Registration
You will receive an email confirming your registration.
IMGXYZ534IMGZYXOn October 3, 2006, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a meeting on the US-Russian nuclear energy cooperation with Ambassador Nikolay Spassky, Deputy Head of the Federal Atomic Energy Agency. Jessica Matthews, President of the Carnegie Endowment, chaired the session.
The Status of US-Russian Bilateral Relationship
Despite the popular narrative, US-Russian relations are generally good. They have undergone and are undergoing dramatic changes, but the relationship is maturing from an overly romantic partnership to a more pragmatic one. Most people speak of this change to a more “selective partnership” as a tragedy, but in reality, it is a natural evolution.
During the 1990s and indeed continuing into the first terms of Presidents Putin and Bush, the US and Russia shared unrealistic visions of our countries as strategic partners and created an agenda that was beyond implementation. However, the false expectations created by this romanticism led to disappointment; both Russia and the US were unable to deliver on their promises. As Bush and Putin entered their second terms, it became clear that they could not continue to pretend that our countries shared a truly strategic relationship.
A new, more pragmatic partnership has emerged, centered on issues that matter to both of our countries: counterterrorism, non-proliferation, and most importantly energy security. Of course, defining this new relationship was and still is difficult and presents a major challenge. In many ways, it was easier to maintain a relationship based on platitudes and false pretences, but the key to ensuring the health and stability of our partnership is not lies, but rather, engagement on practical and technical issues, such as the challenges presented to us in the field of nuclear energy.
This new pragmatic relationship has made me much more positive about our relations than I was three or four years ago.
Current Situation of Nuclear EnergyIMGXYZ535IMGZYX
The era of Chernobyl is over as two factors have forever changed the framework of the debate about nuclear energy. First, there is significant and growing demand for energy in general and nuclear energy in particular. It is estimated that over the next 20 years demand for energy will increase 50%. Secondly, there have been significant improvements in nuclear technology that have made the generation of nuclear energy far safer and more viable than in the past.
The unprecedented growth in the demand for nuclear energy is inherently accompanied by an escalating threat of proliferation. Increasing reliance on nuclear power will require more production of nuclear fuel through enrichment or reprocessing technologies—two proliferation-prone points in the fuel cycle. It is not, therefore, subversive countries such as Iran and North Korea that threaten the current non-proliferation regime, but rather, the overall trends of nuclear technology.
Some point to the inadequacy of the NPT as the source of the growing threat of proliferation and proclaim that the NPT is dead. However, the NPT is not dead; it is simply in the midst of a crisis. The crisis arose out of certain contradictions in the NPT that give all countries a right to a closed fuel cycle, while simultaneously producing a danger of more countries developing dual use technologies to meet their energy needs.
Any resolution of the current contradiction and the threat of proliferation it causes will require the leadership of the US and Russia. However, we cannot impose limitations on countries seeking to develop nuclear programs; rather they must choose to forgo weapons enrichment voluntarily. Meanwhile, the seemingly easiest solution to the current contradictions, simply amending the NPT, is not a viable option because the NPT is not strong enough to survive the amendment process. It would be impossible to put together a large enough coalition for change, and the treaty would crumble.
Nonetheless, in order to manage the unprecedented growth of nuclear technology, it is imperative to institute voluntary limitations on the use of nuclear technology. The US, Russia, and other nuclear powers have offered new initiatives aimed at solving the main problem of proliferation under the current regime: convincing sovereign nations to forgo their right to enrichment. To succeed, however, any proposal must build trust among nations by envisioning a central role for the IAEA. Moreover, they must be commercially viable; countries will adopt a new structure only if it is profitable. Notwithstanding the differences in the substance of the US and Russian proposals, they both meet these requirements.
What is to be done?
To confront the challenges presented by the increased use of nuclear technology, we must completely leave behind the world of symbols and images that encapsulated our previous relationship and continue to build our new practical and pragmatic partnership. Indeed, our only chance to secure the acceptance of any new non-proliferation structure is to dove-tail our two initiatives. Partnerships for change with other major players in nuclear energy are simply not possible at this point and will not secure the desired outcome of a new voluntary limitation. It is, therefore, up to our countries to take the lead, increasing our cooperation on civil nuclear energy.
First, however, the US and Russia must adopt a so-called “123 agreement.” Section 123 of the US Atomic Energy Act establishes an agreement for cooperation as a prerequisite for nuclear deals between the US and any other nation, and it is amazing given our history of cooperation on nuclear issues that our countries do not yet have a 123 agreement. The current lack of a 123 Agreement slows down any US-Russian exchange and cooperation that does occur, requiring numerous provisions and qualifications. A bilateral 123 agreement held under international law would make cooperation easier and ensure continued engagement.
The second step is dealing with the issue of anti-dumping bans imposed on Russia in 1992. Current trade exists on “the margins” outside of the uranium market and the trade agreement that secured existing trade will expire in six years. 44% of Russian uranium exports are to the United States. If this drops to zero at the end of the currently structured deal it would devastate the Russian uranium industry. Only by taking steps toward reversing the anti-dumping restrictions can cooperative relations be sustained.
If we manage to put together a 123 agreement, and dove-tail our two initiatives, it will be the greatest success in our relationship in the second term of our two administrations.
Q&A:
Q: The Russia Federation would not support the nuclear program of any country that threatened its existence and territorial integrity. Yet, Russia supports Iran despite the fact that it has verbally threatened Israel. Why should we trust Iran with nuclear technology?
