Beyond the Surge: A Political Strategy for Afghanistan?

IMGXYZ2329IMGZYXOn the sidelines of the international ministerial conference on January 28th, Carnegie Europe, in collaboration with the UK All-Party Parliamentary Group on Conflict Issues, brought together Afghan stakeholders and Western experts at the House of Commons in Westminster London, to share their insights on two thematic areas to shape the debate on the future of Afghanistan.

Session 1: What Political Strategy for Afghanistan?

In light of rampant corruption, a discredited post-election Afghan leadership, and a local governance vacuum, prospects for an Afghan surge are marred by uncertainty. Carnegie’s Gilles Dorronsoro, former Royal Marine Justin Holt, and Nader Nadery, Commissioner of the Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission, discussed what realistic political strategy options are possible under Obama’s eighteen-month timeline.

Strengthening the Afghan Government

President Obama’s strategy, Nadery stated, pursues military objectives at the expense of developing a viable Afghan government. This drives Afghans who are disillusioned with the state building process into the Taliban’s ranks. These Afghans do not join the Taliban for ideological reasons, and they could be won back, Nadery continued, but that would require that the Afghan government address several key points:

• Local Governance: The Afghan government must build the trust of the population by strengthening local governance and the provision of services at the district level. District governments are currently only nominally functional and fail to deliver basic services, such as justice and education, to the people
   
• Tackling Corruption: The Afghan government must end its tolerance of corruption and must distance itself from many of the questionable figures it has relied on until now for political support
   
• The Afghan National Army:  The Afghan National Army (ANA) is an increasingly highly respected institution in Afghanistan. The international community must continue to invest in the ANA, and must apply the same rigorous strategy and vetting procedures used with the ANA to the Afghan National Police.
   
• The Taliban: The Afghan government must be in a position of strength in order to include the Taliban in any kind of negotiations. Any negotiations must be part of a clearly defined process that reassures the Afghan public that the rights and freedoms they have obtained over the past few years will not be bartered away for the sake of reconciliation.

The Tribal Solution

Holt argued that, of all of the options available to the international community, only the tribal option stands any chance of long term success:

• The Afghan Government: A strong centralized government is not a viable option in Afghanistan. Kabul’s role should be tailored to that of supporting the tribal infrastructure.
   
• A Buffer: By energizing and cultivating existing Afghan tribal structures, the international community might have a chance of creating a tactical, operational, and even strategic buffer between the Afghan government and the Taliban. 

Dorronsoro disagreed, stating that the tribal option is equivalent to arming or supporting militia groups, and will not work. He contended that militias will only further undermine the legitimacy of Afghan institutions and push more Afghans into the hands of the Taliban.

Negotiate With the Taliban

The only viable strategy in Afghanistan, Dorronsoro maintained, is to negotiate a political agreement with the leadership of the Taliban, allowing the international community to withdraw from the country. Such an agreement would have to include reassurances from Pakistan and the Taliban that Afghanistan will not return to being a sanctuary for Al-Qaeda, and create a broad-based coalition government in Afghanistan that includes the Taliban. This strategy, he explained, is inevitable for a number of reasons:

• Human Cost: There are currently 150,000 troops and 100,000 contractors deployed in Afghanistan. There were 520 allied casualties in Afghanistan in 2009, an increase of roughly 60% on the previous year, and casualties are likely to increase in 2010. 
   
• The Karzai Government: Following the presidential elections, President Karzai has lost legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan people. Currently, state structures are minimal or non-existent in many parts of the country. Karzai is unlikely to succeed in building a new state and is not a viable Afghan partner for the international community.
   
• Pakistan: The Pakistani government has made it clear that the border will stay open and that they will not launch any kind of offensive against the Afghan Taliban. The insurgency is thus guaranteed a valuable sanctuary in Pakistan.
   
• Afghan Security Forces:  It is ultimately unrealistic to believe that the Afghans will be able to take over any significant responsibility for Afghan security within the next three years.

