The 41st Taiwan-U.S. Conference on Contemporary China

The Republic of China National Security Council’s Jason Hsiu, National Chengchi University’s Titus Chen, and George Washington University’s Robert Sutter discussed the evolution of Chinese foreign policy. Carnegie’s Michael Swaine moderated.

• Policy Continuity: Hsiu said that the foreign policy of incoming leader Xi Jinping is likely to be broadly consistent with that of the previous administration. This is reflected in official documents such as outgoing president Hu Jintao’s report to the 18th National Party Congress, he added. This foreign policy continuity like results from a range of reasons, including a broadly stable international balance of power, consistent domestic goals of economic development, and China’s consensus-based decisionmaking structure.


• Increasing Outreach: Hsiu predicted Beijing will take a more pragmatic stance toward maritime territorial disputes and increase its outreach to Southeast Asian countries in order to resist U.S. military presence and increase Chinese influence in the region. In the future, Hsiu said, China will continue to develop its new major power relationships and begin to confirm its role as a “major responsible country” and international rulemaker.


• No New Ideology: Chen explained that China has been endeavoring to develop a foreign policy that reflects its new material standing, but since 1979 its leaders have yet to develop ideals of governance that are attractive to the rest of the world. Without ideological underpinnings, its economic and technological achievements become sources of tension and its foreign policy is perceived as more assertive, he said.


• Regional Hedging: New Chinese leaders must address the issue that China’s material achievements have failed to win friends and allies, Chen said. In the meantime, the lack of a coherent strategy means Chinese foreign policy decisionmaking will continue to be opaque to outsiders, and Asian countries will continue to hedge against China’s rise through the U.S pivot, he concluded.


• Conflicting Goals: Sutter explained that China has demonstrated increased assertiveness while espousing a policy of “peace and development.” He argued that China has conflicting goals of trying to uphold a strategy of peace and development and protecting its core territorial interests. The tension between these two ideas is causing a period of uncertainty where the direction of Chinese foreign policy could turn sharply to assertiveness, Sutter said.


• Sustaining Forces: Elite opinion and public opinion are two increasingly influential but unpredictable forces sustaining more assertive global behavior, Sutter said. In response, the United States and Southeast Asian countries have adopted a cautious stance to avoid provocations that could cause an exaggerated reaction from China.


• Colored Perspective: Swaine argued that when analyzing Chinese foreign policy, it is important to understand China’s perspective on the context of disputes. China’s views and behavior are colored strongly by sentiments about Chinese history, perceptions of other regional powers, and a tendency to look at international issues in suspicious and colored terms, Swaine said. In particular, China sees its behavior as a reaction to unjust changes in the rules of the game.

Shaocheng Tang and Arthur Ding of the National Chengchi University and Alan Romberg of the Stimson Center discussed the present condition of and future opportunities for China’s Taiwan policy. Bonnie Glaser of the Center for Strategic & International Studies moderated.

• Political Stability: Tang predicted that the cross-strait relationship will remain stable and peaceful as long as the ruling Kuo Min Tang party remains in power in Taiwan. Tang added that the global economic slowdown has made closer cross-strait economic cooperation possible, and said that Beijing is also more willing to partner with Taiwan on sovereignty disputes in the East China Sea. Finally, he said that Chinese statements have suggested that leaders in Beijing might be willing to seek a resolution of the cross-strait political arrangement before completing reunification.


• Seeking Status Quo: Ding said that following KMT presidential candidate Ma Ying-Jeou’s reelection, the cross-strait relationship should remain quiet and stable for the next four years, since Ma’s weak domestic position and deep divisions in Taiwanese society will make him reluctant to alter the status quo. He added, however, that some factions in China that believe that Taiwan’s goal is permanent “peaceful separation” could pressure leaders in Beijing to advance negotiations on Taiwan’s status. Taiwan has also criticized China for making unilateral moves, as in the recent controversial publication of Chinese passports with maps that included disputed territories, Ding said.


• Policy of Patience: President Ma’s reelection is seen in Beijing as a vindication of a policy of patience, Romberg said. However, new economic and trade agreements show that China does not support stasis and will continue to push for its ultimate goal of peaceful reunification. Under Xi Jinping, China’s leaders will likely undertake comprehensive short-term steps to build trust between the two sides, attempt to lock in achievements while Ma is in office, and continue to put pressure on the opposition Taiwanese party, the Democratic Progressive Party.


• Building Trust: Romberg echoed Ding’s conclusion that while the mainland remains confident about the ultimate success of reunification, the main question is the pace of unification. While the Chinese government understands that pushing too hard for reunification could be counterproductive, some non-governmental groups are unsatisfied with the progress of cross-strait relations. Romberg concluded that the Chinese government should advance trust-building measures and attempt to win the “hearts and minds” of Taiwanese citizens by avoiding negative publicity like the passport controversy and extending more opportunities for Taiwan to participate in the international sphere.

