President Donald Trump vowed to end the war in Ukraine within 24 hours of taking office. He sent his negotiator Steve Witkoff and Secretary of State Marco Rubio for multiple rounds of negotiations with Russia and Ukraine, and even hosted Russian President Vladimir Putin at a high-profile summit in Alaska this August. But despite these moves, the war grinds on with no resolution in sight. Negotiations have stalled as Russia continues to demand sweeping concessions. Frustrated by the lack of progress, Trump is now pressing for more assertive international action against Moscow, even as his own willingness to impose further costs on Russia remains unclear. The path forward looks increasingly grim, and the limits of U.S. influence in Ukraine are becoming ever more apparent. So what kind of outcome is realistically achievable— and at what cost?
To assess the dilemmas inherent in America’s policy toward Ukraine, Chris Chivvis speaks with Thomas Wright, a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution and former Senior Director for Strategic Planning at the National Security Council during the Biden administration.
Transcript
Note: this is a rush transcript and may contain errors.
Tom Wright:
The main problem to be solved is to change Russia's calculations. And the way to do that is to have a sustainable policy of military support that convinced Russia that it cannot win and cannot achieve its objectives on the ground.
Chris Chivvis:
The policy hasn't succeeded so far. And if I understand your prescription correctly, it sounds like you want to continue doing the same thing because it will succeed in a few years. And for the American people, are we giving them a satisfactory policy outcome here?
Today, I'm joined by Tom Wright, former senior director for strategic planning on President Biden's National Security Council. Tom's now a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution just next door to us here at the Carnegie Endowment. We're discussing a country that's remained at the center of global attention, Ukraine, which was brutally invaded by Russia in 2022 and has been at war since then. President Trump is pushing for a negotiated end of the war, but so far those efforts haven't borne fruit. Russia continues its attacks on Ukraine and its civilian population. And Trump has claimed that his patience is wearing thin. So what does this tell us about US strategy on Ukraine? What does it tell us about American power in the 2020s? What options remain and what might come next?
Tom, thrilled to have you here with us today on Pivotal States. I should say that I've admired your work as a strategic thinker here in Washington, and I mean that very genuinely. In a town where a lot of people are often consumed with operational details, even tactical details, your ability to look longer term and think about the big picture really stands out. So I'm glad to have you here with me.
Tom Wright:
Thanks, Chris. It's very kind and it's great to be here.
Chris Chivvis:
I thought it'd be interesting if we started by talking about your time in the Biden White House. Obviously, there were a lot of people involved on the Ukraine issue, a lot of different voices, but you were one of the important ones. You were on the National Security Council. You have deep expertise on Europe and was one of the people who had the ear of the people who were making the most important decisions on Ukraine. So would you go back a little bit and talk about how you saw Biden's strategy towards Ukraine? What the objectives were and how it evolved over the time that you were there?
Tom Wright:
This is the largest land war in Europe since World War II. I think it is always imbued with great risk and dangers, both in terms of Russia winning the war, but also just in a day-to-day basis at various points. We came close to pretty significant crises. And, of course, it hits, one, a country that's being invaded is smaller than the country that is the invader. And that, I think, creates some challenges as well in terms of end states. And then it's a war that also basically went global, I think, in ways that people didn't fully anticipate. I think if you had said in February of 2022 that in the course of the war, North Korean troops will be fighting in Russia against Ukraine and sending five million rounds of artillery, and Iran would be sending drones. And we would also have South Korea sending massive amounts of artillery, albeit indirectly to Ukraine. And Japan being involved in some way in Australia.
This is a war, I think, that is to the 21st century in a way what the Spanish Civil War maybe was in the 1930s, obviously very, very different conflicts, but they both attracted and pulled in indirectly countries all over the world actually in different ways.
Chris Chivvis:
It was a war that began as a conflict between, well really Ukraine and Russia. But over the time that you were in the Biden administration, it globalized.
Tom Wright:
Yeah.
Chris Chivvis:
Both in terms of the support that was going to Russia. And you mentioned North Korea, Iran, also China obviously, and maybe we should talk a little bit about that. But also globalized in the sense that the United States tried to bring a global set of partners on board with sanctions and direct military and other forms of aid to Ukraine. What did you think the objectives of the United States ought to be when you were there, at least in the early months that you went into the White House?
