The Future of Russian Politics: What the West Perceives and Misperceives

On November 14, 2006, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a meeting entitled "The Future of Russian Politics: What the West Perceives and Misperceives" with Evgeni Kiselev, an independent political analyst from Russia. Andrew C. Kuchins, Director of the Russian and Eurasian Program at the Carnegie Endowment, chaired the discussion.

My talk today—on the West’s perceptions and misperceptions of Russia—was enriched by my recent lecture tour, which took me to many of America’s finest universities.  Students offered many questions that betrayed a lack of a full understanding of Russia, even in the academic community.  In answering their questions, I was unable to paint a black and white picture, but was at least able to give them a better description of the current situation in Russia—much more detailed than the one offered by American media. 

It is natural to draw the conclusion from following western press that Russia is not free, but the reality is more nuanced.  There is still a lot of freedom in Russia today—freedom of travel, freedom of religion, and yes, to a limited extent, freedom of information.  Of course, the state now controls most of the media outlets, but the public is still free to access information on the internet, and internet usage is rising.  In fact, usage rose 3%, from 15 to 18%, in just this last year. On the other hand, freedom of political activity is severely limited by the ruling team’s monopoly on “political tools.” It controls the press, fundraising, and the election courts.  Moreover, the security services have started to push their influence further into the private sphere.  They are present in schools, and are trying to control business activities.

Another common misperception is that Putin ended oligarchy, but a quick comparison of Forbes’ list of billionaires from the late nineties with today’s shows otherwise.  With the exception of Berezovskii, Gusinsky, and Khordokovskii, the list remains almost unchanged.  In fact, the oligarchs have deepened their control over business in Russia, diversifying into different sectors.  Moreover, a new class of oligarchs has emerged out of the ruling elite, who use their power and influence to build their personal fortunes.  Dmitri Medvedev and Igor Sechin, both Kremlin insiders, have stakes in Russia’s booming hydrocarbon industry.

While corruption is still rampant in Russia, it has been swept under the table.  One clear example of this is Lenoid Reiman, who is trying to create a communications monopoly.  The Wall Street Journal recently ran a two-page spread on Reiman—the kind of spread that would have received a lot of attention in Russia and the United States during the nineties, but it went virtually unnoticed today.  The case of Roman Abramovich is also often overlooked.  The oil magnate lives in London and owns a stake in Chelsea, but somehow is still the governor of Chukotka.  When a rumor spread that he intended to resign, Putin asked him to stay on until the end of his presidential term.  Many of the students on my lecture tour were shocked to learn that Putin had such an amiable relationship with an oligarch.

Nonetheless, the biggest misperception in America concerns the future of Russia.  Unlike the other misperceptions, this one is not only present in the mass media or for that fact only in the US.  It is commonly held that politics in Russia is dead.  Both senior level US and British diplomats and scholars have said as much to me in private conversations.  In reality, however, politics and political competition have merely been swept under the rug, much the same way that they were swept under the rug in fascist Germany.  Competing parties still vie from power, but the process involves a select number of participants and is completely opaque.  As Churchill famously quipped, competition in the Kremlin resembles “a bulldog fight under the rug.” 

As the end of Putin’s term approaches, the struggle for power is intensifying and   succession has by far become the most important issue.  The electoral project very clearly illustrates the intensity of the competition between the elites. While United Russia struggled to consolidate its power base, a new party, Just Russia, emerged as the result of a merger between two smaller parties.  There are even indications that a third party may emerge before the next Duma elections.  Some might argue that these parties are the result of an exercise in political technology, but I contend that it shows that the “political elite” do not agree on Russia’s future or on a successor.  Putin, of course, wants Medvedev, but most of his team opposes him as a candidate.  As a result of this division among the “political elite”, it is possible that a self-appointed candidate may appear. 

Meanwhile, the West has yet to grasp the fact that succession is and has traditionally been the most important issue in Russia, focusing instead on Russia’s troubled relations with its neighbors or its assertive energy policy.  Yet, historically political transitions in Russia are rarely smooth.  In fact, I count only two smooth transitions:  in 1855 when Alexander II ascended to the throne after the death of Nikolai I and in 1891 when Alexander III succeeded Alexander II after the latter’s assassination.  Other than in those two cases, succession has always created a crisis.  Another interesting pattern that emerges from history is that when confronted with a tough succession decision, the Russian political elite have traditionally chosen the weakest candidate.  The boyars picked Mikhail Romanov, who was but a boy when he ascended the throne, hoping that they would be able to control him.  Indeed, even Stalin was seen as a weak candidate when compared with Comrade Trotskii and others who might have been picked as Party Secretary. In light of these historical patterns, it is doubtful that Medvedev can be Putin’s final choice.  Yet, Putin must name his candidate soon, probably this coming summer, if he hopes to succeed in naming his replacement.  The role of the press during this transitional period is to try to make the process as transparent as possible—that is, to lift the carpet up off of the bulldogs.  I intend to return to television with a new show on RTVi in November to do my part to inform the public about the succession process.

