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On July 17, 2007, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace hosted a launch of the new publication Assessing the Threat: The Chinese Military and Taiwan’s Security, edited by Michael D. Swaine, Andrew N. D. Yang, and Evan S. Medeiros with Oriana Skylar Mastro. Four experts who wrote a chapter for the volume spoke: Kenneth Allen (CNA Corporation), Roy Kamphausen (NBR), Lonnie D. Henley (Office of Director of National Intelligence), and Roger Cliff (RAND Corporation). Dr. Swaine, a Senior Associate at Carnegie, moderated the event and summarized the conclusion of the book, which he and Ms. Mastro, a Junior Fellow in the Carnegie China Program, co-wrote.
Swaine began by introducing the central themes of the volume. The volume examines three key areas necessary to understanding the nature and extent of the PLA threat to Taiwan’s security: relevant PLA capabilities (particularly compared with those of the United States and Taiwan), the dynamics of escalation and crisis instability in a Taiwan confrontation, and the overall influence of the regional security environment. Swaine posed a series of questions that the volume seeks to address: Is the PLA acquiring capabilities that are currently altering—or will soon threaten to alter—the balance of forces across the Taiwan Strait in its favor, thus potentially increasing the likelihood of a Chinese use of force? Are improving PLA capabilities increasing the likelihood that China will deter or defeat a possible U.S. attempt to assist Taiwan in the event of such a conflict across the strait? Under which types of conflict scenarios would such potential dangers be most likely? What is needed to reduce such threats? Would a crisis or potential conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan prove especially difficult to manage or control, thus increasing the likelihood of inadvertent and highly dangerous escalation? What factors or features of such a conflict would generate the greatest degree of escalation or overall instability and why? What can be done to reduce such instabilities? Finally, to what extent and in what manner does the larger Asian security environment influence the threat posed to Taiwan by China’s growing military capabilities? What can the United States do to shape the regional environment in ways that lower the propensity for crisis or conflict?
Kenneth Allen spoke first about his chapter entitled “Air Force Deterrence and Escalation Calculations for a Taiwan Strait Conflict: China, Taiwan, and the United States.” All air forces have three main missions: deter, defend and, in the case of war, defeat. Given these main goals, every country wants updated equipment and adequate training. However, the upgrading of equipment and better training can be seen as deterrent or escalation. For the three players in the Taiwan Strait -- China, Taiwan and the United States -- trying to decipher the difference between deterrent and aggressive actions is a major issue for regional stability. Furthermore, when making assessments about each side’s military capabilities, it is much easier to assess the quality of another country’s weapons systems than to assess their level of training. Therefore, in Allen’s opinion, training is a key component of each side’s deterrent.
The United States is also upgrading its air force, but the U.S. sees doing so as a regional strategy, not merely a China-oriented hedging strategy. Most reports about China’s military, such as the U.S. Department of Defense annual report on the Chinese military, focus on hardware. While the United States and China can forward deploy aircraft in different ways, Taiwan does not have many deployment options given its small size. The incident that Allen thinks is the most important to understanding the propensity for conflict over the strait is that of the 2001 EP-3. Allen collected data about all flights in the strait, finding that there are at least 1,000 civilian flights there. The PLA air force began to fly to the center line in 1998 and now runs about six sorties a day, with Taiwan sending a similar number of flights. In addition, Taiwan has lost several aircraft over the past few years due to mechanical errors. However, what if this occurs while Taiwan and Chinese aircraft are in close proximity to each other? The mechanical failure could be misconceived as an attack, in which case escalation would be likely.
In this scenario, would the United States get involved? If they used the military model that the U.S. employed in Afghanistan, Kosovo, etc, they would begin by taking out airfields, meaning that China would not be able to fly as many sorties and, consequently, might not be able to maintain air superiority. If the U.S. does get involved, what would be the rules of engagement be? Because of the difficulty in deciphering military signals, it may not be very clear who is escalating, thereby making the scenario even more unstable.