Tom Wright:
Yeah let me answer in two ways and just say the objectives the President set down, but then also over the course of the conflict, what I thought our end state or goal actually was.
Chris Chivvis:
Okay.
Tom Wright:
Right? President Biden laid down pretty early three objectives. One was to help Ukraine defend itself against the Russian invasion. Second was to avoid a direct conflict between Russia and the United States.
Chris Chivvis:
And just to say there's obvious tension between those two things which is part of the art of-.
Tom Wright:
Yeah, and the third is to keep allies united. And there's a tension actually between all those three things. And I think they're all actually pretty important, right? I think some people might've said at the beginning that he was erring by taking direct intervention off the table, or, US troops off the table. But I actually think that was incredibly important because we also had to keep the American people and Congress on board throughout the conflict as well, because that was integral to our strategy of indirect support. I would say over the course of the war, our objective was to put Ukraine in the strongest possible position on the battlefield so that it would be able to negotiate with Russia to have a Ukraine that was free, independent, and sovereign with the ability to defend itself and to deter a future attack.
For the war to actually end, you need to convince the Russians to stop fighting. To do that, you need to convince them that, A, they're not going to be able to accomplish their objectives in Ukraine. That there's no hope of being able to achieve those objectives. And B, that they're paying a very high price that will weaken Russia, not just vis-à-vis Ukraine, but also regionally and globally.
Chris Chivvis:
It's interesting because I think on the outside it didn't seem that the intended end state of the Biden administration was a negotiation. President Biden did say that at least once, and there were hints that that was the case. But the impression that some of us had was that negotiations were off the table because our Ukrainian partner simply would not accept them. But you're telling me that actually there was a lot more openness to it, or is it more that it evolved over time and openness to negotiations as an end state or at least the next phase of the conflict grew over the course of your time in the White House?
Tom Wright:
My memory of it is that we always knew that ultimately there would have to be a negotiation to end the war, but we also knew that that negotiation would reflect the battlefield reality. And up until mid 2023, I think there was that reasonable expectation that Ukraine could liberate at least the territory that Russia had occupied in the 2022 invasion, if not back to 2014, to the annexation of Crimea. And if that was a battlefield reality, that would be a very different type of negotiation with Russia than if Russia was occupying 18 or 20% of Ukraine, which I think is where it's at today.
Chris Chivvis:
So Ukraine winning back some of its territory could also be congruent with the aim of a negotiation?
Tom Wright:
Yeah, for sure. Again, the terms of the negotiation are obviously vitally important, and that's where, I think, there would've been some differences with Ukraine throughout, because I think for them, obviously they wanted all of their territory back, which I think is a very reasonable goal consistent with the UN Charter-
Chris Chivvis:
It's an understandable goal, yeah.
Tom Wright:
... obviously, yeah. I think for us, the military piece was key like, "How do we make sure that Ukraine has the weapons and the training and the intelligence cooperation it needs in a sustained way to be able to defeat Russian forces in Ukraine." And I would say, looking to where we're at now, if you had told us in February 2022 that three and a half years later the Russians would've lost over a million casualties. Well over a million at this point. That they would basically be stuck still in the Donbas and parts of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson between 18 and 20% of Ukraine including what they took in 2014, and that they will be making very, very slow gains at an enormous ongoing cost. I think that would've sounded reasonably, I wouldn't say good, but I think people would've thought that's not a good outcome for Russia, right? And actually Ukraine is still standing and still there, and that wasn't automatic. I think that required a huge amount of work primarily by Ukraine obviously, but I think international support helped them be in a position to be able to do that.
Chris Chivvis:
Can you talk a little bit about the tools of American power? You said that the military dimension was especially important. Maybe it would be good if you just talked about that a little bit more. But first talk about the other dimensions of power, obviously sanctions, we had global opinion. How did you think about the way in which the US arrayed its tools of national power against this challenge?
Tom Wright:
I think if you look at the sanctions regime, it's definitely not a silver bullet.
