Talking to the Taliban: Quick-Fix or Political Solution?

IMGXYZ2423IMGZYXThe international coalition’s strategy has reached an impasse in Afghanistan. None of the efforts attempted since the summer of 2009 has halted the deterioration of the political and security situation. Against this stark background, a growing consensus is emerging that direct negotiation with the Taliban leadership is the only option that will lead to a lasting political solution in Afghanistan. However, important questions persist as to the credibility of the Taliban as a reliable partner, the timing of potential negotiations, and, more fundamentally, the desirability of negotiating with a group that has such unpalatable values.
In an event hosted by Carnegie Europe, Carnegie’s Gilles Dorronsoro, on return from his latest trip to Afghanistan, addressed the key issues surrounding negotiation with the Taliban and finding a long-term solution for Afghanistan.

A Conflict Lost

Dorronsoro opened his discussion by building the case for immediate negotiations with the leadership of the Taliban. He explained that, for all intents and purposes, the International Coalition will not be able to significantly weakenthe Taliban, and outlined the principle reasons he believes that this has occurred:

• No Strategy: The International Coalition doesn’t have a coherent strategy in Afghanistan, even if the United States relies on an efficient public relations machine to create the perception of progress where no such progress exists on the ground. For example, the operation in Marjah was represented as demonstrative of a successful counterinsurgency doctrine. In reality, the operation was a failure; the Taliban are still present in Marjah and the U.S. military controls only a small part of the area. The overall choice of Marjah—a marginal area—also raises questions about the strategy of the International Coalition.


• Government in a Box: A significant part of the International Coalition’s current strategy rests on the false assumption that government institutions can be imported in a district or a city from the outside. This has led to a situation where government officials are hand-picked by Western powers, important institutions such as the police do not function because they are not made up of local people, and ultimately all important decisions are made by senior U.S. officers and civilians.


• Distrust of the Afghan Government: The 2009 presidential elections were marred by massive fraud, and it is likely that as little as 10 to 15 percent of the population voted for President Karzai.  Karzai himself has lost all legitimacy, and is increasingly dependent on networks of criminals and warlords. Corruption is endemic at both local and ministerial levels of government.


• No Local Partners: Afghans are increasingly wary of collaborating with the International Coalition. The population does not trust the coalition because they fear the coalition’s withdrawal. Many Afghans have already been killed by the Taliban for collaborating with the coalition, and local leaders fear for their safety if they were to work with the coalition. In eastern Afghanistan, the United States has been trying to build up local militias, but villagers there are unwilling to work with them.


• An Open Border: The Taliban have almost complete freedom of movement across the Afghan-Pakistani border.  Apart from a few small stretches, the border is open, allowing the Taliban to establish very effective supply networks.


• Taliban Morale: The contention that Taliban morale is waning is completely wrong.  The Taliban are currently winning the war, and they know it, so their morale is in fact quite good. Their main worry is their relationship with the Pakistani army, not the COIN.

Talking to the Taliban

The accepted wisdom of the coalition has been that by pushing forward with major offensives in 2010, they will be in a better position to negotiate in 2011.  However, Dorronsoro explained, if the coalition waits until 2011 to negotiate, the situation will be worse:

• Karzai: Karzai will probably be weaker in 2011 than he is now.


• Failure:  The media portrayals of a successful Marjah operation, and potentially other operations, will begin to wear off, and the true extent of their failure will become painfully apparent.


• Public Opinion: Many crucial members of the coalition, including France, Holland, Britain, Germany, and Italy, are under intense political pressure at home to begin withdrawing from Afghanistan. Waiting would only exacerbate this problem.

Therefore, Dorronsoro argued, the coalition should not wait, but rather begin negotiations immediately, with the hope of salvaging something from the current situation. However, there are potential problems that lie in the way of negotiations:

• Karzai: Karzai, who is currently trying to organize his own ‘peace jirga,’ is a hindrance to negotiations. The Taliban are aware that he would not be able to deliver on any promises he might make, and are not interested in speaking to him. Karzai himself has no interest in an end to the war.  Any settlement in Afghanistan would entail the election of a new leader, and therefore the end of his political career.


• The Negotiation Process: The question of who would be involved in the negotiation process will also be a difficult one.  All of the major players with a stake in Afghanistan have their own, often mutually exclusive agendas.

Negotiations, Dorronsoro continued, will therefore not be an easy undertaking. Dorronsoro suggested a few essential steps to begin the negotiation process:

• Ceasefire/Amnesty: The international coalition will need to initiate the negotiations by offering a ceasefire, and an amnesty for the Taliban leadership to entice them back to Afghanistan.  This will remove, at least partially, the Taliban leadership from Pakistan’s sphere of influence. 


• The Major Players: Pakistan cannot be marginalized in the negotiations themselves.  Pakistan has made it clear that no deal can take place in Afghanistan without it.  Therefore the major players in any negotiations would have to be, the coalition, Karzai, the Taliban, and Pakistan.  Including anyone else would make the situation far too complicated, although there might be room for marginal actors such as Hezb-i-Islami. 

The ultimate aim of these negotiations from a coalition perspective, Dorronsoro concluded, should be to strike a political deal that would be robust enough to withstand a slow withdrawal of international forces.  Such a deal would necessarily entail the creation of a coalition government, and the creation of a small number of international military bases in Afghanistan for fighting against Al-Qaida and other extremist groups.