosecutor could act as an agent for the federal government as played out in the case of Yaroslavl Governor Anatoly Lisitsyn, against whom a criminal investigation was launched only three days after the appointment of a new prosecutor.

The Kremlin successfully solidified its control over regional courts and law enforcement. Satisfied with the courts’ loyalty, the Kremlin abandoned the twenty-one administrative (district) court’s proposal meant to bring the judiciary under control. There are exceptions, such as in the Bashkortostan and Tatarstan republics, but in general the Kremlin has achieved complete command over the federal agencies.

The second key area in the redistribution of power involved elections. During Yeltsin’s presidency, the Kremlin relied on regional leaders’ support in the federal elections, in exchange for which governors enjoyed additional power. Under Putin, the center pursued a different strategy, breaking off its dependency on the governors. However, before 2003, the center’s attempts to exclude the regional leaders from the electoral process were unsuccessful. The Kremlin then reversed its position, inviting regional leaders into United Russia and granting them leadership roles. After this year’s presidential election, the center has turned back to its previous exclusionary strategy, extensively limiting regional leaders political power.

The First Electoral Reform transferred control over the regional election commissions to the Kremlin. Before, the governor, and the governor-controlled assembly appointed the commission members. Now, the Central Election Commission can choose to offer the chair and to appoint two members of the regional election commissions, and has the power to dissolve the commissions. In two cases the Central Election Commission exercised these rights; first, in Krasnoyarsk, the regional election commission was dissolved; more recently, in Samara, after a local dispute caused an impasse, the Central Election Commission appointed a whole new regional election commission.

Further electoral reforms proposed by the center serve only to strengthen Kremlin’s influence. At present, the State Duma elections are based on a mixed system, with half the representatives elected from independent districts, and half on a party list basis. Since only the United Russia Party participates in regional elections, the Kremlin automatically controls half the representatives in the regional assemblies. The Kremlin’s move to make the State Duma elections based solely on a party list basis, would cause regional leaders to loose all influence over regional elections.

Even more important than the rules is control over the implementation of these rules. Since both the courts and the law enforcement agencies are loyal to the Kremlin, the center can prevent any candidate from running. Several old Yeltsin governors, including Yaroslavl Governor Anatoly Lisitsyn and Saratov Governor Dmitry Ayatskov, have had criminal investigations launched against them, but none of these cases have led to any punishment. In Ayatskov’s case there is no doubt of past criminal actions, but instead he is being prosecuted for overusing his power—a crime all regional governors are guilty off. Such investigations are not meant to bring governors to justice, but they are a black mail tactic used by the Kremlin to signal to a governor not to seek reelection. The Kremlin is no longer concerned about promoting candidates in regional elections, but rather pushing out the "bad guys", with the remaining candidates all being acceptable. As a result of this strategy, on the surface there seems to be less interference by the Kremlin in regional elections, but in reality the elections are completely controlled by the center.

A problem resulting from Kremlin’s control over regional elections, is the replacement of effective governors with loyal ones. "Good guy" generals from the secret service currently govern over a dozen regions. However, a good general does not necessarily make a good public politician. Only one of the governor-generals, Moscow oblast Boris Gromov, who become a politician before and actually against Kremlin’s wishes, has been successful. A real threat emerges when, as in the case of Voronezh, despite being ineffective the governor-general is reelected. Undoubtedly, these generals are loyal to the center, and for Kremlin this appears to be sufficient.

Another scheme used by the center to gain control over regional leaders is the proposal to enlarge the regions. Alexander Kazakov, a member of the Federal Council and former first deputy chief of staff, received an order from Putin to introduce a plan that would create twenty-eight enlarged regions from Russia’s existing eighty-nine. This proposal sends a clear message to regional leaders: submit to Kremlin or lose all power. Although the region enlargement plan seems unlikely to transpire, below the surface, some regional enlargement is taking place. An example is Krasnoyarsk, where regional enlargement was unsuccessful, but regional law enforcement agencies were unified anyway. Through such means, the center is able to redistribute power without attracting publicity.

Despite the massive consolidation of power, the Kremlin does not have complete control over the regions. For instance, in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan federal officials are still under the influence of regional leaders. Tver serves as another example. In this poor region near Moscow, the center replaced all key federal officials simultaneously, a year before gubernatorial elections. However, the move backfired, and the Kremlin lost all control in the region. When the newly appointed Chief Federal Inspector was forced to run for governor, he received less than two percent of the vote.

In summary, the Kremlin’s initial consolidation of power was necessary to prevent the governors from acting like medieval princes in their regions. However, now, the balance has shifted too much in favor of the Kremlin, preventing the regions from acting to counterbalance the center.

The Kremlin’s monopolization of decision-making has transformed the rest of the government into an artificial, vertical hierarchy that is incapable of self-directed action. Such a system is unable to function effectively in a country as large and diverse as Russia. The failure to communicate with the coal miners striking in Krasnoyarsk and the disastrous hostage crisis in Beslan, both showed the paralysis of regional governments in high stake situations.