Chris Chivvis:
Right.
Tom Wright:
It's not something that... And when I hear President Trump say, "If we just did the energy sanctions, then the war will be over." I think that's a consistent fallacy, not just in this war, but often throughout conflict historically, where it's viewed almost as an economic thing that if the other side is losing money because it's fighting, then it will make a rational decision and stop. But that's obviously not the-
Chris Chivvis:
It rarely happens.
Tom Wright:
Yeah, that's not the full picture because there were other objectives.
Chris Chivvis:
But then the question is why do you think that military force is going to be more effective? We have a really recalcitrant regime in the Kremlin here, as you just explained eloquently, not that susceptible to economic pressure, capable of finding ways around the pressure that we've put on it. Militarily, why is that going to be any different?
Tom Wright:
I think it's totally different because with military power, you're physically stopping the other side from achieving its objectives. So you're not trying to deter or compel Putin psychologically by saying, "We're going to do this, therefore you have to back down." You're just proving on the battlefield that he's physically not able to take what he wants to take. So when he is trying, even over the last 14 months right after Ukraine took Kursk and then the Russians went in the offensive because the Ukrainians are spread thin, right? In that time, he's physically not being able to fully take Pokrovsk or other areas that it was assumed he would be able to take.
So it's just creating a battlefield reality that demonstrates to him and to Moscow that they can't accomplish their objectives. And then Ukraine with a mixture of long range strikes and other capabilities are inflicting ongoing cost in Russia. So I think it is different. I do think the sanctions help. I don't want to say they're not helpful. I think they are important. We can talk about that because they suppress Russia's ability to reconstitute itself.
Chris Chivvis:
Maybe just briefly talk a little bit about global public opinion and how you viewed that.
Tom Wright:
I think at the start, the assumption was that the world will be pretty united against Russia, and I think it did become more complicated. The Global South obviously was calling for an end to the war and condemning the invasion. We had Gaza, which made things more complicated. I think we got accused of hypocrisy after that, obviously in parts of the world. But our approach, I do remember in the first move by Global South countries on peace plans, we talked about it, what our attitude should be and we decided not to oppose what they were doing. We did not say that they should not be involved or that they should not be looking for peace. We decided to constructively engage, and we met pretty much all the countries including China, Brazil, South Africa and others. And our message was always the same.
It was, "We welcome your involvement. This is a very complicated war. If you're going to try to help bring peace, that's great. We welcome that, but you need to do your work. You can't just make some declaration. You have to really invest in the problem and try to figure out a way forward. And if you talk to Vladimir Putin, you also need to talk to Zelenskyy. And if you go to Moscow, you also need to go to Kyiv. And you need to grapple with the problems in the dilemmas on territory and other things." And over the course of the war, I think, we were able to stay engaged with those countries. I think we also needed to show that we had a peace plan too. And that's where Ukraine ended up coming in with its own peace initiative, which I think was helpful.
But I think it was a struggle. I think it wasn't just a matter of saying, "Russia bad, Russia invaded. Everyone should isolate Russia and be on Ukraine's side." That might've been okay at the start, but I think once we were 6, 12 months in, I think we needed to engage those countries that weren't aligned. And I do think we did that actually.
Chris Chivvis:
So the question, I think, that arises here is did the objections of these rising powers... You mentioned Brazil. South Africa was obviously important. Did their objections ever give you pause about the policy that the Biden administration was pursuing? Did you ever say, "I wonder if they have a point?"
Tom Wright:
On what though?
Chris Chivvis:
On negotiation in particular.
Tom Wright:
There was really only one moment, I think, where there was any inclination from the Russians that they might be remotely interested in negotiation. And that was on the very eve of the counteroffensive in 2023, where we get some sense that they didn't know if it was going to work or not. Right?
Chris Chivvis:
Interesting.
