The Kremlin and the Regions on the Eve of the Transfer of Power

On September 26, 2006, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a meeting entitled “The Kremlin and the Regions on the Eve of the Transfer of Power" with Nikolai Petrov, of the Carnegie Moscow Center.  Senior Associate Martha Olcott chaired the session.

IMGXYZ527IMGZYXThe struggle for power in Russia takes place not only within the Kremlin walls but also in the regions.  The Kremlin’s competing towers appeal to regional power bases or “Kremlins”, such as Kazan, Nizhegorod and Novgorod, to bolster their bids for control of Russia.  Putin serves as the linchpin within the Kremlin, maintaining the balance between competing factions. 

As the fall elections approach, the competition between clans of siloviki will disturb the current equilibrium and create new instability.  United Russia, traditionally the Kremlin’s umbrella party, has already started to lose its dominant position as members break ranks and form new external coalitions.  Under the leadership of Mironov, the Party of Life , Rodina, and the Party of Pensioners have combined forces, and as of August were qualified to participate in all regional elections except one.  Meanwhile, to maintain its influence, United Russia is also trying to form a new coalition.

The enlargement projects of the major parties coincide with a new stage in the development of Russia’s electoral laws.  Recent changes to the registration rules mandate that parties have a minimum 50,000 members and 500 members in at least half of Russia regions.  As a result of these changes, only 9 of Russia 35 current parties qualify for the upcoming elections, with about 7 more parties close to meeting the requirements.  Petrov predicts that there will only be 12-15 remaining parties by the 2007 elections with 4-5 parties emerging as winners in that election.  Meanwhile, the two liberal parties, Yabloko and the Union of Right Forces, will wither in this new environment as they are no longer needed by the Kremlin.

It is important to note that all of the emerging coalitions are temporary, and as such, it would be an oversimplification to try to speak of battles between soft siloviki and tough siloviki or civilians and lawyers.   The key players in the Kremlin change their alliances as fits the situation.  This is illustrated by the disagreement between Deputy Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev and presidential advisor Vladislav Surkov over the concept of sovereign democracy.

Meanwhile as the elections grow closer reforms have come to a halt.  For example, the overhaul of the Russian railroad system and its alcohol market were both postponed.   The current socio-economic stability is akin to a drunken man standing against a wall. As long as he stays against the wall, he maintains his balance.  However, he stumbles the instant he attempts a step forward.  In other words, the current stagnation will have devastating effects as the country tries to move forward, and indeed, is already taking its toll.

The Kremlin’s “new approach” to domestic politics was influenced by two recent events in the post-Soviet space.  The first was the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, which led Putin to question the role of foreign NGOs, and the second was the protest in response to the poorly-implement cash-for-benefits reform.  In the wake of these two events, the Kremlin turned to the regions to solidify its control.  Prime Minister Fradkov has increased his trips to the regions and United Russia now holds its party congresses in the regions.  Meanwhile, the regional administrations are happy to cooperate with the Kremlin as it means they will receive increased funds for development projects in their regions.

Elections will take place in 63 regions on October 8th, and United Russia’s stated goal is to receive no fewer than 45% of all open seats.  Indeed, many regional party officials have sworn to win an even higher percentage.  This enhanced competition has led to a dramatic increase of campaign spending in the regions.  For example in Svetlovskaya, where there are only 14 seats open, candidates have spent over 60 million rubles—about 2 million dollars.  Petrov also pointed out that Mironov, representing the Party of Life, not United Russia has received permission to use Putin’s image.

To conclude his remarks, Petrov stated that Putin’s second term is already lost with little hope for continued reform.  The president’s remaining power will be spent on the succession struggle.  Putinism, due to its personal nature, is not likely to survive its founder, and the current stability will eventually crumble under the weight of mounting inefficiencies.

Q&A:

Q: After Putin’s dismissal of the concept of sovereign democracy at the Valdai conference, United Russia seems to be having a crisis of confidence.  Why do they feel so insecure? 

It is because they, like most parties in Russia, have no real ideological basis or agenda.  They are an umbrella group aimed simply at maintaining power.  They recently released their party platform, which was without any substance except a promise to move further toward central planning.

Q: You seem to conclude that the major players in Russia are all petty bureaucrats, looking simply for power.  Is there anyone with ideological passion or firmly held beliefs that could emerge?

Russia is a big country, and there are probably passionate leaders somewhere, but Putin is dominating the stage.  Nobody else can increase their influence under existing circumstances.

Q: What kind of power do the governors wield?  What can they use to block the Kremlin’s attempt to grab their power?

Many Governors are happy with the new system as it is easier for them to keep good relations with the Kremlin and insulates them from political criticism.  Instead of blaming the governors, the population can now blame the Kremlin, which appointed those governors.  In this way, the new reforms increased their power. 

Q: One of the goals of 2000 reform was to rein in the federal officials in the regions and make them subservient to the Kremlin and not the governors.  To what extent has the Kremlin been successful in reining in these officials?

The Kremlin initially managed to gain control over key agencies in the regions.  However, there were many regions in which these agencies remained independent.  Nonetheless, the system seems to be working in regard to the FSB, the Interior Ministry, and many judges.  The process continues, but on an individual basis.

Q: What concrete levers do the regional leaders have in the transition process? Are leaders from mineral rich regions able to use those resources to influence the outcome of the power struggle?

Regional leaders have control over party lists, and are able to assert themselves more during election times.  This is evidenced by the fact that after election United Russia has to continually try to regain control over governor’s offices.