Rather than radical anti-terrorist measures or some kind of “retribution against Ukraine,” the return of the death penalty and a stricter migration policy are being touted as possible responses to the attack at Crocus City Hall. But neither of those initiatives is guaranteed or imminent.

One thing that both Navalny’s funeral, at which those gathered chanted anti-war slogans, and the thwarted presidential bid of Boris Nadezhdin—who ran on an anti-war platform—have shown is that Russia’s anti-war movement is alive and well, if only occasionally visible.

There are plenty of good reasons for a political reshuffle after Putin’s reelection in March, though the Kremlin is likely to be cautious about shaking things up in wartime.

Russia’s regional governors have been set the fiendish task of reacting to emergencies while maintaining the semblance of peace in their regions.

While the Kremlin believes de-escalation is unacceptable and constantly signals its radical intentions, its actions are nowhere near as drastic as expected by either its supporters or adversaries.

The trends of 2022 in no way signal decentralization or re-federalization. Russia’s central government adheres to a simplified version of the Soviet model, which includes a rigid power vertical.

The bombings look like an attempt by the Russian establishment to convince itself and others that Russia still has enough determination and resources to regain the military initiative.