What's Really Happening in Afghanistan: A Report from the Front

The International Coalition’s military offensive in Helmand province this summer failed to bring much needed stability to southern Afghanistan despite the addition of 20,000 troops. Lt. General Stanley McChrystal, the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, is expected to request more troops in the near future. Returning from a month in Afghanistan, Gilles Dorronsoro explained that the “clear, hold, build” strategy, intended to force out the Taliban so that economic and political development can proceed, is doomed to fail—regardless of troop levels. A new strategy focused on economic development and improved security in urban areas is needed.

In a discussion with the Washington Post’s Karen DeYoung, Dorronsoro warned that the situation in Afghanistan is dire. The coalition forces cannot afford, psychologically or militarily, another disastrous campaign like the one in Helmand province. The best option is to refocus energy on securing cities and key roads. The Taliban are dangerous, and the coalition would be best served by taking them seriously as a formidable force.

Reality:

• Taliban Expansion: The Taliban have wrested control of the rural areas in the south and east. They also have taken several districts of Kunduz province in the north with a fully-organized insurgency, destabilizing the area and threatening communication lines with Tajikistan.
• Taliban Strategy: The Taliban are growing tactically mature. Instead of frontally resisting Coalition forces as they did in the past, they are suffering fewer casualties by resorting more to the use of IEDs.
• Economic Hardship: The successes of crop substitution programs designed to convert farmers from poppy cultivation to other crops is misleading. Afghan farmers are largely reacting to temporarily low opium prices and security concerns. When these conditions improve, poppy production will likely increase.
• Regional Tensions: India’s investment in Afghanistan’s physical and political infrastructure is fueling rising tensions with Pakistan. Despite concerns in the West, Iran remains a marginal player on the field, as does al-Qaeda.

Challenges:

• Coalition Strategy: In the south and east, where the insurgency is strongest, focusing on the countryside has reduced security in areas where progress could be within reach, namely the cities and key roads.
• Taliban Advantages: The Taliban are numerous, capable, local, and organized. They have a keen understanding of the difficult terrain and feed off of local xenophobia. Despite Western perceptions to the contrary, they are aggressive and courageous fighters.
• Rebuilding Effort: Development programs cannot succeed without local administrations, especially in the south and east, where currently, the state is largely nonexistent.

Solutions:

• Development Strategy: Coalition forces should invest resources in areas where support is attainable. Urban populations offer a more viable base of support because they are more open to a certain degree of Westernization.
• Military Strategy: In the south and east, the coalition should shift its efforts to the protection of cities and key roads, which are strategically more important than the countryside. To avoid the mistakes made by the Vietcong in the Tet Offensive, Coalition forces should secure a buffer region around the cities.
• Coalition Reorganization: In the north, a more proactive Coalition policy is needed to stop the insurgency’s progress. The troops presently engaged in the region have not been effective due to external political constraints.