Tom Wright:
It was never serious. They never reached out to say they wanted to talk, but there was some sense that maybe there was elements in Moscow that might've thought this might be the time to try to at least slow down the counteroffensive, right? Otherwise, there was never a moment where there was any reason to think that the Russians were interested. On a number of occasions, least on two occasions, senior officials were talking to the Russian counterparts and basically said, "We keep hearing that you want to talk. If you have something you want to say to us, say it." And the very clear answer back was, "Absolutely nothing to say." So I think that there really wasn't a moment, especially in 2024, for the first part of 2024, we didn't have a supplemental. So we weren't in a position of strength at all.
And the Russians knew that and we were focused on trying to get this up. And then after that the Russians were just waiting for the election. I think that in the context of this year, we know Trump gave the Russians a proposal that was much more tilted toward them than anything we would've given. And they said no, because they still want Ukraine. The bottom line is, and I think the incontrovertible truth is that Russian intentions throughout this war have remained very, very consistent what they were at the beginning, which is Vladimir Putin wants to break Ukraine and take it, and he's willing to pay an enormous price to do that. He still feels he's in a position to do that and that is not changing. He's been offered now a freezing of the lines. He's been offered no NATO. He's been basically offered an end to US support for Ukraine after the war.
All of these were demands that we believed he had that would've gone too far for us. Some of them is like an end to US for Ukraine, for example. But none of that is enough. He actually wants to take Ukraine and he wants demilitarization. He wants territory he doesn't control, and that's even too much for the Trump administration. So I think that's the problem. The problem we have is how do we convince Vladimir Putin to negotiate and to basically change his opposition to something like a free and independent sovereign Ukraine that he is currently opposed to? That's our diplomatic problem. We should be spending time trying to figure out how to do that diplomatically, militarily, in other ways to create those conditions for negotiations to succeed. And that was our focus really in 2024. It wasn't that we were sitting around saying, "We don't believe in negotiations."
We always believed negotiations, the moment for them will be in 2025. We were preparing for a 25 negotiation, when Biden was running, when Harris was running, when we thought we might... If one of them won, our assumption was that this would be the year of negotiation. Because if one of them had won, then Putin would have to grapple with the fact that the war will go on for four more years or he could have a negotiated settlement. I remember saying, at the time, that if we did everything right and if we had support in place and we had a framework for negotiations and we had the Ukrainians on board and the Russians weren't making any gains, that even then our chances of success in the negotiations is probably about 30%. Putin remains Putin, right? And he remains fairly ambitious in this conflict, and this is very deeply ideological for him. Like it's rooted in Russian nationalism, his belief in Russia's place in Europe. And that's a very hard thing to shift.
Chris Chivvis:
Yeah, I agree. And I want to come back to that problem because for me it poses the core dilemma from a US policy perspective, is just how important the stakes seem to be to Russia's current regime under Vladimir Putin. But before we go there, let's talk a little bit about Trump. We've talked about Biden. You have a generally positive assessment of what you managed to accomplish there. You were moving towards negotiations, if you had had a second term. Trump then, of course, wins the US election, also has a plan for negotiations. How did you assess his plan off the bat and then how do you see it having unfolded over the course of the last nine months?
Tom Wright:
Yeah, when they won, I think, when Trump won, when his team won, they had a theory of the case which I don't think was ridiculous. Right. I do think it was wrong, but I don't think it was absurd. And their theory of the case was if you freeze the lines and say no NATO, then we'll bring the war to an end. The Russians will take that because they're getting a lot. The Ukrainians might not take that, but we can bludgeon them into accepting it. And in any event, the Ukrainians aren't going to get back their territory. So all we're doing is speeding up the tape, right? Because otherwise the war will go on another three or four years, lots more people would die. We'd end up in the same position anyway, so let's just skip to the end, impose this deal.
And then they wanted to obviously normalize relations with Russia and do all of that stuff, right? But the basic theory of the case, which was something we got accused of not doing, was be realistic, freeze the lines, and no NATO and then the war will be over.
Chris Chivvis:
Just by no NATO, you mean Ukraine does not get to become a full-fledged member of the NATO alliance?
Tom Wright:
Yeah, exactly. Right. We believed very strongly that that was not going to work. And we told them privately that our assessment was that it wouldn't be enough for Putin and that we believed Putin's objectives went much, much further. And if you want the war to end quickly, you have to convince Putin that the war could go on for a long time unless he compromises. And so it's important to have sustained support, but obviously they didn't agree with us.
