Carnegie Global Dialogue

Wed. October 22nd, 2014
Beijing

The year 2014 has been a momentous one for the world. The Russian invasion of Crimea, the rise of the Islamic State, the continuation of civil war and sectarian strife in Syria and Iraq, the growing popularity of nationalist parties in Europe, and a historic China-Russia gas deal are just some of the highlights. China is an emerging world power with significant resources and an interest in maintaining global stability. But what role will Beijing play on the international stage?

Leveraging its global network of scholars and expertise and bringing together experts from across Europe, China, and the United States, the second annual Carnegie Global Dialogue will attempt to answer this question. Panelists will discuss the contributions that China and the broader international community can make to global stability, with an emphasis on regions of the world where instability is most acute.

Wed. October 22nd, 2014 10:30 AM - 12:00 PM EST

China’s Evolving Foreign Policy and Global Role

The world order is changing amid a host of global challenges and Sino-U.S. bilateral relations are evolving in response to China’s growing capabilities and assertiveness.

China’s growing capabilities and resources enable the country to contribute more meaningfully toward solutions to the world’s most pressing security challenges. However, trends and influencing factors in China’s foreign policy continue to evolve, as does understanding about the type of great power that China will become.

The 2014 Carnegie Global Dialogue’s opening session centered on how the world order is changing amid a host of global challenges and how Sino-U.S. bilateral relations have evolved in response to China’s growing capabilities and assertiveness. The morning plenary featured remarks from Carnegie President Jessica Mathews and a discussion between Carnegie’s Douglas Paal and Carnegie–Tsinghua’s Yan Xuetong. Carnegie-Tsinghua Director Paul Haenle hosted and moderated the session.

Discussion Highlights

  • Resurgent Bipolarity: After a post–Cold War period of U.S. unipolarity, the world’s balance of power, panelists observed, seems to be shifting again. Emerging powers like the BRICS are competing more actively with established powers like the United States. While experts differ in predicting a shift to bipolarity or multipolarity, the panelists predicted that a bipolar shift is more likely given the amount of power China is amassing and the country’s growth rate. 
     
  • Redefining Great-Power Relations:  In the past year, the concept of a new great-power relationship between China and the United States has risen to prominence. One panelist noted that although this phrase—credited to Chinese leader Xi Jinping—likely served to rally domestic support behind a more active Chinese foreign policy, it is clear that both sides want to differentiate themselves from the previous U.S.-Soviet relationship. This policy is a step in that direction. Nevertheless, China and the West understand great-power politics differently. Panelists asserted that the West already views China as a competitor, but also expects Beijing to collaborate on emerging global challenges commensurate to China’s growing capabilities. China, meanwhile, expects more respect for its policy positions from the West. One speaker proposed that both sides create a common definition of “new great-power relations” to more effectively cooperate. 
     
  • Divergent Narratives: Panelists discussed why Chinese and U.S. narratives involving the Asian-Pacific region are conflicting. Washington views Beijing as increasingly assertive in its conflicts in the East China Sea. Meanwhile, China perceives the United States as trying to contain it through neighboring alliances. The panelists agreed that this was due to different conceptions of power. Because the United States already views China as a competing power, Washington interprets Beijing’s actions as being aggressive. On the other hand, China will not view itself as balancing the United States until Beijing considers the two countries to be on equal footing on a global scale.
     
  • A Globally Active China: Despite consensus that China and other major powers must collaborate more on new challenges, panelists admitted that it is unclear to what extent and in what areas China should take responsibility. They noted that China still views itself as an “incomplete power” and is only willing to involve itself in international cooperation proportional to its self-perceived power. That said, President Xi Jinping’s latest visit to Latin America marked the first time a Chinese leader claimed that China was ready to provide more public goods to the international community. Panelists agreed that this could mean that China is ready to take on a more active international role.
     
  • Beyond Bretton Woods: The panelists suggested that current international institutions were made for a world with a different balance of power. They agreed that the IMF and World Bank are not evolving quickly enough to meet the world’s needs. China has difficulty exerting its growing influence in institutions that are only slowly including it. In response, China is leading efforts to create new institutions like the New Development Bank and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. These new forums prompted a Western debate about whether China is trying to fit into the existing order or change it. One panelist suggested that these newly formed institutions do not threaten the Bretton Woods institutions, but instead form a complementary and more inclusive institutional structure.

