In response to “Why Ukraine Should Keep Striking Russian Oil Refineries” by Michael Liebreich, Lauri Myllyvirta, and Sam Winter-Levy.

The bulk of the current analysis of the attacks on refineries is celebratory, with a strong element of confirmation bias—and that is a classical folly that prevents learning. Russia’s refining sector, unlike its Black Sea Fleet, has proven to be resilient to the recent type of attacks, rather than the Achilles’ heel of the Russian economy that many were hoping it would be.

Vladimir Putin has reason to be confident that Russia can maintain current military spending levels for a relatively long time. This is bad news for Ukraine, its Western partners and neighbors, and overall global security.

If the scale of Ukrainian drone attacks is maintained at the levels of March and Russian air defenses do not improve, Ukraine will be able to keep damaging Russian refineries faster than they can be fixed, slowly but steadily eroding the country’s refining capacity.

Extending the transport of Russian gas via Ukraine after 2024 would likely benefit both Russia and Ukraine. Stopping the flow of gas, on the other hand, would be painful for whichever side initiates it.

Ukrainian aerial attacks could cause significant problems as international isolation makes it harder for Russian companies to fix broken equipment.

The state has taken an ever-greater role in Russian energy markets in recent years, and the system for regulating domestic fuel prices has become more and more cumbersome. The war in Ukraine has shown both that the system is no longer fit for purpose, and that a government filled with technocrats is unable to see the forest for the trees.

Ukrainian attempts to force Russian oil from the Black Sea may have unintended consequences for its allies

Building the Power of Siberia 2 gas pipeline from Russia to China is a rational decision that would have made sense even before the war, but the project will never be able to replace Russia’s decimated gas trade with Europe.

Russia is now in a far worse negotiating position than in 2014. Finding itself at the mercy of a monopsonist buyer, there is very little it can actually do.