Chris Chivvis:
This was your message to the incoming Trump administration.
Tom Wright:
Yeah, I think they wanted to try that. They did try that. They really put pressure on the Ukrainians to... Obviously, a very extreme degree as we saw in the Oval Office meeting. The Ukrainians then tacked back and, I think, compromised on their objectives and then endorsed unconditional ceasefire, which I think was incredibly important for them to do because it flipped the script at Trump, right? Because initially they were saying we won't agree to a ceasefire unless their security guarantees and all of this stuff-
Chris Chivvis:
The Ukrainians were say to us.
Tom Wright:
Yeah.
Chris Chivvis:
That's right. Yeah.
Tom Wright:
And after the Oval meeting, they changed because they knew the US might totally pull out.
Chris Chivvis:
Right.
Tom Wright:
And I think by May Trump realized that the Russians were mainly the problem, that they were the primary obstacle to peace.
Chris Chivvis:
He locked himself in by saying he was going to resolve this in 24 hours and then in 100 days and then he still hasn't. So he sort of invested his own political capital in it.
Tom Wright:
I don't really hit him for that too much, because I think that was-
Chris Chivvis:
I'm just saying it makes it more difficult for him to pull back.
Tom Wright:
Yeah, I think that's hyperbole in his part, which, of course, is very normal for him. I think it's a very complicated situation. Right? I think it's a very difficult situation. I think they've been slow to figure a lot of this out. I think when I hear them say, "We've done more for peace in Ukraine than anyone ever." I find that hard to believe, because I actually think in some ways they're further behind than they were when they started.
Chris Chivvis:
How do you mean?
Tom Wright:
Because it took them a very long time to figure out the actual problem, which is Putin's objectives. That the main problem... Ukraine was sometimes difficult on end states, but not nearly as difficult as the Russians. And the main problem to be solved is to change Russia's calculations. And the way to do that is to have a sustainable policy of military support that convinced Russia that it cannot win and cannot achieve its objectives on the ground. And that is the necessary precondition for anything to work diplomatically. And they still, I think, are flailing around about how to do that. They've gotten some of the way with the arm sales, but it's still fairly limited. It's a little hard to tell because they haven't really been public about what they're sending. But the best we can tell is probably about 60% of what was sent in the similar time period last year through the arm sales, with the exception around interceptors, the air defense bit, where we don't know if stuff is being sent yet.
Chris Chivvis:
So just to try to understand your view of what Trump has done. You agree that trying to seek a negotiated settlement is the right thing to be doing. You agree, I imagine, that some pressure on Kyiv was necessary, although I'm sure you don't like the way that they went about doing it, nor do I for that matter. You think that the sanctions that they are threatening but have not yet implemented are a good idea, but not the solution? And your main criticism of their approach would be that they have not done enough to make a long-term commitment to the military support of Ukraine?
Tom Wright:
I probably quibble little bits, but I don't know if they're that are important. Like the sanctions, I don't think the Graham and Blumenthal bill or Trump has proposed in the China bid or the India bid is the sensible way to go about it. I also think that in terms of Europe stopping buying oil from Russia, the only countries that buy crude oil from Russia are Slovakia and Hungary, right? So I think a lot of this is a pretext for Trump not to really do anything. I think in terms of pressure on Ukraine, yeah, I definitely don't like how it was done. I think there was a need to bring them along. I think them getting to support for an unconditional ceasefire was good. It was ugly about how that transition happened. But yeah, I do think... I think we always thought there needed to be a negotiation, like we were planning toward negotiation in 25, was always going to be the moment where a negotiation might be possible.
My worry now is that the basic precondition for a negotiation to succeed is not actually in place, which is to say to Putin, "You can achieve their objectives and if you keep going, we'll keep supporting Ukraine as long as you're attacking it. And that's not going to change."
Chris Chivvis:
I want to look forward from where we are now and think about what's the solution to this problem. You wrote a recent article in the Atlantic that was entitled The Only Plausible Path to End the War in Ukraine. And the key sentence for me in this article is when you write, "The only plausible way to end the war is to create a battlefield reality that convinces Putin that he cannot make more gains, that he will pay a massive price for continuing the war, and that this reality is unlikely to change." Can you talk about that a little bit?