Roy Kamphausen followed with a discussion of his contribution to the volume, “PLA Power Projection: Current Realities and Emerging Trends.” Many studies look at how the new systems the PLA is acquiring affect its power projection capabilities. This chapter, however, focuses on China’s activity in the region. The framework of the analysis is the Department of Defense’s definition of power projection. A country can project power by responding to crises, contributing to deterrence, and enhancing regional stability. Given this definition, current PLA power projection activity is great. These activities are occurring without traditional systems of power projection such as aircraft carriers and contribute to China’s growing Comprehensive National Power (CNP). By responding to international crises through participation in UN peacekeeping missions, China is developing a nascent crisis response capability. China is also increasing its CNP through military contributions to deterrence through enhanced submarine patrols, short-range ballistic missiles, the Dongshan island series, etc. Chinese efforts to enhance regional stability are very similar to U.S. activities in the region, such as its informal collaborative arrangements with other governments to allow temporary basing of Chinese forces. There is a potential for the PLA to transform these access points into a more extended presence. China has also increased its joint exercises with other regional actors, such as the one with Tajikistan based on a terrorism scenario.
From this activity, Kamphausen identified six trends in Chinese power projection activity that will help us understand how the PLA will act in the future: observe sovereignty and pay attention to borders; intervene when in China’s interests; strengthen support for UN PKO missions outside of Asia; strengthen support for multilateral operations, primarily in Asia, where China can assume a leading role; conduct small-scale deterrence missions; and enhance naval presence missions.
If China's military power is deftly wielded, it could contribute to regional stability; however, its power projection activities are risky and could increase the propensity for conflict and escalation. Many nations in the Asia-Pacific region may feel insecure as they observe the process, and it is difficult to assess how they will respond.
Lonnie D. Henley spoke about his chapter, “Evolving Chinese Concepts of War Control and Escalation Management.” War control and containment first appeared as new concepts in the Chinese literature in the 2001 edition of the Science of Military Strategy. That is, although these concepts may not yet have pervaded China’s military doctrine, top Chinese leaders have referenced them in recent official statements. War control refers to a deliberate manipulation of the scope, intensity, and duration of a crisis to reach political goals. This may include de-escalation or escalation of a crisis, depending on the political objectives. Furthermore, maintaining the initiative is a central concept in China’s military doctrine. During the crisis management stage, China also seeks to shape the strategic environment in a way that is favorable to China; China will take a firm principled stance by intimidating the opponent with clear military deployments, but this might not necessarily mean that China has any intention to actually engage in war fighting. This makes trying to figure out China’s next move very difficult. The concept of war control affects all aspects of military planning, such as target selection. Furthermore, China wants to control the conclusion of the war. If China is losing, it may escalate, taking a bold move to regain the political initiative so as to have more bargaining power. Military considerations do not dominate the decision of when to end the war; rather, political objectives do. However, the political objectives may undermine the military effectiveness or vice-versa. The Chinese leadership's emphasis on initiative and its overconfidence in its ability to control escalation is dangerous.
Roger Cliff spoke last about his chapter, “The Implications of Chinese Military Modernization of U.S. Force Posture in a Taiwan Conflict.” According to Cliff, the U.S. force posture in the Asia-Pacific region may soon be inadequate to protect Taiwan against a Chinese use of force. Much of China’s military hardware is inadequate by modern standards, and these limitations are paralleled by challenges in China’s intelligence, logistics, etc. However, geography works in China’s favor, with its forces much closer to the Taiwan theater than the U.S.'s. Furthermore, China’s defense industry, after years of backwardness, is starting to produce weapon systems that are comparable to similar systems coming out of the United States. China’s economic growth also means that China will have increasingly more money to acquire and develop weapons systems.
