Yemen in the Midst of a Regional Proxy War

Farea Al-Muslimi, a visiting scholar at Carnegie, Abdullah Al Shammari, former Saudi diplomat and head of Gulf studies at the International Middle East Peace Research Center, and Khaled Fattah, consultant on Yemen at the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, discussed the origins of Houthi power. Lina Khatib, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center, moderated the discussion.

THE HOUTHIS: A LOCAL TAKE

• The Emergence of Identity: The Houthis emerged in the northern parts of Yemen, a region characterized by a lack of security, resource scarcity, and conflict over ownership, explained Fattah. Unlike the narrative that is circulated in the media, sectarianism is not the most significant social dimension at play in northern Yemen, he clarified.  
   
• Inattention to Local Level: The Houthis’ rise to power is a result of a lack of communication between different levels of governance and security. During reconciliation efforts, the elites participated in dialogues while neglecting engagement with local representatives, Fattah said. This resulted in growing divisions and fragmentations in every village, clan, and family, leading to in the failure of the transitional process.

SAUDI ARABIA POLICY

• Illusions of One Gulf Policy: The Gulf is not a monolith, and there can be no single Gulf policy, Al Shammari said. The reactions and interests of the Emiratis, the Omanis, Kuwaitis, and Bahrainis differ significantly from one another. 
   
• Operation Decisive Storm: Saudi Arabia led Operation Decisive Storm in large part as a reaction to the emerging power of Iran. The operation was seen as critical to re-establishing equilibrium in the region, explained Al Shammari. 
   
• Saudi-Iranian Dialogue: Al Shammari questioned whether Operation Decisive Storm could really create a historic opportunity for a Saudi-Iranian dialogue. Drawing on his previous experience as a diplomat, Al Shammari said that even if some previous blocks to negotiations have disappeared, Saudi Arabia may not see any value to participating in negotiations, given Iran’s involvement in countries like Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq 

WHAT WENT WRONG

• Foundations of War: The current war in Yemen is grounded in the wrongdoings and inaction of the Yemeni central government, the Gulf, and the international community over the last three years, said Al-Muslimi. 
   
• Poor Governance: Poor governance, especially on an economic front, and the inability to manage power led to the collapse of the Yemeni state and the emergence of the Houthis, Al-Muslimi continued. Over the last three years, while the Gulf powers were busy in Syria and Egypt, the world allowed Yemen to sink into its current situation. Al-Muslimi added that peace is impossible so long as President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi is still in power.

Saadaddin Ben Taleb, former minister of industry and trade in Yemen, Abdullah Hamidaddin, consultant at the Al-Mesbar Center for Studies and Research, and Lina Khatib, director at the Carnegie Middle East Center, discussed the impact of the war on the country’s unity, Gulf politics, and the narrative of sectarianism. Carnegie’s Farea Al-Muslimi moderated the discussion. 

LOCAL IMPACT

• The Rise of Saleh: Ben Taleb explained that Yemen lived in a state of democracy in the first three years after reunification in the 1990s. In 1994, greed and personal interests crept into the system. An alliance was formed between Islamists, followed by the establishment of a ferocious aristocracy led by Saleh. Saleh was able to position his family in key sectors, such as gas, oil, and roads, said Ben Taleb.
   
• Response from the South: The people from the south felt robbed and promises of true democracy were never realized. Ben Taleb explained that the south does not have any representation, and the state’s institutions are 90 percent comprised by northerners. 
   
• What Next: The next Yemen must seek decentralization, political freedom, and democracy, argued Ben Taleb. “We need decentralization; it is the only way for the Yemeni regions not to deal with each political fraction, to face corruption, and to endure heavy bureaucracy. This is why the Houthis intervened; they didn’t want such decentralization. Decentralization would have enabled some actual political freedom for the regions,” he said. A quick political deal between the Saudis and the Houthis will only bring Yemen back to its 2011 status quo; no political improvements will materialize from it, warned Ben Taleb. 
   
• Sectarianism: To imagine that there is a Sunni-Shiite war is misrepresentative. Also, to assume that all Shiites in the Middle East can be congregated in a single group with common and well-defined mutual interests is utter oversimplification. It is very difficult to imagine a political movement with only its sectarian allegiance as its base, argued Hamidaddin. There is no Sunni-Shiite war in Yemen; it is primarily a tribal confrontation. 
   
• The Houthis: Although the Houthis adopted the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, they are not allied with the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood. They are also not allied with Iran; in the 1990s, the Houthis publicly rejected any alliance with Iran.

REGIONAL IMPACT

• Geopolitics in Yemen: Although the conflict in Yemen is, at its core, an intertribal one, it has grown to have significant geopolitical consequences, Hamidaddin said. Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Cooperation Council all have a potential stake in the conflict and its outcome.
   
• Regional Politics: The relationship between Iran and the Houthis is misleading, Khatib said. What is happening in Yemen is a Saudi-Yemeni confrontation, where King Salaman wants to bring Saudi Arabia back to a central position in the region. Saudi Arabia is concerned about a number of potential threats to its regional position, including the nuclear deal and al-Qaeda. 

Carnegie’s Farea Al-Muslimi and Lina Khatib held a special discussion with former Yemeni prime minister Abd Al-Karim Al-Iryani on the current situation in Riyadh and the future of Yemen.

HIGHLIGHTS

• Security Council Resolution 2216: Unless all parties start to follow the United Nations Security Council Resolution 2216, nothing will be achieved in Yemen, argued Al-Iryani. He contended that the Houthis were too fast to reject the 2216 resolution. Al-Irayni also emphasized the need for an agreement on the constitution, particularly concerning the issue of forming regional borders. 
   