Dorronsoro acknowledged that the Taliban are disinclined to participate in negotiations at the moment, particularly because they do not see Karzai as a serious partner. However, he identified two main incentives for the Taliban to engage in serious negotiations:

• The Pakistani Army: The Pakistani army is the only party that can put any pressure on the Taliban, and they are keen for the Taliban to negotiate a settlement. They want official recognition of a new government and, most of all, they want India out of Afghanistan.
   
• Taliban Confidence: The Taliban are extremely confident at the moment, and they may see negotiations as a shortcut to their ultimate goal, which is to return to power in Kabul.

Session 2: What Prospects for a Realistic Regional Strategy?

Many of Afghanistan’s neighbors have long-term interests and influence in particular segments of Afghanistan, and the objectives they pursue are not necessarily aligned with the coalition’s mission. BBC Panorama correspondent Jane Corbin, former interior minister of Afghanistan Ali A. Jalali, Saad Mohseni, director of the Moby Group, and Hilary Synnott of the International Institute for Strategic Studies discussed the prospects for a realistic regional strategy towards the stabilization of Afghanistan. Carnegie’s Fabrice Pothier moderated.

Obama’s Timeline

Corbin suggested that major regional players have focused on President Obama’s time line for the drawdown of U.S. troops, formulating their Afghan policy strategies around that deadline:

• Iran: In early 2009, there was some tentative cooperation between Iran and the United States on Afghanistan, and there were hopes that Iran could become a positive force for stabilization in Afghanistan. Following the controversial Iranian elections, however, the Iranian regime may evaluate whether it is in the regime’s best interest to meddle in Afghan affairs in order to tie down U.S. forces.
   
• Pakistan: Pakistan is the most important regional player in the equation. The Pakistani army, and particularly the frontier corps, appears committed to solving the problem of cross-border infiltration and support for the Taliban. However, the weakness of civilian government, coupled with the threat of a U.S. timetable, may hinder their ability to deliver. Furthermore, Synott noted that the United States remains highly unpopular in Pakistan, and American and Pakistani interests often diverge, particularly on the question of the Afghan Taliban.
   
• India: India is also a very important regional player in Afghanistan, and its increasing influence there has been a source of alarm to Pakistan. India is the largest provider of aid to Afghanistan, and is keen to design a joint regional strategy for the country.
   
• China: China is waiting for the international coalition to withdraw from Afghanistan before it offers more aid and development. There is hope, however, that China will be able to provide a long-term lifeline for Afghanistan.

Regional Negotiation with the Taliban

Mohseni explained that, while regional attempts at dialogue with the Taliban in the past had met with little success, major regional players are now signaling that they might support such negotiations:

• Russia: Russia has signaled that any negotiations in Afghanistan should involve the Taliban, the Northern Alliance, and other ethnicities in Afghanistan. A positive signal from Russia towards negotiations is important, as it would imply the acquiescence of the Central Asian states.
   
• Pakistan: While the Pakistanis are giving mixed signals, they realize that they will never be able to control their own Taliban unless the Afghan Taliban is under control.

Economic Issues

Economically, Mohseni said, there is no doubt that peace in Afghanistan would benefit the entire region. South Asia would be able to benefit from Central Asia’s energy reserves. It would facilitate trade between Iran, India, and Central Asia, and ultimately it would facilitate regional investment in Afghanistan, which is hampered by the conflict.

Successful Regional Cooperation

Only openness and cooperation with regional powers, supported by the United States and NATO, offer any prospect for security and economic progress in Afghanistan, Jalili stated. He identified four points that are crucial to the success of any regional process:

• Afghan Stability: Regional states are liable to continue their interventions in Afghanistan if the country fails to stabilize as a result of faltering international commitment.
   
• Regional Partnership: Afghanistan’s ability to overcome its economic and political problems is closely linked to the existence of a constructive regional partnership.
   
• American Regional Policy: Afghanistan’s relationships with Iran and Pakistan, and the extent to which the latter cooperate in Afghanistan’s recovery, is closely influenced by their attitudes towards U.S. policies in the region.
   
• The International Community: The regional perception that U.S. and international interest in Afghanistan is waning drives domestic opposition forces in neighboring states to hedge their bets in supporting the Karzai regime.