Tom Wright:
Yeah, I think that's what we need to do to get to a negotiated settlement. I think there's a separate question about what that outcome in a negotiated settlement looks like. But just on this bit, I think it means that Russia is unable to make territorial gains more than a sliver, right? Which I think is where we've been actually for a while. But the gains would be very modest, if at all. That there will be very little prospect of a breakthrough, that they would be taking very high casualties and paying a high price that Ukraine will be holding Russian assets, strategic assets at risk, and maybe economic assets at risk as well, that will convince the Kremlin that this, if it continued for another three or four years, to be very damaging to Russia and that there was no real expectation on the Russian side. That the bottom was going to fall out of Western support for Ukraine, that that will continue in place. That the US and Europe will continue to support Ukraine indefinitely if needed.
And that creates the leverage in a negotiation to say it's in all sides interest to bring this to a conclusion. If you don't have that... If you have all of the first parts, but then the US suggests that maybe in six months it will completely cut off Ukraine, then why wouldn't Moscow just wait six months? If there's really massive shortages of certain types of critical weapons, then why would they not just wait to see if those supplies run out?
Chris Chivvis:
It's clear that that could encourage Russia to continue its war. But I guess the reverse is where I'm struggling a little bit. You said earlier in our conversation that we have to be realistic about Russian objectives here.
Tom Wright:
Yeah.
Chris Chivvis:
So isn't there a significant chance that going back to large amounts of US military aid to Ukraine would just put us back where we were one year, two years and three years ago and turn this into an indefinite long war. How much confidence do you have that taking the course of action, the strategy that you would like to see with more military sports Ukraine, if I understand it correctly, would result in negotiation, on any time horizon that makes sense from a policy perspective?
Tom Wright:
But if you point-
Chris Chivvis:
I would think you would admit that there's a chance that it would fail and that we could just end up in a forever war.
Tom Wright:
I think this is an important point. I think there is definitely a chance that negotiations could fail, even if everything is set up as I recommend, right? There's no guarantee that Russia will accept independent sovereign Ukraine, even if they get to keep the territory in a de facto way that they currently occupy. I can't guarantee that Putin will decide that he wants to compromise. I would make two points though. One point is that from the perspective of the United States, I think this war is sustainable. I don't think it is forever born in the context of US troops dying, obviously on the battlefield in Ukraine. We are not bogged down there. The cost, I think, was very manageable before Trump came in. And now the US is basically not spending anything on the war. I don't really understand why it is inherently unsustainable in some way. Right? I think it might be unsustainable for Russia, but it's not unsustainable for the United States. Second point is that from a Ukrainian point of view-
Chris Chivvis:
Let me just start with your first point, because this is an important one to me. Okay, so first of all, there have been significant costs, and I completely agree with you. It would be wrong to analogize the war in Iraq to what we've done for Ukraine. First of all, we invaded Iraq, so major difference right there. Second of all, as you point out in both Iraq and Afghanistan, we were losing a lot of American servicemen and women and that's a really important difference in terms of the cost. That said, we have invested a significant amount in Ukraine, $187 billion have been appropriated for Ukraine. We spent almost $100 billion along the way. And it's hard for me to imagine that if this were to continue for several more years, that those costs would not rise. Obviously, this is also creating escalation risks with Russia and Europe itself, as we've seen over the course of the last few weeks in Poland, in the Baltic States.
And I blame Russia for those things. But it's also a reality that we have to accept, that as long as this war goes on the European security situation is just going to be less stable. And I think you actually agree with that, you just want to get to an end in a way that I'm challenging a little bit right now. So the problem is not so much that the costs are too high, I do think they're high, but it's just from a basic policy perspective. The policy hasn't succeeded so far. And if I understand your prescription correctly, it sounds like you want to continue doing the same thing because it will succeed in a few years. For the American people, are we giving them a satisfactory policy outcome here? How is that satisfactory?
Tom Wright:
I guess, I think, I disagree with all parts of what you said.