• Constitutional Framework: The UN Geneva Conference must be held, Al-Irayni said. However, any real progress requires a ceasefire and the initiation of a transitional period, followed by presidential and parliamentary elections. Al-Irayni concluded by saying that any solution must be based on a constitutional framework.

Sama Al-Hamdani, analyst and researcher on Yemen, Adam Baron, visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, and Peter Salisbury, journalist and political analyst, discussed the impact of war in Yemen on the development of non-state actors like the self-proclaimed Islamic State and the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula and how the international community can help end the conflict. Timothy Fairbank, co-founder and managing director at Development Transformations, moderated the discussion.

UNPRECEDENTED DIVISIONS AND DESTRUCTION

• Unprecedented Destruction: The conflict in Yemen is unprecedented in its level of destruction and its scope, Baron said. It has had a particularly disturbing impact on Yemeni society. There is an unprecedented level of sectarian language coming from Yemenis, many of whom would be loath to use such language even six months ago, said Baron. 
   
• Bizarre Alliances: The alliance between the Houthis and Saleh alliance is not a new phenomenon, Baron added. Since the beginning of this conflict, disturbing alliances have been made; for example, al-Qaeda is infiltrating Yemeni communities and using the conflict for its own benefit and goals. This poses a great threat to the coherence of Yemeni society. 
   
• Long-term for Yemen: Baron said that the European Union is uniquely well-placed to mediate the conflict, along with Oman. However, the current situation is leaning toward a war of attrition, which is far more likely to continue than a negotiated solution, he warned.

MILITARY IN YEMEN 

• Division of Military: Over the past few years, there has been increasing conflict between General Ali Mohsen and Ahmed Ali Saleh, head of the Yemeni Republican Guard, explained Al-Hamdani. This created an increasingly divided military, and efforts to weaken Ahmed Ali Saleh’s and Ali Mohsen’s grip on the military were unsuccessful. Rather than trying to create a unified national military, the Yemeni government under Hadi dealt with problems on a case by case basis, which Al-Hamdani said has led to the fractured military Yemen has today. 
   
• Mistakes Made: Many mistakes were made in the 2011 restructuring of the Yemeni Army. Al-Hamdani explained that first, the army restructuring was not Yemeni planned; a lot of the information that belonged to the army was handed over to America. Just as jihadis infiltrated the army in 1994, Houthis did as well: With the peace and partnership pact, President Hadi issued appointments for 2,000 Houthis to join the military. Today, there are about 40,000 Houthi fighters in the military, said Al-Hamdani.
   
• Restructuring: Al-Hamdani suggested that in order to restore Yemeni security, regional military outposts must be required to have both officers from that region and outside it.  

YEMEN’S ECONOMY 

• Inequality: Salisbury explained the Yemeni central state grew in power in the early 1990s, as Yemen became an oil exporter. Yemenis became dependent on the central state, not on families and tribal leaders, for resources and patronage. But Yemen lost the ability to export oil and by 2011, the country was nearing an economic and fiscal crisis. Currently, Salisbury said, the poorest people do not have access to clean water and are dependent on imports of food and oil. Meanwhile, the elite are fighting each other for the largest slice of the pie. 
   
• Yemen’s Political Culture: Although some believe the events of 2011–2014 demonstrate something new in terms of Yemeni political culture, Salisbury argued that the past few years are only a continuation of a political cultural which has developed over a period of decades. This political culture consists of one group of powerful elites fighting against another group of elites for power and money, while the people on the ground suffer, summarized Salisbury.

Yezid Sayigh explored the challenges ahead for Yemen’s security sector and possible approaches to military reconstruction in Yemen. Carnegie’s Farea Al-Muslimi moderated the discussion. 

CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE OF YEMEN’S SECURITY SECTOR

• Building a National Army: Assuming there is an end to the current armed conflict, rebuilding a single Yemeni national army will pose a major challenge, warned Sayigh. The current army is politicized and factionalized. Ultimately, he concluded, in a politically and socially divided society, any negotiation on rebuilding the national army is essentially about the nature of the state itself and its relations with larger society.
   
• Opportunities Missed: There were two important opportunities after the Arab Spring for achieving military restructuring and security sector reform in Yemen, said Sayigh. First, in the immediate aftermath of the resignation of President Saleh, there was a basic level of agreement and understanding to place military restructuring at the heart of the formal peace initiative. The second opportunity came with the national dialogue conference and its final conclusion, which touched on military and security sector reform. 

POSSIBLE APPROACHES TO MILITARY RECONSTRUCTION

• Inclusiveness and Transparency: In order to build trust and legitimacy, everything related to military reconstructing and security sector reform should be involve extensive consultation and transparency with the Yemeni society, media, and parliament, argued Sayigh.
   
• A Genuine Army: The army must transition into a professional institution with a clear mandate, Sayigh said. He argued that privileging professional development and investing in resources such as training and building skills based on the identification of real threats, as well as training a new generation of junior officers and creating an incentive structure that makes loyalty to the institution more rewarding than loyalty to a political faction or tribal identity, are critical.
   
• Balanced Civilian-Military Relationship: There must be a proper balanced relationship between civilian, political, and preferably democratically elected authorities on one side, and military and security institutions on the other. Sayigh said that this type of balance is critical to democratic governance, economic growth, stability, and security.