Arms Control and Security in Sino-U.S. Relations

IMGXYZ2959IMGZYXEver since China severed defense exchanges with the United States in January 2010 to protest U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, the future of China-U.S. security relations has assumed heightened importance. To facilitate exchanges on arms control and security, the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center invited young Chinese experts to informally engage with U.S. attendees on extended deterrence, nuclear energy cooperation, military strategy and reforms, and U.S. naval intentions. This event, the third installment of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center’s “Arms Control’s Future” seminar series, was moderated by Carnegie’s Lora Saalman.

U.S. Extended Deterrence and East Asia

He Yun, a PhD candidate at Tsinghua University, argued that the new U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) tries to limit the overall scope of U.S. nuclear deterrence. He Yu n described this as an encouraging start but argued there remains too much ambiguity about the role of nuclear weapons in the U.S. extended deterrence policy in northeast Asia.

• Limiting Extended Deterrence: He Yun argued that if extended deterrence is only applied in cases where aggressive action threatens an ally’s survival, its credibility increases. However, if extended deterrence is used to target a wide range of issues, particularly small-scale conflicts, it loses credibility. He Yun contended that the current policy falls in the second category.


• Japan and the United States: He Yun suggested that if the United States does not limit application of its deterrence umbrella, some people in the United States and Japan may use the policy to counter a broad range of regional threats, such as territorial disputes. As a result, the United States would face a greater burden, while its allies could be disappointed by the inability of the United States to intervene on their behalf in all circumstances.


• Damage of Broad Scope: The wide application of extended deterrence discredits Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which is intended to work toward disarmament, He Yun asserted. Some U.S. allies may want to retain specific U.S. nuclear capabilities in the region, like Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAM), or to maintain America’s nuclear gap with China to make extended nuclear deterrence more credible. Both of these outcomes would make further nuclear reductions impossible.

U.S. Nonproliferation and Nuclear Energy Policies

Wang Haibin, an associate professor at Tsinghua University’s School of Public Policy and Management, described rapid and inconsistent shifts in U.S. nuclear energy cooperation.

• U.S. Policy Shifts: Wang questioned U.S. support for the NPT given its advocacy for nuclear cooperation with India, a non-NPT signatory that has conducted nuclear tests. He also questioned the rationale behind the U.S. decision to strengthen nuclear cooperation with China after 2003, given that China began improving its nonproliferation record much earlier. These two changes are out of line with traditional U.S. policies and behavior, argued Wang.


• U.S.-India Balancing of China: A significant number of Chinese experts believe that the primary reason the United States sacrificed global nuclear nonproliferation norms to support India is to encircle and contain China. But Wang disagreed with this view, arguing that U.S. nonproliferation policies toward both China and India have fallen by the wayside. The United States is no longer as worried about horizontal transfers of nuclear technology and equipment between nations as it is about the specter of non-state nuclear terrorism. This shift was motivated in large part by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, Wang asserted.

Evolution of U.S. Military Strategy

Ding Xin, a PhD Candidate at Beijing University, and Qiu Zhenwei, a researcher at the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC), discussed U.S. military strategy and its evolution.

• Moving Away from Overwhelming Force: Ding argued that in 2003 the U.S. military was characterized by speed, jointness, intelligence, and precision. This meant that overwhelming force was not the primary driving factor in U.S. military strategy. Yet, by 2006, Ding argued that the crisis in Iraq led to another major adjustment to a military strategy based primarily on offensive strike capabilities.


• Role of the Individual: Ding argued that the ability of the United States to reform and innovate allows it to maintain and reinforce its military superiority.  In response to Ding’s question about what extent U.S. military reforms are directed at China, U.S attendees responded that the United States routinely conducts military readjustments that are completely independent of China. While the Asian scenario remains a factor, it is not the sole consideration.


• U.S. Military Readjustments and China: China’s navy plays a critical role in maintaining the integrity of China’s littoral and protecting trade and energy routes, Qiu Zhenwei argued.  In response to his question on the extent U.S. naval and other readjustments in the East Asian region would affect China, U.S. attendees pointed out that U.S. actions in the region did not reflect a new trend, but rather an affirmation for regional players that the United States is still present and has interests in the region.