Fairness is not a concept in International relations. Everybody has there own definition of fairness. Instead, we deal with international law, and international law guarantees the right of every nation, including Iran, to nuclear energy. Iran’s nuclear ambitions and its posturing toward Israel present two very different, albeit related problems. As they are different, we must deal with them individually and in different ways. We cannot deny Iran peaceful nuclear energy, but we must also encourage it to change its stance toward Israel. Confusing and conflating these two issues will only serve to make the situation worse.
Q: If the NSG guidelines are changed with India in order to allow trade, how do you see your relations changing with India? Secondly, Congress just passed the Iran Freedom Support Act, which says that we shouldn’t enter into a 123 agreement unless Iran forgoes enrichment. How will this affect your relationship with Iran?
The situation with India creates a new precedent as it implicitly acknowledges the nuclear status of a country outside of the NPT framework. It speaks to the reality that it is impossible to deny a nation of a billion people nuclear energy or to deny the existence of their nuclear program.
There is, however, a significant difference between the legal situation of Iran and India. Iran is a member to the NPT while India has never ratified the treaty. Substantively, India has a very positive record in terms of non-proliferation, and as a result, an unspoken consensus has formed that the world cannot deny nuclear energy, but rather, must encourage it to draw a distinction between its civilian and military nuclear programs.
As for the Iran Freedom support act: Russia does not believe that sanctions will work but will instead unite the Iranian people to be even more anti-Western. In many ways, it is the international community’s fault that a hard-line regime continues to flourish in Iran. Russia will only accept sanctions if they are passed as international law, and not as national legislation.
Russia is currently following international law in its relationship with Iran. We are continuing the construction of the Bushehr reactor transparently and with oversight form our American partners. Furthermore, before continuing construction of the reactor, we insisted that the Iranians sign an agreement that provides for the repatriation of spent fuel. Russia will continue to provide the fuel as long as it is within the bounds of international law, even if it means contradicting the Iran Freedom Support Act.
Q: Several years ago, the Duma passed a law that allowed for the importation of spent nuclear fuel. There was even support for the importation of spent US fuel. However, a month or two ago Russia reversed its position. What caused the recent change in policy?
Despite the “pure motivations’ that inspired the original legislation, it was over zealous. The members of the Duma who passed it ignored public opinion, and it was not received well by many domestic constituencies. The public outcry completely derailed the issue.
We will eventually have to confront the issue. However, for now, reprocessing causes a vehement reaction from certain groups in Russian society, and we must wait for the proper moment, when it is profitable to local constituencies, to raise the issue again.
Q: The US administration has sped up its timeline on GNEP, skipping straight to commercial plans. What is the timeline on the Russian proposal, and how does it fit the timeline of the US proposal? Secondly, you spoke a little about Russia’s engagement with Iran on the Bushehr reactor. Are there any lessons that the international community can learn from your engagement?
To address the first question: Both initiatives are multilateral in nature and are dependent on the participation of the participation of other major players, but first and foremost the participation of the US and Russia. The US and Russia are also both challenged by the creation of medium and small reactors. The central part of the relationship, however, is the challenge present by enrichment.
As for the timeframe, we must act immediately while Bush and Putin are still in office. Nuclear cooperation is always on the agenda, but Putin and Bush work well together on this issue, and it is thus in our interest to form this framework in the next year.
To address the second question: The lesson for the international community from our engagement with Iran is very simple in appearance, but very complex in substance. It is impossible to deny peaceful nuclear technology to states despite our feeling about those states, but at the same time, we must try to convince states to voluntarily give up nuclear weapons. The only way to balance the right of state to nuclear technology and the need to prevent proliferation is to adhere to international law. Russia remained firm in its insistence of the repatriation of spent fuel with Iran, and the Iranian eventually recognized that right under international law and acquiesced.
Q: Isn’t Iran’s right to peaceful nuclear technology dependent upon their adherence to the rest of the NPT? Secondly, last month the US government offered Russia a deal on a 123 agreement. Did Russia accept that offer?
It is important to look at the history of the Iranian case to fully understand the current situation. Iran was caught while clandestinely pursing its nuclear program, and the current “freeze” on enrichment was introduced as a voluntary measure by the IAEA to build confidence. Both the international community and Iran saw this as an adequate measure to clear up Iran’s past nuclear activity.
Negotiations after the freeze, however, remained slow, and last fall, the board of governors passed a resolution that made the voluntary freeze international law. Russia position is based on this ruling. Now, unfortunately, Iran is bound by international law to suspend enrichment.
To briefly address your second question: We do have a productive offer on the 123 agreement, and are currently in the process of negotiating an agreement.
Q: You justly noted that Russian-US nuclear cooperation was exemplary during the last fifteen years without any formal 123 agreement. Why do we need an agreement now?
The character of our nuclear relationship during the 1990s centered around the safety of our nuclear weapons arsenal and our nuclear facilities. Russia is no longer dependent on US money to maintain its nuclear sites. It is easier for us to finance these projects.
We now want to pursue new relations with the US in the nuclear sphere, opening up US markets to Russian fuel and laying the groundwork to share civil nuclear technology. This agreement is essential to the technical interagency cooperation and contracts that this new relationship will depend on. If we fail to pass a 123 agreement, each new bilateral initiative will require a new framework.