Mark Hibbs is a nonresident senior fellow in Carnegie’s Nuclear Policy Program, based in Berlin and Bonn, Germany. Before joining Carnegie in 2010 he was an editor and correspondent in the field of nuclear energy, nuclear trade, and nonproliferation. His work appeared in a number of publications, including the Financial Times organization, Nucleonics Week, and Nuclear Fuel, published by the Platts division of the McGraw-Hill Companies.
Hibbs’ research is focused broadly on international nuclear trade and nonproliferation governance in four main areas: the international nuclear trade regime, decisionmaking at the International Atomic Energy Agency, nuclear safeguards and verification, and bilateral nuclear cooperation arrangements.
In 2011 in Brussels, and in 2015 in Vienna, Hibbs chaired two workshops for all participating governments of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the world’s leading multilateral nuclear trade control mechanism. He also authored a Carnegie report, The Future of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, published in 2011.
Hibbs also works on policy concerning the generation of nuclear power. In 2012 Hibbs co-authored with James Acton a report on Why Fukushima Was Preventable. Since 2012, Hibbs has led a project at Carnegie concerning the future of China’s nuclear energy program, its nuclear fuel cycle, and spent fuel management policies. In 2018 Hibbs published the report from this project as a book: The Future of Nuclear Power in China; the Mandarin-language version of this report was published in China in 2019.
In 2014 Hibbs authored a study on Turkey’s policies concerning the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Suppliers Group as part of a project called Turkey’s Nuclear Future.
Since joining Carnegie Hibbs has also contributed in articles and commentary which have appeared in the New York Times, International Herald Tribune, Chosun Ilbo, Financial Times, Le Monde, Mainichi Shimbun, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Washington Post, and other media. He has also been a frequent contributor to the Arms Control Wonk blog.
As Russia’s calculus shifts in response to its war in Ukraine, U.S.-Russian alignment to manage global nuclear risks, especially from Iran and North Korea, is unraveling.
In order to explore the complexities of our rapidly changing world, the Malcolm H. Kerr Carnegie Middle East Center will examine pressing global issues through four engaging panel discussions in a one-day event, under the collective title, “The World in Focus: Uncertainty and the Global Outlook for 2024.”
On the 7th of October 2023, Hamas terrorists appeared to drive a stake through the heart of the US effort to broker Israel-KSA normalisation. This has sent shockwaves through the region, and the full implications remain uncertain.
One year after Russia’s assault and takeover of the Zaporizhzhia plant, Russians and Ukrainians face decisions about the operation status of the six reactors that will significantly impact nuclear safety and security.
A statement from Ukraine published on February 10 would imply that, for as long as Russia occupies and controls Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, the plant will not generate any electricity, and that ZNPP will not be connected to Russia’s power grid.
Perhaps the more effective personnel are in reducing risk at the plant, the less nuclear safety will be threatened by combatants if diplomacy fails to achieve an accord not to attack the plant.
If Russia’s March 2014 annexation of Crimea serves as its nuclear blueprint, Russia can be anticipated to interrupt and terminate the IAEA’s ongoing and routine implementation of nuclear safeguards in any annexed Ukrainian territory.
Expeditious action by the IAEA Secretariat and Board of Governors could help significantly reduce the odds of a nuclear accident at Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant.
In the short-term, what we are going to see happen in direct reaction to the Russian war is that there is going to be a substitution of gas from other sources from the Middle East, the United States, North Africa, and other places for Russian gas.
Following from Russia’s invasion of and ongoing war against Ukraine, Ukraine’s civil nuclear energy power infrastructure poses risks that exceed those normally associated with nuclear installations and nuclear and radiological materials.