Chen-shen Yen of National Chengchi Univeristy, Alexander Huang of Tamkang University, and former State Department analyst Christopher Clarke discussed the implications of China’s new leadership on foreign policy, both in relation to Taiwan and to the greater Asia-Pacific Region. Douglas Paal moderated.

• Taiwan’s Role in U.S.-China Relations: Since the era of Chiang Kaishek, there have been five distinct periods in U.S.-China relations tied to Taiwan, Yen said.
  
  
  • Anti-communism: In this first period, Taiwan strived to forge closer a relationship with the United States, and Washington also anchored key military stations and fleets on this strategic island.
  
  
  • Economic Emphasis: In this period, the United States provided contributed substantially to Taiwan’s industrialization and capitalization.
  
  
  • Political Emphasis: In this third period, Taiwan’s democratization allowed Washington to see that democracy can be applied to China’s circle.
  
  
  • National Emphasis: The United States protected Taiwan from China’s aggression.


• International Emphasis: In this final period, Taiwan has participated in regional and global trading systems, quelling those who were concerned that the island is economically marginalized by China.


• Rebalancing of U.S. Interest Toward Asia-Pacific: Huang argued that the “rebalancing” is not a short-term cure, but rather a fairly long process of adjustment/readjustment, involving serious interaction between Washington and the Asia-Pacific. The core of this process consists of economic and trade development that will contribute to recovery in the United States and closer integration among the world’s top economies. In terms of China’s role in the U.S. “rebalancing,” Huang maintained that Beijing should focus on fixing its domestic problems rather than practicing assertive behavior in the region, especially on maritime disputes. As for Taiwan, its government has mixed feelings about the costs and benefits of its participation in the U.S. “rebalancing.” Huang recommended that Taiwan should do more to be a part of the U.S. strategy by opening up its market to new trade arrangements and simultaneously upgrading its future military capacity to protect itself.


• U.S. and Chinese Policy Trends: Clarke contended that the U.S. administration will continue its current course of pivoting toward Asia, intensifying efforts toward the peaceful settlement of territorial disputes, pressuring denuclearization of North Korea, and urging China to conform to international norms. However, because of U.S. domestic gridlock, there may not be a significant increase in the U.S. military presence in Asia. Clarke added that the incoming Chinese leaders will bring no change since their selection was based on the party’s consensus and that Xi Jinping will focus on consolidating his authority in the next couple years. Thus, the earliest possible time for any reform effort will not be until Beijing’s Third Plenum in 2014. Overall, Clarke advocated the current U.S. stance on Asia’s regional issues and advised against any move that will push China too hard.

Chungmin Tsai of National Chengchi University, Chin-fu Hung of National Cheng Kung University, and Center for Strategic & International Studies’ Christopher K. Johnston discussed the implications of the new leadership on China’s domestic politics. Yu-ming Shaw moderated.

• Continuity: Despite the fervor of media coverage, both domestically and internationally, the panelists broadly suggested that observers not expect any drastic changes in policy orientation. Tsai noted that the new group of leaders is comprised of mostly conservatives chosen from within the Jiang Zemin faction. Hung added that the reduction of the number of members in the Standing Committee from nine to seven highlights the Party’s need for ever-greater consensus and stability. Thus, the leadership is unlikely to open up significantly and enact far-reaching reforms, they concluded.


• Vested Interests: Johnston added that while the new leadership is not hyper-conservative and that the new sense of unity may suggest that something may actually be done, this is not to suggest that the changes will be easily enacted given the diverse vested interests in China.


• Hollow Remarks: All the panelists noted that Xi’s position is somewhat constrained, given the general Jiang Zemin faction within the Standing Committee and Xi’s background as a princeling. The implication is that there are unlikely to be any new ideas or values from Xi and the new leadership, they concluded. Hung and Tsai both acknowledged that Beijing has made many promises, but such promises are hollow remarks at best, they warned. Tsai further noted that Xi did not appeal to any previous socialist theories, but acknowledged the many problems that are facing China moving forward.


• Rampant Corruption: A wide wealth gap, extreme social cleavages, and nostalgia for a Maoist revolution are some of the problems weighing on the Chinese Communist Party, Tsai pointed out. Hung agreed, noting that the leadership recognizes the need to address socioeconomic problems, but this will come at the cost of not addressing issues related to politics, transparency, and the environment. Lastly, Johnston stated that while corruption is an important issue for the Party, he sees only possible incremental reforms going forward.