Paul Haenle

Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair, Carnegie China

Jessica Tuchman Mathews

Distinguished Fellow

Yan Xuetong

President, Carnegie China Management Board, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

Douglas H. Paal

Distinguished Fellow, Asia Program

Wed. October 22nd, 2014 2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST

The China-U.S.-Russia Trilateral Dynamic and Implications for Global Stability

The Ukraine crisis has isolated Russia, and consequently tightened Beijing and Moscow’s ties. How will these dynamics affect stability and the balance of power in Eurasia and Central Asia?

Sino-Russian relations have changed dramatically over the past year. The Ukraine crisis has prompted a deep rift between Russia and the West, and consequently brought China and Russia closer together. Meanwhile, the historic gas deal that Beijing and Moscow signed in May 2014 will sustain growth in bilateral ties over the coming decades. How is the United States reacting to this shift and how will these dynamics affect stability and the balance of power in Eurasia and Central Asia?

At Carnegie’s second Global Dialogue, Carnegie–Moscow’s Dmitri Trenin moderated a panel on how events in Ukraine and other global developments will affect relations between Beijing, Moscow, and Washington going forward. The participants were Carnegie’s Eugene Rumer, Yang Jiemian of the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, Sergey Radchenko of Aberystwyth University, and Zhao Kejin of Tsinghua University. 

Discussion Highlights

  • A Closer But Uneven Power Dynamic: Despite historical tensions, China and Russia have an important strategic relationship, panelists agreed, that harms both sides’ interests when it is poorly managed. Now Moscow wishes to enhance economic cooperation with Beijing, its main trading partner. Because Beijing enjoys a favorable strategic position and its choice of stronger trading partners, panelists noted that China has refused to concede to Russian petitions for more favorable trade conditions that would expand Russian exports to China beyond natural resources.
     
  • Ukraine Crisis Isolates Russia: The Ukraine crisis has changed the dynamics of both U.S.-Russian and Sino-Russian relations, panelists observed. Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine and subsequent Western sanctions have isolated Moscow internationally, which has forced Putin to shift from trying to manage Beijing to actively seeking closer ties. Moscow’s isolation, one panelist asserted, reinforces Chinese reluctance to draw too close to Russia, because such a policy could expose Beijing to international isolation through closer association with Moscow.
     
  • No Sino-Russian Alliance On The Horizon: U.S. attempts to exert pressure and influence Beijing and Moscow’s foreign policy might, panelists conceded, provide incentive for China and Russia to seek closer bilateral ties. However, most panelists agreed that this dynamic has limitations, and current Sino-Russian cooperation will stop well short of a formal alliance. China places a premium on multipolarity and maintaining pragmatic, mutually beneficial relationships with all countries; therefore, Beijing will not risk alienating Moscow or Washington by aligning too closely with one side or the other. Furthermore, given the chilly U.S. relationship with Russia, panelists maintained that the United States has little leverage to influence Sino-Russian bilateral ties.
     
  • Chiefly Bilateral Relations: Until recently, panelists agreed, interactions between Beijing, Moscow, and Washington have solely involved two distinct sets of bilateral relations. Indeed, virtually no three-way engagement had been occurring, and the concept of triangular relations has seemed outdated since the Cold War. China’s focus on cultivating independent bilateral ties with all major powers has only exacerbated this trend, panelists said. China’s rise and Russia’s decline have led the United States to focus on engaging China. Trilateral exchanges have also decreased as Washington withdraws from Afghanistan in Central Asia, which was previously one of the main regions where these three state actors interacted. Panelists concluded, however, that Russia’s assertiveness and the Ukraine crisis have prompted all three parties in the last year to pay more attention to trilateral relations.
     