Chris Chivvis:
Okay. Please explain. That's what I want you to.
Tom Wright:
To start with, I think the alternative... Firstly, I do not agree that the policy has not worked, right? I think Russia is bogged down in Ukraine. They've taken a massive number of casualties. They're unable to accomplish their objectives. They're basically still trying to take the Donbas, which I think they do have small parts of other oblasts as well, but they're still very much bogged down, I think, between 18 and 20% of Ukraine is what they occupy. And Ukraine remains sovereign and it remains free. I think that is a good outcome. Right? Again, as I said, I think if you said that in early 2022 that would be where we are three and a half years in, I don't think people would've thought that was a Russian victory. Right?
So I don't agree that it hasn't worked. I do agree obviously that Ukraine has not won this war and that we are not on the cusp of a diplomatic settlement. But the alternative to what I'm proposing is not a peaceful end to the war. The alternative to what I'm proposing, I believe, is a Russian victory in the war. Or for the war to continue for a long time under much worse conditions for Ukraine and much better conditions for Russia. And to me that's being realistic. That is actually the choice. And that's not a choice that I favor, right? That's what Putin wants. That's the choice he's posing to us. So we can choose whether or not to continue to stand up to him in a way that I do believe is very sustainable for us.
We can rush it in the process and to make it more difficult for them, not just to make gains in Ukraine but also to threaten other countries. Or we can pull back. And I would argue that all of the risks you identify on escalation and other things, all get worse if we pull back and Russia is in the ascendancy. I think that if you look at the air incursions over the last month, I believe that that is a direct result of the fact that there's ambiguity in Washington about how the US will respond to that. So Russia is probing and is testing.
Chris Chivvis:
I don't disagree with that. Actually, I agree with that. Yeah.
Tom Wright:
So I see the escalation risk is rising if we pull back from it. And I don't really understand how... I think one could decide... Like the Trump administration, I would totally disagree with it, but they could decide we don't want anything to do with this. It's not in our interest if Europe is at war or the war gets bigger or NATO is attacked, that's a coherent position. It's one I fundamentally disagree with, obviously. I don't understand that even on coherence basis, the idea, that this is unsustainable for us, that we can't do it, because otherwise something really egregious will happen here. That doesn't...
Chris Chivvis:
I understand. I understand what you're saying, but it's not... Does that mean then that you would accept supporting Ukraine indefinitely with military diplomatic financial resources? Just to-
Tom Wright:
Honestly-
Chris Chivvis:
... prevent that outcome.
Tom Wright:
... yeah, I think it means that... Well, you got to remember what I believe is that the way to bring it to an end faster is to commit to support Ukraine as long as Russia is attacking it, right? I also think that support should be indirect as it has been. I think we should be helping Ukraine defend itself, which we have been. I do think that is sustainable, and I don't think we should change that position as long as Russia is attacking. I do believe we also need a parallel track on negotiations. I think we need to create dilemmas for the Russians. Diplomatically, I think there's lots of things we could be doing, including this week, to make things more complicated for them diplomatically up at the UN or elsewhere.
So I think there needs to be a very robust diplomatic part to this too. So I'm not just saying we just accept that this will go on forever. I think we should be working very hard to end it, but I do think that we should not be pulling the plug in Ukraine because Russia remains obstacle to peace. I don't see how that helps not just Ukraine or Europe, but us. I don't get what we get out of that.
Chris Chivvis:
So what are some of the measures that you would pursue right now in order to avoid this going on indefinitely?
Tom Wright:
Well, I think if you... Just on a small tactical level this week at the UN General Assembly, I don't see why the United States wouldn't host a peace conference at the UN and call for an unconditional ceasefire in Ukraine and basically ask all of the Global South countries and China to agree to an unconditional ceasefire. Now, I think China would oppose it, but I think it would be hard for them. It would make them pretty uncomfortable.
Chris Chivvis:
Right.
Tom Wright:
I think many countries in the Global South would support it. The Russians would hate it, but they wouldn't quite know how to respond. They would say it's all about... "We need to create..." Whatever phrase they use about addressing for their point of view, the root causes of the conflict. But I think that would be one way of... Now that we have this movement from Ukraine, I think we could really push that advantage.
