India and the United Kingdom have spent decades trying to define their post-colonial relationship—part partnership, part rivalry, and often, part courtship. Today, that relationship is being recast amid trade talks, tech cooperation, and geopolitical shifts.
The two sides recently signed a landmark trade agreement and officials in London and New Delhi are sounding a new tone of optimism about what the two countries might do together— especially in a post-American world.
To talk more about the new era in ties between the UK and India, Milan is joined on the podcast this week by Avinash Paliwal. Avinash is a Reader in International Relations at SOAS University of London. He is the author of two books, My Enemy’s Enemy – India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal and India’s Near East – A New History. In 2024-25, he was seconded to the UK Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office where he covered ‘India and South Asia’.
Milan and Avinash discuss the troubled history between the two powers, the transformation of the relationship in recent years, and their emerging trade and technology links. Plus, the two discuss the Indian diaspora in the United Kingdom, frictions around Russia and Pakistan, and the impact of rising nativism in the UK.
Episode notes:
1. Avinash Paliwal, “India’s bilateral diplomacy: A quiet rehaul of India-UK relations,” Grand Tamasha, November 5, 2025.
2. “The Past, Present, and Future of India’s Near East (with Avinash Paliwal),” Grand Tamasha, November 20, 2024.
3. “What the Taliban Takeover Means for India (with Avinash Paliwal),” Grand Tamasha, September 15, 2021.
4. “Can Europe be India's Plan B? (with James Crabtree),” Grand Tamasha, September 17, 2025.
5. “India and the Reordering of Transatlantic Relations (with Tara Varma),” Grand Tamasha, March 11, 2025.
Transcript
Note: this is an AI-generated transcript and may contain errors
Milan Vaishnav: Welcome to Grand Tamasha, a co-production of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and The Hindustan Times. I'm your host, Milan Vaishnav. India and the United Kingdom have spent decades trying to define their post-colonial relationship: part partnership, part rivalry, and part courtship. Today the relationship is being recast amid trade talks, tech cooperation, and geopolitical shifts. The two sides recently signed a landmark trade agreement, and officials in London and New Delhi are sounding a new tone of optimism about what the two countries might do together, especially in a post-American world. To talk more about this new era and ties between the UK and India, I'm joined on the podcast this week by Avinash Paliwal. Avinash is a reader in international relations at SOAS University of London and the author of two books, My Enemy's Enemy: India and Afghanistan from the Soviet invasion to the US withdrawal, and India's Near East: a New History. In 2024 and 2025, he was seconded to the UK Foreign Commonwealth and Development Office, where he covered India and South Asia. I'm pleased to welcome Avinash back to the show. Avinash, so good to see you.
Avinash Paliwal: Thank you, Milan. It's great to be back.
Milan Vaishnav: So you're back to civilian life as they say, back to academia, and I want to ask you a little bit about your reflections on this relationship. Let's start by referencing a recent column you wrote for the Hindustan Times--we'll link to the entire op-ed for our listeners. In this piece, you describe India-UK relations as being on the mend in an age of collapsing order. And of course, I want to focus mainly on the mend part of that, but I think it's maybe worth starting a bit in the past. Obviously, we have the legacies of colonialism, but in addition to these, why have UK-India ties historically been so difficult and so troublesome?
Avinash Paliwal: Milan, thank you so much. So first to clarify for all Grand Tamasha listeners, I will be speaking on my own behalf. This is not the voice of His Majesty's government. I did serve at the Foreign Office, but I'll not be speaking for them. Having gotten that caveat out of the way: Look, there are two fundamental reasons in my view why there were hesitancies and there was reluctance on both sides part to really build this relationship. And I think the first core reason is geopolitical divergence. And this is a story that we have seen played out not just in recent decades, but ever since, let's say the 1950s onwards, post-independence, right? The second issue, which I think has manifested itself in how India has expressed its discomfort on these issues of geopolitical divergence, is the colonial history, right? Whenever there would be a disagreement between United Kingdom and India, the colonial history will come back into focus in narrative form during diplomatic dialogues, during, you know, how the two countries will talk about each other, if not to each other to a great extent. So this is why I think there has been a lot of mistrust in the past on both sides, that whether from the British perspective, whether you can really build a relationship with India given the history and given, you know, how the two have tried to talk [through] some of the more fractious issues, including Pakistan and Kashmir. You know, from Indian perspective, there has been a sense that the UK is trying to overpunch strategically by trying to even think of balancing its relationship with, let's say, countries like Pakistan or after ‘71, you know, with Bangladesh when relations between India and Bangladesh were not that good. So, I think these are the primary reasons. Now, if I give a very quick, you know, door the history in that sense, it's not as if the relationship has always been in the talks, that they have never learned how to talk. In fact, the first couple of decades after independence, the 50s and 60s, there were actually huge strategic synergies between the two countries. Of course, UK would look at the subcontinent from a Cold War lens, which was quite different from how an independent India used to view its own strategic realities. But they were there was huge momentum in that relationship. Partly you can say that this was an after-effect or aftermath of the empire and there were dependencies of a particular kind which don't exist today. But there was no hard emotion as such at a public level. I think ‘65 war between India and Pakistan perhaps can be identified as a watershed moment when the UK under Harold Wilson criticized India during that war. And that did not really go down well. And I think that is where one can say that India's troubled history—both with the United Kingdom, but particularly with the Labor Party and Labor governments—you can draw the historical line back to 1965, it has been troubled. And we could we have seen, you know, you have we have seen ebbs and flows in this conversation during the nineties when the Kashmir insurgency was at its peaks, [or] on the nuclear question when it came to Pakistan and the nuclear weaponization, more recently, the war in Afghanistan. You can see those divergences, given the fact that the two countries are very different equities in the region and different interests, really shape the bilateral and shape the structures of mistrust that kept the two really far. And that has begun to slowly change, in my view.
