Security Studies Seminar with Avtar Singh Bhasin

Avtar Singh Bhasin’s book, Negotiating India’s Landmark Agreements, is a guide to deciphering the strategic decisions that have defined Indian foreign policy. It examines the historical significance and diplomatic intricacies of five pivotal agreements signed by India since its Independence. By recounting the negotiation processes behind each of these agreements, the book evaluates the overall global and regional contexts, the strengths and weaknesses of the parties involved, and the clarity and thoroughness of the preparatory briefs. It also considers whether the perspectives and priorities of the counterpart nations were adequately accounted for and examines the flexibility, if any, in India’s negotiating positions. A central focus of the book is the critical role of political leadership in guiding and shaping negotiations, highlighting its importance in ensuring successful outcomes.  

Carnegie India hosted author Avtar Singh Bhasin for a discussion on negotiating India’s landmark agreements. The discussion was moderated by Srinath Raghavan.  

DISCUSSION HIGHLIGHTS  

 Agreements With Neighbors: Participants examined the landmark agreements in India’s Foreign Policy. The 1954 Panchsheel Agreement between India and China was the first agreement negotiated by and for India, which reflected the five principles of peaceful co-existence between the two countries. India’s negotiating ability was criticized by participants as a “diplomatic blunder” due to its inability to realize China’s polarized position. Before the agreement, India managed the Post and Telecommunications of Tibet, operated trade centers, and had a flourishing diplomatic footprint. Participants concurred that India’s naiveite lost all these historic rights as it prioritized retaining goodwill with China rather than protecting own interests. The 1972 Shimla Agreement, formalizing the Line of Control between India and Pakistan, highlighted India’s conciliary stance even though Pakistan strategically resisted addressing the Kashmir issue. Participants explored reports of a “secret meeting” between Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and President Zulfikar Ali Bhutto wherein an informal assurance was given on the possibility of an international boundary. However, no public records of this meeting were kept. Further, the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord was acknowledged as a foreign policy “disaster.” Participants pointed to the treaty’s contradictions and New Delhi’s miscalculated intervention in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs. India’s support for Tamil militancy and its efforts to integrate Tamilians into Sri Lankan society failed to yield lasting results, leaving unresolved tensions and damaging India’s regional image. 

Negotiations With Superpowers in a Bipolar World: Participants analyzed the two major agreements negotiated by India with the Soviet Union and the United States. While public opinion in India largely supported the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, the negotiations behind the scenes were less favorable for India. In 1969, the Soviet Union proposed an “Asian Collective Security” framework to unite Asian nations against China. However, India adhered to its non-alignment policy and resisted this offer. Instead, it sought formal Soviet assurance of support in case of external aggression. Soviet leaders feared that India might lose interest in the treaty. Notably, during Indian envoy Durga Prasad Dhar’s farewell meeting on June 5, 1971, Soviet Defence Minister Marshal Grechko noted that India’s “real enemy” is China, not Pakistan. Participants underscored that the Treaty was strategically motivated to involve India in their ideological conflict with China, especially after India’s tensions with Beijing post-1962. When India remained cautious, the USSR withheld crucial weaponry needed to replenish India’s 1971 war losses, revealing its calculated approach. 

The 2008 India-U.S. Civil Nuclear Energy Agreement, on the other hand, was representative of India’s negotiating prowess, departing from its traditional stance of non-alignment and signaling a strategic shift in foreign policy. During the negotiations with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was credited for navigating coalition politics in India and building consensus for the agreement. However, the 2010 Civil Liability Act imposed stricter liability on suppliers for nuclear disasters, a discriminatory condition compared to international norms which stalled nuclear energy cooperation. Factors such as domestic opposition, high nuclear plant costs, the post-Fukushima caution, and the rise of renewable energy alternatives like solar power further limited progress. Participants concluded that despite barriers to cooperation the India-U.S. strategic partnership was reconcilable.  

Determinants of Foreign Policy: Participants acknowledged key foreign policy determinants that have helped shape India’s landmark agreements. For instance, the political system gives immense importance to the national executive which has considerable autonomy in foreign policy decision-making. Participants noted that apart from the 2008 India-US Civil Nuclear Energy agreement, no other agreement was deliberated in parliament, exemplifying the absence of checks and balances in the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, participants explored the nature of a personality-centric parliamentary practice in India, which allows high-level ministers to have considerable leeway in decision-making without parliamentary oversight. Nonetheless, there is an exchange of information and communication between intelligence agencies and diplomats. Another determinant is the evolving role of public opinion. In the early years of India’s independence, limited media reach and public awareness rendered public opinion largely passive and deferential to the political class. In contrast, recent years have seen public opinion, amplified by the media, play an increasingly dynamic and influential role in shaping foreign policy decisions. 

This summary was prepared by Anavi Akhaury and Swasti Sachdeva, interns with the Security Studies program at Carnegie India.