  • Shifting Economic Balance in Central Asia: One panelist contended that Moscow has conceded to being supplanted by Beijing as the predominant economic actor in Central Asia. With China’s Silk Road initiative in Central Asia, he said, the region has developed economically and tightened diplomatic ties with China. Panelists posited that Russian concessions stem from limited leverage and perceptions that China’s presence will not introduce destabilizing political change. 

Eugene Rumer

Director and Senior Fellow, Russia and Eurasia Program

Zhao Kejin

Resident Scholar, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

Yang Jiemian

Sergey Radchenko

Dmitri Trenin

Director, Carnegie Moscow Center

Wed. October 22nd, 2014 2:00 PM - 3:30 PM EST

Forging Cooperative U.S.-China Relations in an Increasingly Complex International Environment

China and the United States should work closely together to develop comprehensive bilateral solutions to twenty-first century governance challenges.

China’s successful economic development has elevated the country’s status on the world stage. To address twenty-first-century governance challenges, China will need to work closely with the United States to develop comprehensive bilateral solutions.

At Carnegie’s second Global Dialogue, Carnegie–Tsinghua’s Paul Haenle moderated a panel on evolving U.S.-China relations and how both sides can mitigate mistrust, manage tense bilateral ties, and contribute collaboratively to resolving global challenges in a world that is rapidly changing. The panel featured Carnegie’s Douglas Paal, Yan Xuetong of Tsinghua University, Yuan Peng of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, and Tim Stratford of Covington & Burling LLP.

Discussion Highlights

  • Briefing the Presidents: In November 2014, President Xi Jinping and President Obama are expected to hold closed-door meetings following the APEC summit. Panelists advocated a return to “short-sleeve” diplomacy, involving frank discussions and constructive planning for the future in an intimate and informal setting. They highlighted how productive previous meetings of this nature have been in achieving progress on over ninety outcomes from the sixth Strategic and Economic Dialogue.
     
  • A New World Order:  Panelists discussed how China’s rise is often perceived as challenging the current balance of power. Some analysts, they said, believe an era of Chinese dominance in international affairs is unfolding. Several panelists asserted that China is not attempting to overturn the current international system, but rather to carve out its proper place within the existing structure and become a responsible global power. Panelists also criticized Washington's “pivot to Asia” for drawing unwanted attention and causing misperceptions of a hostile U.S. effort to contain China. They stressed that this global and interconnected era requires that cooperative efforts toward mutual stability and prosperity. Some panelists added that the U.S. rebalancing toward East Asia was just a recognition of the region’s growing prominence in international affairs.
     
  • Mistrust and Misunderstanding: Panelists observed that the China and the United States still do not fully trust each other and share different visions about the future and about how to achieve global stability. They discussed how mistrust and frequent misunderstandings have stymied efforts toward cooperation. While the chances of war or nuclear conflict remain very low, a Sino-U.S. rivalry will surely lead to military build-ups and possible escalation. According to panelists, specific areas that perpetuate mistrust on both sides include ideological differences, territorial disputes, media misrepresentations, and uncertainty about long-term intentions.
     
  • Avenues of Cooperation: Panelists stressed that mistrust and misunderstanding should not prevent China and the United States from working together on issues of mutual benefit. One such policy area is counterterrorism efforts to enhance stability in the Middle East. Although both sides define terrorism differently, such Sino-U.S. cooperation could build bilateral trust if successfully implemented. Panelists suggested developing inter-military professional codes of conduct to foster understanding and accomplish joint goals. In addition, the speakers identified humanitarian aid and disaster relief as avenues for increased cooperation with great potential for success. 
     
  • A New Great-Power Relationship: Panelists acknowledged that some friction in Sino-U.S. relations is unavoidable. They suggested that both countries can contribute more in potential areas of shared interest, such as counterterrorism and disaster relief. The panelists further challenged President Xi and President Obama to assess current global affairs and lead their states to develop joint capabilities and collaboration. By working from shared values rather than pure self-interest, panelists maintained, both sides can achieve a broader range of mutually desirable outcomes.

Douglas H. Paal

Distinguished Fellow, Asia Program

Yan Xuetong

President, Carnegie China Management Board, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

Yuan Peng

Tim Stratford

Paul Haenle

Maurice R. Greenberg Director’s Chair, Carnegie China

Wed. October 22nd, 2014 4:00 PM - 5:30 PM EST

China-Middle East Relations: Beyond Energy?