Milan Vaishnav: So I think it's really useful at this point to focus on the here and the now. Let's come to the current period. In your piece, you made a point of saying that we are at a kind of transformational moment in the relationship. And I guess I want to ask you: what has changed either structurally in terms of the globe or politically in either country that allows these two sides to move beyond, as they say, the hesitations of history?
Avinash Paliwal: There are both strategic synergies today in the economic sphere, but also in the security, strategic sphere. And there is operational acumen. And I'll come to the operational acumen bit perhaps in a bit, but I think just to lay out the ground as to what has fundamentally changed and why I think that this is a transformational moment, right? So first and foremost, I think rather than overburdening this relationship with the Pakistan question, which has always been a source of divergence and friction, I think there is a recognition on both—in both Whitehall and in Raisina Hill—that is the big rise of China and how do you deal with the China question that is truly likely to be defining for not just the world, but of course also for UK and India. How do you deal with such a powerful country and such a country which is asserting itself in quite different ways, whether it's in the economic sphere, in the strategic sphere, security sphere. And I think that is the fundamental shift that happens. And that is what is driving almost every aspect of this conversation. Now, of course, let me acknowledge that the way UK sees China is no way similar to the way United States sees China, right? Or United States used to see China during the Biden administration, let's say. Today, Trump 2.0 is a very different, different ball game. But there was a particular view of China's rise. Now, that is a view which does not always resonate in its intensity and its scope and its scale across the pond in the UK. But there is very there's clarity in London that this is a country without which you cannot have economic well-being, but you also have to be very clear, right, that it's a security concern. And there are communities within the UK which view, fairly so, China as also a security threat in the long term to some of the you know political systems that UK has developed over the century. So, this is something which has been recognized by both India and the United Kingdom. So, they have been able to move past the Pakistan friction because of that. And I think that's a fundamental shift that has happened, right? If I look at the timeline of this change, now there are different beginnings, right? If you ask me when did this transformation start to happen, I would say the timelines and the circumstances that trigger these changes are different for both India and for the UK. For the UK, I would identify Brexit as a watershed moment in this, where the country has taken a decision and undertaken a referendum which is effectively a strategic shock for the United Kingdom, both in terms of its relationship with the European Union, but also its economic well-being. For a trading nation like the UK, leaving a free trade region was nonsensical, to be honest. And I think that is when the realization that you need to start working with other larger budding economies such as India really kind of sedimented. And Boris Johnson was a huge proponent of that relationship for that reason, right? And again, that—concentrated minds in London that you need, that Britain needs India, you know. And for that you have to kind of figure out a way whether you can have a conversation about Pakistan or reduce the salience of that relationship in in terms of your comms with the Indians. I think for India 2020 is really the kind of breakeven point in that sense, that one is the Galvan clash. Of course, US is the more important partner in that sense, both in a security sense and otherwise. The US did come in very strongly on India's side during that crisis, even if not, you know, openly so, but behind the scenes, it was, it's very clear. And that's a story well known. But not just the US. I think there was a realization in Delhi that you need to work with the Five Eyes, you need to work with the West if you need to take on the challenge or the scale of challenge that you're facing in the security sector from the Chinese. Another thing happens in 2020 is the collapse of India's negotiations to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. By not joining the RCEP, which India felt was not being, you know, that is an arrangement, multilateral arrangement unfair to India's aspirations as a power, as a rising economic power. I think those two things really sediment, start to kind of sediment this idea that you need to diversify, which has always been a kind of strain in India's foreign policy thinking, you know, whether it's non-an-alignment, strategic autonomy, that you need to diversify and meaningfully do so. And that's when the idea of, okay, let's start looking at middle powers a bit more seriously. That's when UK becomes really, really important. And I think some of the frictions that you would see happen between these two countries afterwards, whether it's a Khalistan issue or other issues, right? They were able to kind of move on from that because there was an agreement that this is, this will be a comprehensive strategic partnership. We need a roadmap. We need something that will guide us, a guardrail, if you like, that will help focus our minds during moments of crisis like this. So 2021, the two countries really start talking about a roadmap which opened…a roadmap to 2030, which opened up space for negotiations for the comprehensive economic and trade agreement, which was signed very recently. So, this is the broader timeline and that is why I say that look, it's a transformative moment. And we need to appreciate it for that. Will it last or not? Of course, is an open question. But right now, […] I'm confident that in the last two to three decades this is arguably one of the finest moments between these two countries.
