Elections in Russia's Overmanaged Democracy

On April 26, 2006, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a meeting entitled “Elections in Russia’s Overmanaged Democracy” with Nikolai Petrov, of the Carnegie Moscow Center. Andrew Kuchins, Director of the Carnegie Russian and Eurasian Program, chaired the session. Petrov’s remarks are summarized below.

On March 27, 2006, Russia held elections for 519 posts in 68 regions. There were a few by-elections to the Duma, the last single-mandate contests before the shift to a fully proportional system in 2007. There are no longer any gubernatorial elections. Eight regional parliaments held elections, with half the seats decided by a proportional system and half by single mandates. There were a few elections for mayoral posts and many for municipal councils. As yet the councils have little power, but when municipal reform takes effect in 2009 they will become more important.

United Russia (UR) won all eight regional elections, but polled below expectations at 27 to 55 percent. If UR performs similarly in the 2007 national parliamentary elections, it will not have a majority in the Duma. Interestingly the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF) won 39 single-mandate seats in the regional parliaments, approximately ten percent of the single-mandate seats contested.

The nationalist Rodina party was allowed to run only in the Altai region. There Rodina drew votes away from the communists and as a result Vladimir Zhirinovsky’s Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) won 16 mandates. The Kremlin may have used this relatively unimportant region to test how Rodina’s participation could affect the 2007 election. In other regions the authorities excluded Rodina largely on the basis of technicalities, relying on increasing involvement from the courts. One court held that Rodina had violated election law by distributing air fresheners.

These elections took place under a new law on political parties, which took effect on January 1, 2006. It requires parties to have at least 50 thousand members and chapters in a certain number of regions. The Federal Registration Service applied these standards strictly. The CPRF didn’t bother submitting the names of its working members, fearing that the registration service would create trouble for them on the job. Of the 180 thousand names the CPRF submitted, 139 thousand were approved. The LDPR reported 90 thousand, Rodina 142 thousand, and UR 943 thousand.

Remarkably the democratic parties did not make it into any regional parliaments, despite the alliance between the Union of Right Forces and Yabloko. Their best showing was 6.5 percent in Kursk oblast, where the threshold was 7 percent.

Low turnout, five to seven percent below the level of the last parliamentary elections, helps explain these results. Many voters balloted “against all,” and in Kaliningrad this was the second most popular “candidate.” UR was split in Kaliningrad, which is only natural since it is the only real political party. The democrats did badly because their voters didn’t participate, not wanting to take part in a simulated election. Indeed these elections were less about power than the opportunity to serve power. Presidential Aide Vladislav Surkov indicated in a speech to party activists that UR should plan to stay in power for at least 10 to 15 years.

The electoral system has performed worse each time. The government should reform it, but instead it is tightening control. Head of the Central Election Commission Aleksandr Vishnyakov is upset. According to him, the restrictions on Rodina all came from one office at the “center” [i.e. the Kremlin]. The new two-term limit on tenure in his post will soon remove Vishnyakov. In the future five election commissioners will be nominated by the Duma, five by the Federation Council, and five by the President. The president’s nominees will not be eligible to chair the commission.

Of the 35 Russian political parties only 23 submitted signatures to the Federal Registration Service. Vishnyakov estimates only 18 of those will be registered. Essentially there is a governing bloc with UR, the CPRF, and the LDPR. Rodina, the Party of Pensioners, and the Party of Life are left to fight for the remaining spot as the most junior coalition partner.

There will be two more elections before the 2007 Duma elections, which will be fully proportional. So far UR has failed to sweep the field. It has merely absorbed well-known local figures wherever possible. Elections are becoming less and less effective, even from the Kremlin’s point of view. The electoral system needs more competition or it could one day lead to a result like that of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election.

Q&A
Q: Why did the liberal parties fail? Are these elections good predictors for 2007?
Petrov: The liberals failed because of the electoral system, not their own faults. They didn’t have programs because they have no hope of implementing them, aspiring to only 7-10 percent of the vote. UR takes elements from the other parties’ programs and there is a general lack of trust in elections and regional parliaments. These elements contribute to low participation. These elections don’t predict the 2007 Duma elections. They show party strength and allow the Kremlin to test election procedures.

Q: Why won’t UR get a majority?
Petrov: The Kremlin doesn’t want one huge dominant party. It’s better to have a senior party and junior partners.

Q: Are UR leaders in ethnic regions from local ethnic groups?
Petrov: Since UR has no program, it is eager to embrace local leaders. The center is trying to co-opt ethnic clans, not oppose them.

Q: Why hasn’t the Kremlin eliminated the “against all” option?
Petrov: Cutting “against all” would be like not taking your temperature when you are sick. It doesn’t actually make you better. They may keep this option to prop up turnout. There are also other devices to prop up turnout, including early voting, lotteries, and requiring workers to show their bosses proof that they voted. But none of these solve the basic problem: lack of trust and legitimacy.
Q: “Against all” is great for the Kremlin because it wastes votes that might otherwise go to the opposition.
Petrov: With respect to Yabloko, it’s an appealing brand to the Kremlin, and can be shown to people as a token of the democratic electoral system. Yabloko is in a bad spot, because without the Kremlin it can’t get any business money. The elections Russia holds now are imperfect, but better than nothing. And it’s better to vote “against all” than boycott the process. Publicity after bad elections can play an important role. 

Summary prepared by Matthew Gibson, Junior Fellow with the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.