Q&A: 

Q: It seems that despite the fact that Putin and his team adequately control most of society that they are constantly tightening their control.  Why do they continue to close the space?  Why the overkill?

There is really no good answer to that question.  In some ways what Russia really needs is not a political analyst, but a psychoanalyst.  We clearly see the trend you point out in the sphere of media.  After wresting NTV from Gusinsky, the Kremlin was not happy and NTV continues to try to control the airwaves.

In my estimation, this trend arises from the elite’s gross insecurity.  Putin cannot forget the synthetic nature of his political persona.  He did not evolve naturally as a political leader; rather he was made, and in reality, came to power with no solid policy plan or record of success.

Q:  You mentioned earlier that the FSB is playing a larger role in business.  Would you elaborate on that a little more?  I would also like you to expand on your comments earlier about the division in the elite.  How do you see those divisions developing over time?

The best example of the FSB meddling in business came this last summer during the infamous wine crisis.  As you all know, wine disappeared off thr shelves in the stores and had to be shipped back to the distributors because of a problem with the software created to read the wine labels.  What isn’t widely known is that that software was created by a government security institute controlled by the FSB.  This is just one example.

As for your second question, the elite are currently divided on a successor.  No compromise candidate has emerged.  Medvedev is unpalatable for the Siloviki as Ivanov is for the liberals.  Other names have been floated as well:  Ustinov, Furtsenko, and Yakunin, to name a few.  However, it is likely that the Putin’s choice is not known yet.  He will unexpectedly rise out of obscurity to assume the throne as Vladimir Vladimirovich did.  Putin does, however, have to adhere to the deadline I spoke of earlier.  He needs to allow enough time to complete the succession successfully.  

Of course, the debate over the successor represents a fundamental divide in the Kremlin about the future of Russia.  On the one side, you have those who espouse a liberal future for Russia, and on the other, you have those who want to limit freedom even more.

Q:  It seems to me that journalists in Russia these days go out of their way to maintain Putin’s image, and those that dare to question his governance are marginalized.  Can you speak about the significance of Anna Politkovskaya’s death both on the journalistic community and on society in general?  Was Putin correct in his cynicism?

There isn’t really any journalistic community to speak of in Russia at the moment.  It is torn by longstanding, historic disputes. Chanel 2’s current quest to control the airways further exasperates the situation.  Radio is one of the only free mediums left.  Print, despite popular belief, has slowly become subservient to the government. The sad state of journalism is the result of a process of natural selection that has taken place over the last fifteen years.  Independents have slowly been forced out.  This is illustrated quite clearly by the case of my friend and the former editor of Izvestia, Raf Shakirov.  Shakirov was more or less a loyal liberal, and until the crisis in Beslan, supported Putin. But, he felt morally obligated after that crisis to print the truth, and because of that he was pushed out.

As for Putin’s cynicism, yes he was correct:  Politkovskaya death had more affect on society than her writings.  Of course, Putin tone when he spoke of Politkovskaya was completely disrespectful.

Q:  People are constantly asking how stable the succession process is in Russia. As far as I can tell, the are three possible scenarios: 1) the elites can’t reach a consensus, and the parties take a life of their own; 2) With the stakes high, the parties reach an agreement before the election and succession is successful; 3) The elite reach some sort of agreement before the election and then battle for power after that. Can you comment on these?

I’ll offer a fourth:  The elections go forward in a relatively free manner as Putin realizes that the best way to maintain his influence is to rely on his approval rating.  There’s relatively equal access to media; United Russia doesn’t have a monopoly on fundraising; and the election commission isn’t stacked.  Ultimately, this would best protect Putin in the future—the most important interest he has riding in this election.

Of course, this might be too rational of an alternative, and Putin is too suspicious to trust the public completely.

Q:  You mentioned the elite traditionally pick a weak leader so that he remains malleable to their interests.  If Putin wants to maintain control, then it follows that he would choose a weak candidate.  Where then, does Yakunin, who is by no means weak, fit into the picture?

Yakunin right now is sending up test balloons to gauge his political future.  But it is unlikely that he would ever be chosen as a successor because he intimidates many in the elite.  In many ways though, he would make a good candidate: he has been very open with the press.