Milan Vaishnav: So let's now dig in a little bit on the individual pillars that you've laid out. Let me start where you ended, which is with this recent comprehensive economic and trade agreement or CETA. CETA promises to augment bilateral trade by twenty-five and a half billion pounds every year from its current standing of around forty-five billion pounds. So, this is quite a significant, ambitious goal. There are some observers, however, who say, look, these trade concessions, they sound good in theory, but they're actually pretty modest in practice. For instance, some people say, look, the UK's tariffs on Indian goods are already pretty low. India, for its part, has kept a lot of politically sensitive agricultural commodities out of the pact. How do you respond to critics who say that the upsides of this trade pact have been overplayed?
Avinash Paliwal: My response is that the significance of CETA is more political, Milan. The criticism that this is a modest trade pact, I accept that. That's fine. And honestly, given where the relationship was even 10 years ago, I'll take a modest [plan], I'll take modesty. I don't want perfect to be the enemy of good. And honestly, I'd rather have something which helps the two sides build confidence in each other, build trust. And I think this is how I view it. I think the fact that the negotiations survived a lot of tumult between the bilateral but also globally that we have seen with the shifts that are happening in the US, China's rise and other issues. And you know, this is an age where global supply lines have been, supply chains have been weaponized. Geoeconomics is a weapon. It's a tool, you know, it's a weaponized tool in international diplomacy rather than one that necessarily leads to happy outcomes, right? So, in that age to be able to negotiate consistently and to be able to sign a trade pact of this caliber, I think that's a win that we must not underestimate. And that happened because there was political understanding, because there were strategic synergies. So, this is this is where my kind of fulcrum truly is in the in terms of what this means to me. But of course, now coming to the economics of the trade pact, look, you already put the numbers, right? 44.1 billion dollars is the current standing of the bilateral trade. The promise is that every year, in ideal circumstances, there will be an increment of twenty-five billion dollars’ worth of trade. That's more than fifty percent of the current standing increment on an annual basis. That's a huge shift. Now, this is also in the realm of optimism. This is also in the realm of hope, right? We need to see how the markets truly respond. India, even today, is a protectionist economy, as you hinted, right? This is not an economy which will open itself unless forced to the way the Americans are trying to force it. And even there, there is huge resistance. Unless forced to open by a superior power, there are good reasons why there are certain sectors that the Indian government would want to offer protection to, right? The Indian farmer needs that protection. There are industries in India which require that kind of government support. Now one can criticize that Indian businesses are not being competitive. They are kind of really seeking excessive political support from the state. And I see that, I see that argument. I see, and that's a fair criticism. But that's also a reality when you're in government that you have to contend with. So, the choice for the UK policymaker was either you make take that reality and just get you know, cull the conversation that okay, this is not going to happen, or you work with what you have. And I think this is where again a decision was taken in Whitehall that look, we want to work with what we have. And you can see that there is still a desire in UK, and this is something which is very important for the Brits, right? The bilateral investment treaty. So earlier the aim was to have the CETA and the BIT be signed together, because this is important from a UK perspective. There was resistance, there was reluctance from India's part. And again, the political leadership, the political principle decided in the UK that we will not overload the FTA conversation with that of the bilateral investment treaty. And the BIT is important for another reason. It signals [to] British capital, it signals [to] British corporate that the HMG has confidence in India as a partner as a stable market where UK corporate can go and invest in. This helps British capital take an informed bet on their part in terms of investing in India, knowing that their government has their back as well, right? So, this is important from British perspective. And this will also eventually feed into India's own desires of being a manufacturing hub, of make in India and all the sorts of programs and indigenization programs that are being that are being that have been launched by New Delhi. So, let's hope that that happens. It has not happened. So that does underscore the modesty of this agreement. But again, just to reassert, from my vantage, this is a political success more than an economic one.