Despite challenges like terrorism and intraregional conflict, the United States and China remain invested in the Middle East and should work together with regional actors to manage instability.

With the rise of the Islamic State and the protracted civil war in Syria, the Middle East has drawn international attention as a region continually plagued by conflict, unrest, and ineffective leadership. Washington and Beijing’s regional involvement includes commitments that go well beyond the energy sector. Yet it remains to be seen how much China will contribute to multilateral efforts to manage regional instability.

At Carnegie’s second Global Dialogue, Carnegie–Tsinghua’s Matt Ferchen moderated a panel on Chinese and American regional interests in the Middle East and the likelihood that the two powers will respond in concert to challenges like Iranian nuclear ambitions and ongoing intraregional conflicts in Syria and Iraq. The panel included Carnegie’s Karim Sadjadpour, Wang Lian and Wu Bingbing of Peking University, and Bernard Haykel from Princeton University. 

Discussion Highlights

  • Countering Terrorism: Although the Islamic State poses an immediate threat, one panelist noted that the United States, China, and other states have limited means to address the situation in the short term, because its roots are at least as structural as proximate. The panelist suggested that one underlying cause is that Sunni communities perceive the region’s predominantly Shia rule to be disenfranchising, a frustration that the Islamic State has used to mobilize pockets of Sunni Arab support. The different—albeit overlapping—objectives that inform U.S. and Chinese counterterrorism efforts, panelists asserted, further complicate potential collaboration. Beijing emphasizes non-interference and overall regional stability, while Washington is more willing to use military force and supply weapons to local actors. Thus, panelists conclude that joint Sino-U.S. counterterrorism efforts, while possible, would prove challenging to implement in a manner amenable to both sides.

  • Discrepancies in Power Projection: Middle Eastern stability depends as much on global powers as it does on regional ones, panelists asserted. Yet a gap exists between U.S. and Chinese military capabilities and regional interests—China simply cannot project power into the region to the same extent as the United States. Moreover, panelists pointed out, Beijing’s ongoing commitment to non-interference in other states’ internal affairs remains a political obstacle to greater military involvement. Nevertheless, a U.S.-Sino consensus is still indispensable to resolving regional tensions. In the short to medium term, panelists concluded that China will likely remain without a regional military presence, and the degree of Beijing’s involvement will continue to be facilitating crisis response and humanitarian resources.  

  • China’s Western Borders: Panelists noted that U.S. military withdrawals from Iraq and Afghanistan might potentially have destabilizing effects on China’s western borders. They observed that Uighur unrest in Xinjiang remains a complex problem for China. Some panelists raised concerns that imams returning from training in the Middle East may upset China’s internal stability.  Beijing therefore has a vested interest, one panelist asserted, in ensuring that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan goes smoothly. He suggested that western China stands to benefit from the stability that would be afforded by strong internal governance from Kabul, particularly after NATO and U.S. troops have departed.

  • Deepening Economic Cooperation: Panelists pointed out that China has a serious interest in a stable, developing Middle East and North Africa. Chinese investments are financing factories, harbors, and other infrastructural projects in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria. The region’s oil reserves also have important implications for China’s energy security. In addition, Middle Eastern states hope to foster deeper economic ties with China in high-tech sectors, such as petrochemicals and alternative energy. Relevant state actors seek this economic exchange, panelists explained, not only to offset U.S. regional dominance, but also to develop their own domestic economies, which currently rely heavily on the oil and petrochemical sectors.

  • Nuclear Talks With Iran: Panelists cautioned that the chances of an impending deal between Obama and Rouhani should not be overestimated. Even if such an agreement were to be reached, the opposition from Israel, the U.S. Congress, and Iranian conservatives could still be enough to prevent a fully comprehensive deal. Panelists also observed that Iran’s regional importance, its relative stability compared to its neighbors, and the country’s vast energy resources have made China reassess Iran’s strategic importance, which may suggest that China will be more reluctant in impose tougher sanctions in the future.