Because of these trends, the U.S. needs to make a few changes in its regional posture. For example, it must follow through with currently planned enhancements to U.S. force posture in the region; must improve its capabilities to detect a surprise use of force; increase the readiness levels of air and naval forces in Hawaii and on the west coast of the United States so that they can be deployed to the Western Pacific on short notice; and ensure that its most capable new weapon systems are deployed first to the Pacific theater as they are fielded.
Cliff closed with the comment that conflict in the Taiwan Strait is not inevitable, but as long as China reserves the right to use force, and the United States is committed to deterring this use of force, the United States needs to improve its force posture in the region.
Swaine explained the overall conclusions of the volume. On balance, this volume does not confirm the argument that the balance of power has shifted; instead, China still faces many daunting challenges to its military power, especially in terms of seizing Taiwan outright. China will not be able to maintain air superiority or a naval blockade in the foreseeable future.
However, this volume reaffirms concern that China is acquiring new and large capabilities in some areas that are narrowing the gap in ways that could, over time, weaken deterrence and undermine the cross-strait military balance. This especially applies to area denial capabilities, missile forces, submarine forces, etc. Therefore, there is a need to assess how these capabilities apply to different contingencies and how the Chinese leadership believes these capabilities apply to a Taiwan conflict. For example, these capabilities might encourage the Chinese leadership to take preemptive action to force Taiwan to capitulate before the U.S. has time to intervene. However, this is a very risky option, and there is no indication that China is currently preparing to exercise it; the Chinese view most of these capabilities as deterrence. Furthermore, there are features of the U.S., Chinese, and Taiwanese military doctrines and crisis management strategies that could lead to unintended escalation and consequences that undermine regional stability.
To reduce the potential for conflict, the United States needs to continue to improve its ability to reply swiftly to a Chinese attack without striking the Chinese mainland early on. This is difficult given that much of U.S. military doctrine is offense-oriented. The U.S. should also continue to support Taiwan’s acquisition of defense capabilities; this is a critical element of the maintenance of deterrence because there may be a period of time in which Taiwan needs to hold on until the U.S. can intervene. Taiwan cannot defend itself unaided against China and Taiwan’s primary strategic objective should be to resist a Chinese attack until U.S. forces can arrive to repel such an attack. The book also offers a series of recommendations that China and the United States should implement to improve crisis management capabilities.
During the Q&A, the other panelists addressed how they view the balance of power across the strait. Henley commented that the geographical challenges are large; China does not have the ability to transport forces across the strait, especially in the face of Taiwanese and U.S. resistance. Allen emphasized that one needs to focus on training, not the quantity of hardware. The PLAAF training is much better than it was ten years ago, including the ability to fly at night, over water, and over long distances. However it is difficult to assess how good they are at doing this and whether or not they could sustain such operations over time during a conflict.
Henley addressed civil-military relations in China and their effect on war control. She observed that decision-making in China is still very opaque; outside observers know the structures in place, but how military objectives are assigned to the PLA and how much freedom they have in implementation are still unclear.
In the wake of the EP-3 incident, Henley argues, the Chinese realized they needed a more formal crisis management system, but it is unclear if anything has actually been done. Swaine adds that he believes that the military responds to the directives given by the civilian leadership. In addition, the formation of a National Security Council system may be difficult in China, where several leaders need to share in the crisis decisions in contrast to the U.S system in which decision-making power during a crisis is concentrated in the president's hands.
Cliff commented on a question about how best to promote a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue. He argued that the long-term solution is dependent on China. Either China has to undergo political reform towards democracy or a more pragmatic leadership has to emerge in Beijing for a peaceful resolution to be possible. Swaine commented that the United States is reluctant to sell Taiwan F-16s because Taiwan has yet to acquire the weapons they asked for from the United States in 2001. Kamphausen commented on a question about whether the United States and Taiwan see the threat in the same way. He said that there are many other factors involved, making it difficult to know whether they perceive it similarly. Henley added that all sides agree on capabilities and intentions; the disagreement lies in what could force China off its preferred course of maintaining the status quo.