Milan Vaishnav: I mean, you know, it kind of reminds me sometimes of the conversations we have in Washington about the US-India civil nuclear deal. You know, there a lot of critics point out that US manufactured civil nuclear reactors still do not exist in India. But defenders say, well, that's not really the point because it essentially ended up being the pivot for this broader strategic relationship. Let me ask you about another piece that you brought up because I think it's clearly one that's getting a lot of attention right now by policymakers, not just in London and New Delhi, but also in Washington, Brussels, and other places. The two countries announced a new UK-India Technology Security Initiative that would be a new pillar of this relationship. But beyond the kind of rhetoric Avinash, what do you think this initiative will actually do in practical terms? You know, when it comes to collaboration on critical minerals or artificial intelligence, other forms of critical emerging technology, what do you think this new initiative allows?
Avinash Paliwal: So, Milan, I would put this initiative somewhere between rhetoric and immediate results. This is an initiative, the sole purpose of which is to offer a framework, is to offer a platform for the two sides—to the academia of United Kingdom and India, to private players, to companies, to government actors, different government departments—to actually have a framework in which they can work and have support that framework with, of course, funding, right? To think long term, to think about technology as not something that you will try to find and build a bridge between the two countries and the two economies, because you know, technology is something which is, which has become so defining for global comms, right? For global society as well, is to really see that look, what can we bring to the table as two sides that will really change the game, even if it's 20 years from now? This is a really long term, and again, in the tech sway, 20 years sound big, but my point is this is a long-term planning, right? So, I'm personally not being, not burdening my expectation with immediate results. That will not happen, and I think that's an unfair sort of metric to adjudicate this. Where I see potential here is again, apart from the fact that the two countries are talking tech, which is again a sign of political trust in some senses, is the fact that the UK's and again, and my this is my phrasing, so let me caveat that. I think UK wants, you know, India to be what the Chinese were for the American Silicon Valley, but in the emergent strategic tech space moving forward. India has the manufacturing capabilities, the capacities and aspects of scale that UK R&D can do with. UK is really advanced in terms of R&D in the strategic tech sector. Quantum is, you know, effectively, you know, it was it emerged in the United Kingdom's kind of tech space, but you cannot have that R&D, that innovation translate into manufacturing and assembly line flow the way it has, you know, the way UK would want it to be. Now, the option historically has been either you go to China or you go elsewhere into Southeast Asian countries. But the kind of ambition that UK also has for itself in terms of becoming a leader in AI and emergent tech, you need a partner which can offer that kind of that that aspect of scale. And India is the most likely contender for that. And I think that's where TSI becomes very important, be it running global AI centers, running hackathons, trying to work in the biotech sector to see whether the two sides can get companies and institutions together to work on in vivo gene editing in the semiconductor space on which the Indians have made a strategic bet, right? Can British and Indian conglomerates and scientists get together and see whether you can use graphene to build chips? Can you use 2D materials to build semiconductors, you know, chips moving forward? So, there are a lot of conversations that that are happening. And the idea, of course, is to enable those conversations. Now, having put that concept, you know, having laid out that concept, let me also, you know, lay out this landscape of caution here, right? This will require because technology and security are so deeply interlinked. This will require, you know, and this is one reason why this channel is being led by national security advisors from both sides. It requires trust bit at the level of security leadership of the two countries and not just the political leadership. In UK, there is still a concern that you can it's great to work with India. We want to work with India, and we want to enable India if India wants to become a double-lipped power, let's say Viksit Bharat, right? That's the official sort of slogan by 2047, 100 years after independence. We want to be with India at that moment, with them standing together. But that also means that is there a risk of spillover of such sensitive tech to countries with which India's partnered with, and in and the UK does not have good relationship with. Russia comes becomes a primary contender, right? This is a conversation that we have had in the defense sector. This is a conversation which is likely to, which is a concern even in the tech sector, emergent tech sector, right? So those issues, those issues remain, those risks of spillover remain. But again, the idea is that maybe TSI, you know, which all honestly builds from iCET, which was introduced by the US during the Biden administration. It really…the idea is to offer a platform for that conversation, which is much more forward looking rather than looking back and trying to figure out or iron out historical sort of friction points.
Milan Vaishnav: You know, Avinash, when you were talking earlier about the reset in UK-India relations, you discussed structural factors, but you also alluded to some bureaucratic factors. And I want to ask you a little bit about this, because it was an interesting point that you made in your piece in the Hindustan Times. You say that this translation of political will into action amidst this kind of round of musical chairs at the cabinet level required the civil service to up its game. And we need to probably remind our listeners that you've had multiple UK governments during this time, even though you've had relative stability on the Indian side. In particular, you've pointed to two inflection points. Number one, Delhi's decision to appoint a new High Commissioner to London in 2022. And number two, the appointment of a new UK High Commissioner in New Delhi in 2024. Tell us a bit about the impact these specific appointments had on the upswing in bilateral ties.
