The Nuclear Chain: U.S.-China, China-India, India-Pakistan

IMGXYZ3187IMGZYXDespite the increasing multilateralism of nuclear dynamics, analyses often remain confined to the bilateral or trilateral level. Nowhere is this more evident than in discussions of strategic stability. To explore the potential for nuclear trends to affect relationships between multiple countries, the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy hosted a group of Chinese graduate students at the Tsinghua Politics and International Relations International Community Conference under the fourth installment of the “China and South Asia’s Future” seminar series. Carnegie’s Lora Saalman moderated and spoke at the event.

Strategic Stability

• Past and Present: While much has changed in nuclear dynamics and power structures since the end of the Cold War, much of the old terminology lingers argued Li Deshun, a Ph.D. candidate at Tsinghua University. He cited the use of the phrase “strategic stability” to describe U.S. relations with China and Russia in the 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. While arms race stability was a feature of the last decade, Li emphasized that crisis stability could be said to characterize the present. He noted that interdependence between countries is a core feature of this new dynamic.
   
• Linking the Chain: Lin, a Masters Degree candidate at Beijing Language and Culture University, and Saalman noted that U.S. nuclear advances drive China’s military pursuits. This provokes a response from India, to which Pakistan then reacts. While dynamic, this process is not always linear, both agreed. India remains reliant on U.S. support, which China sees as an effort to contain it and expand U.S. regional influence, argued Lin. He noted that some might therefore view China’s support for Pakistan as a means of countering Indo-U.S. expansion. He cited Pakistan as the weakest link and the United States as the primary catalyst, due to its:
   
  • Possession of the largest and most advanced nuclear arsenal
     
  • Refusal to accept no first use (NFU)
     
  • Challenges to the nuclear taboo, a de facto normative prohibition on nuclear use
     
  • Deployment of ballistic missile defense (BMD) and nuclear submarines eastward to impinge upon China’s defensive strategic capabilities

U.S.-China

• U.S. Strategic Pressure on China: Lin argued that U.S. military development has created benchmarks for the advanced military systems needed by China for self-defense. He noted U.S. qualitative nuclear weapons improvements and nuclear strategy adjustments elicit a response from Beijing. Reiterating China’s NFU and minimum deterrence pledge, Lin suggested that, in facing U.S. advances, China may feel compelled to enhance its second strike capability. Thus, he suggested there are advantages to cooperation between the United States and China in enhancing crisis stability.
   
• Conventional Weapons Stability: One Chinese participant highlighted the function of conventional weapons in impacting strategic stability. He argued that the predominance of conventional arsenals of countries like the United States have shaped the nuclear decisions of others. However, he argued that BMD and Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS) should be evaluated on their own merits to determine their impact on strategic stability. 

China-India

• Strategic Stability Foundations: Unlike the United States and China—which face significant constraints on bilateral strategic stability, such as BMD, CPGS, vast gaps in nuclear stockpiles, and unbalanced nuclear postures—China and India share underappreciated similarities on NFU, de-mating nuclear warheads from delivery systems, and minimum credible deterrence, Saalman said. As a result, China and India are better positioned to explore strategic stability, particularly in a low numbers environment. She suggested that they could do so by using unofficial talks to set the foundation for higher-level bilateral NFU and non/de-targeting agreements, as well as to explore such sensitive issues as:
  
  
  • U.S.-India and China-Pakistan nuclear cooperation,
     
  • Pakistan’s fissile material expansion and tactical nuclear weapon pursuits,
     
  • China and India’s ballistic missile defense advances.

• China and India’s Broken Link: Saalman argued that nuclear linkages are not unidirectional. Just as shocks to the system from the United States can impact other countries, steps taken by Pakistan and India can impact China and the United States. She cited Pakistan and India’s ongoing fissile material production, Pakistan’s alleged tactical nuclear weapons pursuits, and India’s expanding missile and BMD ranges as examples. One Chinese participant countered that events impacting Pakistan and India would not influence China’s decision-making. He saw the chain as broken at the China-India link, with the former unconcerned about the latter.
   
• Defensive Stability: While India has been building its nuclear “strategic triad,” it continues to rely on external technology and on China as an excuse for such advances, argued Lin. India faces BMD and nuclear weapons limits, as well as a large gap with China’s military expenditure. Ultimately,  India and China have achieved a level of “defensive balance,” concluded Lin. Ma Jie, a master’s degree candidate at Beijing Language and Culture University, added that India’s nuclear weapons pursuits do not result from a threat from China or Pakistan, but instead its effort to achieve daguo diwei (great power status).

India-Pakistan

• Nuclear Redlines: Ma cited differences in India and Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons, with the former seeking great power status and the latter eschewing NFU to prevent India’s strategic or conventional attack. Lin noted that before India and Pakistan’s nuclear red lines are crossed, however, there remains room for a conventional conflict, triggered by such doctrines as “Cold Start.” He noted Pakistan’s nuclear postures are tied to India’s conventional military and doctrinal benchmarks.
   
• Lack of Nuclear Coercion: Zhang, a master’s degree candidate at Renmin University, argued that a loss of strategic balance between India and Pakistan would be unlikely to result in nuclear coercion. Citing India’s NFU posture, conventional superiority, and pursuit of great power status, Zhang and Ma explained that too many constraints exist for India to utilize nuclear coercion vis-à-vis Pakistan.
   
• Pakistan’s Dilemma: India’s pursuit of “Cold Start” has diminished Pakistan’s ability to deter its use of conventional, much less nuclear weapons, emphasized Zhang and Ma. They agreed that this imbalance demands the pursuit of bilateral crisis stability. Yet, Zhang argued that if crisis stability were to be challenged, the most likely origin would be Pakistan. He explained Pakistan’s dilemma as:
  
  
  • Faltering conventional capabilities and first use posture,
  • Damaged relations with the United States, following the killing of Osama bin Laden,
     
  • Political divisiveness, religious extremism, terrorism, and potential collapse

• External Actors: Chinese participants stressed the central role played by external actors in tamping down nuclear escalation in South Asia. U.S. counterterrorism, nonproliferation, and regional stability goals would force its involvement, noted Zhang. Similarly, she argued that China has an interest in ensuring that South Asia maintains peace and stability. If regional instability occurred, China and the United States would intervene to control the situation, Zhang argued.