Putin is trying to establish a flow of objective information through the extensive hierarchy. A system of public reception rooms has reemerged, with offices at each federal and regional level collecting citizen’s complaints against the administration. As an information system, the public reception rooms network is less effective than an institution like the independent media, which it is attempting to replace.

The second stage of the federal reforms involves the redistribution of finances that is leading to a further consolidation of federal power. The division of tax revenue between the center and the regions is now sixty-forty, up from forty-sixty during Yeltsin’s times and fifty-fifty based on the 2001 Tax Code. Each year with the adoption of the new state budget, the center is readjusting the distribution. The governors claim that while the regional budgets are shrinking, the duties of the regional governments are being expanded. For example, the regions are to pay for part of the monetization of privileges social reforms, without new budgetary funding. Furthermore, the governments have no flexibility to find money by maneuvering between funds, because the Federal Treasuries now control all regional budgetary expenditures.

With their power and finances rapidly diminishing, this summer the governors have begun to publicly oppose the Kremlin. Governor Lisitsyn, who is now under criminal investigation, began the movement by speaking out against Kremlin’s decision to eliminate the Road Fund. A few weeks later, Volgograd Governor Nikolai Maksyuta followed by objecting to the social benefits reforms. Two other politicians, Khabarovsk’s Governor Viktor Ishayev and President of Yakutia Vyacheslav Shtyrov, are viewed by the public as opposition leaders. Organized opposition was started by the Far East Governors Association, which issued a collective letter opposing the center’s monetary redistribution plans, signed by all governors except for Chukotka’s Roman Abramovich and Primorsky’s Sergei Darkin. The Kremlin immediately applied pressure, and several of the governors withdrew their signatures. Despite the recent flare-up in opposition, the resistance is temporary. The Kremlin is in control of the governors’ budgets, so eventually they will submit.

In numerous regions either oligarchs or administrative managers are governors. The Kremlin’s long term strategy in controlling such governors involves gaining control over their businesses. A good example occurred in the Republic of Bashkortostan, where Murtaza Rakhimov, who was considered to be one of the strongest regional leaders, unexpectedly did not win the first round of gubernatorial elections. Only after negotiating with the Kremlin, and relinquishing control over several enterprises, was he permitted to win in the final round.

The presidential staff and the FSB appear to be running Kremlin’s federal reforms. The only Chief Federal Inspector to speak out on the issue, Perm’s Nikolai Fadeyev, said that the regional chief federal inspectors take orders from the FSB. The introduction of security service people into the bureaucracy is widely viewed to be positive, they are believed to possess a level of professionalism much needed to fight the wide spread government corruption. Unfortunately, the focus of the ‘militocracy’ has shifted from effective governing to an internal power struggle. There are a lot of conflicts below the surface, within and between the security services. For example, a major struggle emerged when FSB gained control of MVD, and while the new Minister of the Interior, an ex-FSB agent, was pleased, the army was not. The problem with such internal clan struggles is that they are replacing public political conflicts.

The Presidential Envoy was a critical tool used in the First Federal Reforms, and will continue to be utilized in the future. For example, the Municipal and the Enlargement reforms will require changes of borders and property rights, and will use the presidential envoy to overcome resistance. Also, Putin’s recent promise to mobilize society will most likely involve the presidential envoy. However, due to the appointment of second-rate politicians over the last year, the status of the presidential envoy has diminished. Since a presidential envoy doesn’t have an independent budget or any formal executive powers, Putin will need to nominate more prestigious figures, or grant concrete powers to the presidential envoys, for them to continue being effective.

The government of Russia has only one real politician, Putin. All other parts of the political machine are interchangeable. Horizontal rotations occur within agencies as easily as between them. For example, Viktor Cherkesov, was the first deputy director of FSB, then made presidential envoy, and then appointed head of the new federal drug control office.

The case of Vladimir Yakovlev raises doubts about Putin’s power. Instead, of imprisoning this corrupt ex-governor of Saint Petersburg, who is openly opposed to the president, Putin appointed him presidential envoy and then minister. This might have been a strategic move to get Yakovlev out of Saint Petersburg where he is well connected, and preoccupy him with new problems. Still, by choosing this "push-pull" strategy over a retirement home scenario, Putin appears vulnerable.

The inadequacy of the Russian government is apparent in its inability to respond to a crisis and its lack of preparation for a future transfer of power. First, the high oil prices create a dangerous illusion of wellbeing that is quickly unveiled by crisis, which are followed by disasters due to the system’s inflexibility. As for the lack of a succession mechanism, United Russia could have been used in a single party system similar to that of Mexico’s, but was not. The center’s attack on governors thus appears to be an attempt to eliminate any future opposition.