Avinash Paliwal: So this takes us back to your earlier question about why is this a transformational moment. And I identify the strategic causes but also the operational acumen. And this question is very much on the side of the operational acumen on both sides of this relationship, right? When it comes to the United Kingdom, the civil service is a permanent civil service, unlike the United States, where you have political appointees. Now, of course, we have SPATS as well, special advisors, but the actual heavy lift of policy think, of policy assessment, of analysis and policy direction is being done by the bureaucracy. And then of course, you know, it has to, it has to fit with the political direction that that we get from whoever the political principle is and whichever party is in power. But the bureaucracy is a very important interlocutor. And I think given the, as I say in that article, the musical chairs, ministerial musical chairs that unfortunately UK has been going through, and God forbid we might go through still. I mean today, you know, there is there are concerns whether Kier Starmer will remain Prime Minister moving forward or whether we are looking at an internal political civil war in a serving Labor government. We don't know. I hope not. But the bureaucracy then becomes, Whitehall becomes a very important custodian of this relationship. And I think the white Whitehall, you know, to work with the bureaucracy, you need an individual or a team that can really understand the, you know, the cultural traits of that bureaucracy. And I think that the new high commissioner that was appointed in 2022, Vikram Doraiswami really did crack that code, right? I remember having conversations with my colleagues earlier, and one of them said that look, Vikram got under our skin in a very good way. He really understood how we work. And I think that says something. And that understanding, that relationship, that rapport, you know, plays a huge role in ensuring that issues that can become diplomatic spats never even come out in the open. Because that's the operational understanding that is there, right? That is something that you start working, building personal relationships which will last beyond, of course. The second, the response that, you know, the appointment of UK high commissioner to India, I think it's not directly related, but also shows that how that shift from India side, where you're sending a very promising diplomat who still has a career in front of him and is likely to use United Kingdom as a building block for their own career you know, kind of development, as much as investing in the improvement of the bilateral, they you know, UK responded by appointing Lindy Cameron, and she's a person who was the head of UK Cybersecurities Center. She has very good understanding of how the security space works, you know, in its full, in all its dimensions, is of Northern Irish heritage. So, she understands how what kind of you know emotions exist in former, you know, countries like India or in the former Commonwealth or in the in the Commonwealth, right? Former previously colonized countries. And that these are really conflicted, complicated emotions that can find expression during moments of geopolitical divergence and friction as they have. She understood these things and that's why, you know, that is the perspective that she took with her to Delhi. And that's one reason why, you know, you can see Delhi recognizing the potential in having a conversation, a heart to heart, so to say, with Lindy on some of these more, more tricky issues. I think that really gives, you know, that enabled conversation between the NSAs, that enabled conversations between the foreign ministers, between the political parties, and a good testament of the success of that was that when a new government came to power, you know, earlier this year, right, when the labor government last year, sorry, the Labor government comes and comes to power, there were anxieties in India that will we be dealing with the Labor of the 2000s or this is this a new Labor party with a very different outlook. And the fact that Kier Starmer, David Lamy, and now Yvette Cooper have actually, they hit their ground running in large part thanks to a lot of the operational synergies that these two individuals and their teams, both in Delhi and in London, were able to put into place and build that kind of momentum. Because given how distracted the political leadership in UK today is, they could not have given that kind of guarantees that, you know, we want to focus on this bilateral, given how distracted they are. And that's where I would say the operational acumen of the two sides really kicked in. But this is also again a bit concerning because if personalities change, it shows things can change. So, this must not be taken for granted, Milan. I do hope that both London and Delhi are aware of, you know, the potential risks if, you know, you send in wrong personalities in these places, that has effects. And we can see that play out in other parts of, in other contexts as well. So, I'm hoping that whoever comes to London next from Delhi and whoever London appoints next after Lindy are able to continue and continue to build on this momentum which already exists.
Milan Vaishnav: Avinash, we've spoken a bit about the plus points, the areas of collaboration, the ways in which the relationship has kind of gone from a not-so-great place to a much better place. Let's spend a minute, though, talking about the irritants, and specifically here I want to ask you about the Khalistani issue. In your piece you write that the Khalistan issue at one point did risk burning bridges, but it actually ended up strengthening ties, and I thought that was a sort of counterintuitive takeaway. Although both sides continue to view Khalistan quite differently from their own perspectives, in what ways do you think they've been able to find common ground?
