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Throughout history, states have employed various strategies to prevent their rivals, potential rivals, and even allies from developing nuclear weapons. These counterproliferation strategies include military interventions, offers of security guarantees, economic sanctions and, at times, non-intervention. Despite the policy relevance of counterproliferation, existing literature does not have a single theory that encompasses the behavior of all states and the counterproliferation strategies they employ. Is it possible to develop a comprehensive theory that can help explain various counterproliferation strategies pursued by states right from the dawn of nuclear weapons to the present day?
Carnegie India hosted Kunal Singh for a discussion on the inquiry of various techniques that non-proliferation countries use to impede, disrupt, delay, or reverse the pursuit of nuclear weapons by proliferating countries. The discussion was moderated by Srinath Raghavan.
DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS
Counterproliferation Strategies: Participants reviewed how states use counterproliferation methods to prevent other countries from developing nuclear weapons. These are typically categorized under five different types. Kinetic reversion, a high-risk strategy, entails striking extensive nuclear facilities to impede or destroy the progress of developing the bomb. This tactic, whether implemented independently or during conflicts, can escalate into full blown wars. Military coercion includes using small-scale explosions, threats and targeted killings as negotiation strategies to limit proliferation. Participants also discussed diplomatic measures of reducing incentives for nuclear aspirations through security guarantees, economic sanctions and disarmament negotiations. Moreover, subcontracting counterproliferation efforts to more powerful allies become conceivable when states lack the capacity for direct action. The 'do-nothing' policy emerges at the other end when a state lacks interest and capability in counterproliferation. Participants deliberated over how these techniques differ on the parameters of risk and effectiveness, with kinetic reversion being the most risky and sub-contracting being the most indirect.
Motivations for Counterproliferation: Participants traced the three main motivations for counterproliferation activities arising from myriad concerns. First, nuclear weapons are intended to deter adversarial states from carrying out massive conventional or nuclear attacks and mitigating existential threats, particularly for small powers with conventional combat capability. Second, nuclear weapons provide deterrent guarantees in the event of securing newly acquired territories in territorial disputes for aggressor states, in turn enhancing its strategic relevance. Third, regional power and influence dynamics are crucial, as rival regional power’s possession of nuclear weapons complicates the construction of conditional spheres of influence. It destabilizes the regional security parity in the international system. Participants also acknowledged how big powers grapple with the dangers of a proliferation cascade among other big powers in their quest for counterproliferation. This complex web of motivations could accentuate the significance of strategic thinking and successful policy responses in counterproliferation operations.
A Case Study on Leverage, Restraint, and Counterproliferation Dynamics: The presenter shared a case examining the dynamics of counterproliferation and proliferation strategies in India and Pakistan's nuclear rivalry. The effective credibility of deterrence has long been a contentious factor in the regional security mix. Existing literature reveals that India contemplated preventive military strikes on Pakistan's nuclear facilities during the 1980s but ultimately abandoned the plan for a strike on the Kahuta uranium enrichment facility. K. Subrahmanyam's claim that India's counterproliferation strategy was nuclear-resistant, employing diplomatic inhibition, is highlighted and supported with relevant evidence. The participants deliberated on the 1983 Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting Summit, during which Indira Gandhi's approach to nuclear weapons was laid down by Mani Shankar Iyer. The study delves into the credibility of India's restraint, which stems from using the weapon as a bargaining chip for negotiations. It postulates that an agreement between Pakistan, China, and India could have bolstered India's security. Finally, the study distinguishes between diplomatic inhibition and military coercion strategies in India's approach. It argues that India refrained from attacking Kahuta but left the possibility open, employing limited and ambiguous signaling for military coercion. The examination of India's restraint in striking Kahuta is set against the backdrop of Pakistan's readiness and potential for retaliation, considering factors like air defense capabilities and proximity of targets. By dissecting these intricate elements, the study offers a comprehensive understanding of India-Pakistan nuclear dynamics, considering the interplay of strategic choices, military considerations, and diplomatic maneuvers.