Karim Sadjadpour

Senior Fellow, Middle East Program

Matt Ferchen

Nonresident Scholar, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

Wang Lian

Wu Bingbing

Research FellowInstitute for International and Strategic Studies, Peking University

Bernard Haykel

Wed. October 22nd, 2014 4:00 PM - 5:30 PM EST

Building a China-EU Partnership for Reform

While China-EU cooperation has been fruitful and potential avenues for further collaboration exist, substantive progress will depend on the artful management of competing priorities.

The strategic partnership between Beijing and Brussels has evolved over time, and the EU collectively represents China’s largest trading partner. While cooperation has been fruitful and potential avenues for further collaboration exist, substantive progress will depend on the artful management of competing priorities. The partnership undoubtedly has produced beneficial programs, but whether the arrangement is comprehensive and strategically sound remains an open question.

At Carnegie’s second Global Dialogue, Philip Bartley of the China-EU Trade Project moderated a panel on the opportunities and challenges of increasing bilateral cooperation between China and the EU, while simultaneously managing multilateral relations between China and individual EU member states. The panelists were Sebastian Heilmann of the Mercator Institute for China Studies, Carnegie–Tsinghua’s Shi Zhiqin, Duncan Freeman of the Brussels Institute of Contemporary Chinese Studies, and Sun Haiyan of the China Center for Contemporary World Studies.

Discussion Highlights

  • Shared Interests: Panelists observed that Beijing hopes to benefit from Europe’s familiarity with high-tech industrial production, flexible market networks, and the challenges of managing a fully developed economy. They further suggested that remaining competitive in increasingly globalized markets and supporting an aging population are policy challenges that both China and the EU face. These tasks demonstrate a common need for reform agendas that fundamentally restructure education, health care, and social welfare programs for the twenty-first century. Moreover, one panelist noted that both parties share the frustration of being disadvantaged by institutional arrangements that shape world financial markets to favor the United States. 
     
  • Balancing Bilateral and Multilateral Commitments: Panelists emphasized that relations between China and the EU involve many state actors and that parallel interactions do not always coincide perfectly. Nevertheless, high trade volumes have ensured that the strategic partnership between Beijing and Brussels remains a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy that cannot be undermined by bilateral dealings between China and individual EU member states. One panelist contended that bilateral interactions, like Chinese Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Germany in October, provide opportunities to test innovative ideas in a national state setting before integrating successful strategies into the EU organizational structure. In particular, Li’s visit helped complete a bilateral pact that includes a series of initiatives to promote innovation in energy and technology, a commitment to finalize an investment agreement, and over two billion euros in economic and investment deals. Such bilateral engagement, the panelist argued, need not be a paralyzing agent to further Sino-European collaboration.      
     
  • Implications of New Leadership: Panelists maintained that leadership transitions in China and Europe have both broadened and narrowed the scope of future Sino-EU cooperation. They discussed how Xi Jinping has increased Chinese engagement with the EU. Nevertheless, panelists conceded that the success of nationalist parties in this year’s European Parliament elections suggests a potential swing to the far right that might constrain future collaborative overtures.
     
  • The Future of European Firms in China’s Economy: In accordance with last year’s Third Plenum, the Chinese government has announced that market forces, as opposed to the state, will be given a higher degree of prominence in influencing economic outcomes in China. Still, it remains uncertain, one panelist asserted, to what extent this principle will apply to foreign firms operating in China. In the end, China must decide how to balance offering coveted market access to European companies against the perceived risks in exposing state-owned enterprises to international competition.
     
  • Competition Impeding Cooperation: Despite calls for Sino-EU collaboration on developmental goals, panelists warned that competitive forces may constrain these efforts. In industries such as energy resources and renewables, China and Europe remain competitors and firms contend with each other for market share. Based on these disincentives and the uncertainty surrounding European firms’ market access to China, panelists concluded that conditions that appear ripe for joint efforts may not produce desired outcomes.

Shi Zhiqin

Resident Scholar, Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy

Sebastian Heilmann

Duncan Freeman

Sun Haiyan

Philip Bartley

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.