Avinash Paliwal: So, Milan, the Khalistan issue is still an issue that will require continuing vigilance, right? It's not an issue that has gone. Both sides have very different understandings of this issue. And there are different legal structures, there are different political cultures that are militating, especially when it comes to these issues. And both sides have legitimate concerns around these issues, right? On how they deal with it and what this kind of activism really augur for the bilateral. What I would say is in the past couple of years, what has happened is the fact that all these allegations that cropped up about India's kind of, you know, alleged extrajudicial activism in in the US or attempted hits in Canada, that case really concentrated minds. I think that is a moment when you know there was the more securitized side of UK's, you know, UK government really said that okay, what is going on here is a country that we want to partner with. We want to have a futuristic kind of, a happy relationship on the economic side of things and the strategic side of things. You know, entering territories, entering areas allegedly, which are not very helpful. And a similar thing happens in Delhi where there's a feeling that the West is not respecting some really core security concerns when it comes to diasporic Khalistani activism, especially in the light of what's happening in Punjab, whether it's related to, you know, the drug problem or kind of resurgence, even if limited, very limited, of certain Khalistani elements. I think that is a very clarifying moment where the stakes of this relationship become very clear. Do you want this to become a hindrance, or do you not want this to become a hindrance? It could have well become a hindrance. And I think the conversations that it triggered, the fact that UK decided that look, what happens with British citizens, we have to take ownership of that, we have to take responsibility of that. We have to offer more protection to the Indian High Commission at Strand. We have to legitimately understand we need to credibly understand the concerns which are legitimate as far as New Delhi's asks are coming, but also be very clear about the red lines that we have and communicate them unambiguously to New Delhi. I think that that is why it was a crisis which, the fact that the two sides were able to communicate their intents, their intentions and their red lines and how they can work together, I think that's why I call this a moment where a crisis, which could have it could have easily burned bridges, ended up kind of strengthening the relationship. There is an understanding between the two sides that you don't want this issue to hurt the wider canvas of relationship and issues that you're working on, the TSI, free trade agreement, all various issues, conversations around on China. But it will need to, it will require careful management. And I think both sides have been able to, at least for now, assure or reassure the other side that look we are not, we will respect your concerns til the time we also know that you are respecting our core security concerns. This is where we are on this one.
Milan Vaishnav: Let me ask you about another set of challenges. You talk in the piece about how the two countries view China, Russia and Pakistan. You say with respect to China, actually both countries have a pretty similar approach, which is that Beijing is a security challenge, but it also represents an economic opportunity. Russia and Pakistan, however, are slightly different, and you say that on both, there is a gulf that remains in their understanding. So, I wonder if we could maybe just take each in turn, starting with Russia and then going to Pakistan. Walk us through what you see as the principal points of friction on these two relationships.
Avinash Paliwal: So let me start with Russia, which is a fairly obvious one. I think we both we all know India's historical relationship and equities with Moscow and UK's kind of historical animosity and very complicated relationship with Russia. I think the Gulf remains insofar as UK is very committed on pushing back Russia's invasion of Ukraine. It views Russia as the primary security threat, and it's very committed to working with its European partners and of course the United States to put sort of you know the proverbial both the money and the boots that is required. You can see over the last few months there has been a huge uptick in defense spending, in R&D, in KID, and almost all of it is aimed towards the Russians, right? So, this is something which I think India has begun to appreciate very clearly that there will be limits to how much we can work together with the West and the UK when it comes to the Russia question. And for UK, I think there has been a realization that pushing India to cut its relationship with Russia is not likely to work. It's unhelpful, in fact. It's counterproductive given the history of that relationship. And I will go back to the moment of Russian invasion of Ukraine. It sent shock waves in London about how India reacted to that particular event, right? There was a false, I would say, expectation for India to side with the West, at least among the policy community who thought that, you know, because of shared values of democracy and India's own territorial concerns in relation to China, this is a country which would work with the West to criticize Russia. And that never happened really. I think there is a much more nuanced appreciation of where India is coming from on that count. The fact that India has historically had quite a lot of dependence on Russian weapons and tech, defense tech is something that is not lost on London. But also, the fact that India is diversifying and moving away from Russia in that sector is also appreciated quite a lot. Where there is difference and gulf moving forward and is likely to remain is of course the sanctions regime. You know, UK is likely to continue pursuing a sanctions strategy against private entities who indirectly are financing Russia's war machine. The fact that the two sides can now converse, can actually talk about it, that you know, that we see where you're coming from. It's nothing personal. I think that itself, you can see that the gulf, even though it is there, is considerably reduced from where it used to be, let's say, in 2022. And that again is a net positive in my view, right? Because it makes sure that the UK-India bilateral is not being held hostage to what the Russians do in some