Policymakers on either side of bitter trade dispute seem to confuse two issues.
Michael Pettis is a nonresident senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. An expert on China’s economy, Pettis is professor of finance at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management, where he specializes in Chinese financial markets.
From 2002 to 2004, he also taught at Tsinghua University’s School of Economics and Management and, from 1992 to 2001, at Columbia University’s Graduate School of Business. He is a member of the Institute of Latin American Studies Advisory Board at Columbia University as well as the Dean’s Advisory Board at the School of Public and International Affairs.
Pettis worked on Wall Street in trading, capital markets, and corporate finance since 1987, when he joined the sovereign debt trading team at Manufacturers Hanover (now JPMorgan). Most recently, from 1996 to 2001, Pettis worked at Bear Stearns, where he was managing director principal heading the Latin American capital markets and the liability management groups. He has also worked as a partner in a merchant-banking boutique that specialized in securitizing Latin American assets and at Credit Suisse First Boston, where he headed the emerging markets trading team.
In addition to trading and capital markets, Pettis has been involved in sovereign advisory work, including for the Mexican government on the privatization of its banking system, the Republic of Macedonia on the restructuring of its international bank debt, and the South Korean Ministry of Finance on the restructuring of the country’s commercial bank debt.
He formerly served as a member of the Board of Directors of ABC-CA Fund Management Company, a Sino–French joint venture based in Shanghai. He is the author of several books, including The Great Rebalancing: Trade, Conflict, and the Perilous Road Ahead for the World Economy (Princeton University Press, 2013).
Policymakers on either side of bitter trade dispute seem to confuse two issues.
Many more years of high economic expansion are only possible if the country restructures to boost domestic consumption.
A well-functioning trading regime would permit neither the large, persistent trade imbalances that characterize the current global trading system nor the perverse flow of capital from developing economies to advanced economies. Global trade needs new rules that encourage a return to the benefits of free trade and comparative advantage.
The beginning of the impact of China’s high debt-to-GDP levels is becoming more visible, and the country will need another source of real growth if the “rapid expansion” of infrastructure comes to an end.
There is no doubt that China’s economy is struggling. After Chinese President Xi Jinping ended the country’s zero-COVID policy a year ago, most economists expected growth to surge—but that never really happened, and deeper problems became apparent. So what are the exact causes of China’s stagnation?
If China’s GDP is to continue growing at 4–5 percent for the next decade, either other major economies must be willing to reduce their economies’ investment and manufacturing shares to accommodate China or China must establish policies that cause the locus of growth to shift from investment to domestic consumption. Neither is easy, and the former is very unlikely.
A discussion on the prospects of China's economy, the real estate market and the government's policies
The Contested Causes of Stagnation
Both Washington and Beijing treat rising debt as a consequence of irresponsible behavior by local institutions. But in China and the United States, rising debt is spurred by policies that have encouraged distortions in the distribution of domestic income. Until these distortions are addressed, both countries must choose between rising debt and rising unemployment.
That is why for all the excited debate, debt ceilings won’t limit the rise in US debt. They just allow Congress to pretend that it is doing something meaningful about America’s surging debt burden.