senses. Similarly with Pakistan, I think this is a much more, it's a trickier case, right? Because UK in India has usually been seen as a country that is either trying to hyphenate India and Pakistan or is outrightly pro-Pakistan and has a bias in favor of Pakistan. And I, for one, strongly disagree with that. I think the fact of the matter is UK cannot do without Pakistan, right? It's you know, this is because of historical reasons and even geopolitical reasons, that if you are concerned about radicalization at home, and if you can source that radicalization to a certain extent to Pakistan and Afghanistan as you could earlier, and even today in some to some extent, or you want to work in the counter-terrorism space with the Pakistani security establishment, you need to have that relationship. And that relationship has to be empowered. That's not a relationship that you can it requires investment, it requires equities, it requires focus. And that often becomes a bit of a friction point when it comes to India and UK's kind of conversation. Today we are at a moment where Indians have started to realize that this is just a British reality. You know, as I said and again in the piece, the Whitehall does not have a rosyate view of Pakistan. This is a country with whom there are huge risks that accrue to UK's national security. And for that reason, UK uses whatever access it has or influence it has in Islamabad and Rawalpindi to protect its own interests, right? But UK is not signing a free trade agreement with the Pakistanis. UK is not negotiating a TSI with Pakistan. UK is not trying to work with Pakistan or views Pakistan as a middle power which will enable UK's kind of well-being in the long term, in context of China's rise, of US turning inwards. So, I think there is again, there is an understanding of that. And I think the latest round of crisis, which happened in April, May, only clarified some of those aspects, right? UK did not go out, you know, either pretending to or trying to mediate between the two sides. That's official policy on Kashmir, on UK, on India and Pakistan, UK's policy is clear: this is a bilateral matter, and this is for you two sides to kind of resolve between yourselves. Of course, as partners of both countries, we are happy to help only if you want us to help in capacities that you want us to help, right? And we, it is in UK's national interest that India and Pakistan don't go to war as well. So, that is another very clear expression of British interest that a war between the subcontinent is likely to have repercussions on the streets of United Kingdom, given how big the British-Indian and the British-Pakistani diaspora is. So, we don't want you to go to war. Of course, we can't stop you if you are committed to it, but we would want, we would do whatever little we can to help the two sides kind of prevent any crisis escalation. And you can see that during Sindhoor, the messaging that was happening to both sides was that of, you know, extending, you know, firstly acknowledging what had happened in Pel Gam was wrong. India has the right to respond. And even to Pakistan, I think the messaging that happened afterwards also, I think India has, India knows what messaging that was and has an appreciation that this is not a power that is not acknowledging what is going wrong in the space. The remnants of it, which are playing out even till now, given the attack that we saw happen the blast in Delhi. So, I think again, going back to the fact that the two sides have learned how to talk to each other, they have also learned to talk counterterrorism. They have also learned to talk to talk Pakistan and to make sure that Pakistan again, you know, UK's relationship with Pakistan is does not hold the India-UK relationship hostage, just like India's relationship with Russia is not holding this bilateral hostage.
Milan Vaishnav: I want to pivot now towards the future. In your piece, you highlight two emerging challenges to UK-India ties, and I want to ask you about each of them. Let me start first with what's happening within the UK itself. You alluded earlier to the problems in the Labor Party, but actually there's a much more complicated picture when you think about interparty politics. We're seeing a potent English nativism typified by the rise of people like Nigel Farage, the rise of Reform UK in the polls. This nativism has been, you know, further weaponized by figures such as Tommy Robinson and others. If these nativist forces continue to gain ground in the UK, what kind of impact do you think that's going to have on the bilateral relationship?
Avinash Paliwal: So there will be, this will be a diaspora story as much as a diplomatic story. I think the diaspora story is appreciated more or the impact, the implications of this sort of nativism. And let's assume or let's say that Reform UK does form the government in future, given how kind of exclusionary and honestly racist some of the views are. The diplomatic story is less appreciated. Now, very quickly on the diaspora bit of it, right? The angst against migrants and minorities, you know, that is being typified by people like Tommy Robinson or Nigel Farage, you know, it is not just, you know, right now it is being channeled primarily against let's say British Muslims. I remember years around Brexit when a lot of this angst was being channeled against Eastern European communities, you know, Brits of Eastern European heritage or Eastern Europeans themselves who were who were living here at that point in time, and some of them actually left, right? The black communities have almost always felt disadvantaged. And that's a conversation that's, you know, thankfully in the UK you can have conversations about these issues about multiculturalism with some degree of honesty and openness. Perhaps this is less so the case in many European countries, but this is still a struggle in that sense of the term, right? And to think that British Indians will not be in the firing line, in the proverbial firing line in future, I think is to kid yourself. And that's where my concern comes in. Over the last 10 years, eleven years, British Indians have also become politically conscious, you know, what if tomorrow the kind of targeting that is happening of Indian Americans in the US by the Make America Great Again crowd, right? That movement, that sort of targeting begins at scale against British Indians, and then that community goes to India and says, “Okay, can you do something about this? Can you support we supported you when you wanted the diaspora to stand up for India? Now it's your turn to kind of, you know return the favor, so to say.” That will then directly have spillover into the diplomatic story of this relationship. And people are you know, this is an underappreciated aspect in my view, but this is an active risk looking forward. Diplomatically, and I'll give you just one example. There is a lot of pressure at this point in time on the United Kingdom to put the kind of punitive tariffs that the US have put against India, not just against India but to the other countries as well. You know, the pressure is in that sense not just aimed against one country. But UK cannot afford to do that given the political and economic circumstances it is facing. And it is having to stand up, it's you know, to stand up and own its ground that look, we will not impose that the kind of tariffs that you've imposed on India because we have once signed a CETA, but we actually view India as a partner of the future. I'm not sure a Reform UK government, which has really kind of eroded the capabilities or kind of really hamstrung the bureaucracy, you know, will be able to or even want to withstand that kind of pressure. Imagine Nigel Farage or Reform being in power today and that kind of pressure coming from across the pond to impose tariffs on India. I would not bet, I would not you know there's no guarantee that UK would not join the American bandwagon and kind of happily burn those bridges. So, I think that's a risk which we should not underestimate moving forward. And this is why I say that look, the UK bureaucracy is already being chalked by a quarter. The foreign office, including the development side of it, is front center of the firing line. The mood inside the bureaucracy is quite grim because of that. And this is happening in just the first couple of years of a Labor government. Now imagine a Reform UK government comes to power with ideas or inspirations from DOGE that happened by Elon Musk in White House. I mean, this will wreck the institutional guardrails which have actually enabled this India-UK bilateral to transform in the shape and form and to reach the point that it has reached as of now. And that's a real risk moving forward.
Milan Vaishnav: Let me just quickly come to the second risk, and you talked about this a little bit, so maybe we can just touch upon it briefly, which is the challenge having to do with Russia and Ukraine. I think here the risk that you foresee, if I understand you right, is that how Europe responds to this continued crisis could have broader impacts. You worry that under certain conditions, India might end up dropping in the UK's list of priorities. What are those conditions you envisage whereby essentially the space for India could get crowded out?
Avinash Paliwal: So there is look, the Russia-Ukraine war has really triggered some serious existential security anxieties in parts of Europe and for good reason. And increasingly, there's a feeling that the Russians are testing European resolve. And by Europe here I include United Kingdom, regardless of the fact that we are not in the Union, we still are a European player, especially in the security sector. And if, God forbid, there is a moment in future which at least our Eastern European partners have long been warning of, and increasingly even the Germans and the French are of the opinion that the Russians can truly test Article 5 and can test European defenses and European resolve and unity moving forward in a much more militaristic, kinetic manner, that will really focus British energies almost solely on the transatlantic relationship and making sure that Europe, you know, it's part of Europe's security response and defense response. Now, in that moment, India, you know, even though there's long been talk of the Indo-Pacific strategy of, you know, if not Indo-Pacific today, then maybe Asia Pacific and working with partners in Asia to counter China's rise. I think that will, even though the two theaters of Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific are joined, Britain will focus very clearly on Europe. And that means a lot less resources, literally bureaucratic resources, national resources, to focus on building and sustaining the momentum that India and UK have done over the past four or five years. It will just be a reality, just a resource reality more than a political reality. And that's simply because of divergent interests for both countries at that point in time. And that's a risk I think that again, New Delhi and London must be aware of. It's a risk that kind of finds its segues from the gulf on Russia on the Russia question that the two sides have. But we need to be, what we need to be more cautious about is that this divergence of priorities does not translate into conflicting interests given India's Russia equities at that point in time. So, this is something I do hope. I mean, you know, the two sides will be able to have a more honest conversation about it moving forward. But the initial signs are good because we have seen that, you know, the Indians are negotiating and trying to s finalize an FTA, a free trade agreement with the European Union as well. I mean, their timeline is before the end of 2025, and I wish them well. But clearly there is a realization, not just in UK, but also across Europe, that you know, you do not want to lose India, which is an important rising power in Asia, and just let Russians decide what your relationship with the rest of the world will look like. I think that's a learning that has happened across the continent. UK has been at the forefront of delivering some of the goods based on that learning, given our historical equities with India. But I do hope and I do believe that will be the story with the Europeans as well in the next five to ten years.
Milan Vaishnav: My guest on the show this week is the scholar Avinash Paliwal. He's a reader in international relations at SOAS University of London, and he's the author of a new piece in the Hindustan Times on the UK-India Partnership. He's also the author most recently of India's Near East, A New History. It's a book we featured earlier on Grand Tamasha, and I'm pleased to say it's been shortlisted for the new India Foundation Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay Best Book Prize for Nonfiction. Avinash, thanks so much for coming and congrats on the award.
Avinash Paliwal: Thank you so much, Milan.
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