Chris Chivvis:
Makes a lot of sense. Sure.
Tom Wright:
That's not going to end the war, but I think it helps. I think on the negotiation... I think the point we need to make to the Russians is, "Look, you guys have created what Putin warned about at the beginning, which is an enemy on your border that's highly militarized and very embittered because of what you've done to it. That didn't exist in February 2022." That type of Ukraine, the enemy of Russia is there now. "And you don't have a solution to that other than breaking it as a state. We're not going to let that happen."
So we should have a conversation about how do we get to an end state, point the war ends from your point of view and our point of view and Ukraine's point of view, it is as stable as possible. And that gets into work we did on end states where to me, I think, there's two different models, right? There's like the Israel model where basically we help Ukraine, but it's fighting on its own. And that model creates a country that I think is highly insecure, quite militarily effective, and willing to take risks and-
Chris Chivvis:
Highly insecure, why?
Tom Wright:
Insecure because they see a very large threat on their border. They don't have an external guarantee of another country to help it.
Chris Chivvis:
But just so we're clear we're talking in this scenario, in the Israel model, Ukraine has a large military because we and the Europeans have invested in building up its own self-defense against future Russian invasions.
Tom Wright:
It's on its own against Russia, basically with our support. And the other model is some type of security guarantee where they are either in NATO or some other mechanism. And my point that Russians will be that actually from their point of view, they probably have more of an interest in Ukraine being part of an external structure, that it's somewhat restrained and other countries have a significant say over its foreign policy and its defense than one where basically Ukraine is on its own. Now, I don't expect the Russians to accept that, but I think over time I think that is a dilemma they would need to confront, and I think we can create that dilemma a little bit.
Chris Chivvis:
So just to go back to the... In the two versions, and obviously there may be variants, but in the two versions that you're proposing, an Israel model, is the other version then membership in NATO? Would you say with security guarantees or-
Tom Wright:
I think there's different ways to do it.
Chris Chivvis:
Okay. I'm just trying to clarify.
Tom Wright:
Yeah, the model of NATO I like for Ukraine is a combination of the West Germany model and Norway. And West Germany, that model, it only applies to territory that you control. Right? So not like East Germany or in Ukraine's case not occupied Ukraine. That I think is fairly clear. The Norway model, Norway joined NATO at the beginning but it agreed to limit on NATO troops inside of Norway. Basically, no NATO troops inside of Norway and very limited NATO use of Norwegian ports. And basically it was Norway inside of NATO, but no NATO inside of Norway. And I think that's something that if we were to end up with Ukraine getting into NATO, Norway would be a basis for that. Plus maybe some negotiation on architecture around it. Now again, I think that will be a lot for the Russians to accept. Ukraine as its own deterrent, right? So build up the Ukrainian military so they will be able to defend themselves to deter a future attack. And that I think is-
Chris Chivvis:
Without security guarantees.
Tom Wright:
Without security guarantees, yeah. That's the outcome I...
Chris Chivvis:
So this is more of a negotiating strategy that you're talking about?
Tom Wright:
Yeah, I do think over the long term, I think NATO membership on the Norway model is probably the best outcome for European security, and I think that would produce the best guarantee of a stable peace. I think that is not possible. Obviously, if Russia doesn't agree to it, because Russia can just choose to continue the war. So in the absence of that, I think, would in direct support for Ukraine, so they are able to defend to deter. And that means creating a force of the future inside of Ukraine that has an air force, has a layered air defense, has a means of defending itself, and I think has a long-range strike capability that it could use if the war broke out again. That would be effectively the deterrent to Russia attacking.
Chris Chivvis:
In this scenario that you're talking about, is Ukraine effectively neutral?
Tom Wright:
I don't know what neutral means. I think if neutral means not a member of an alliance, yes, Israel is not a member of a formal alliance with an Article 5 guaranteed, but I don't think anyone would say it's neutral. It's an ally basically of the United States. So I don't really know what neutrality means. I've looked at all the models, We did a lot of work on all the models of neutrality. I don't think any of them work for Ukraine because the main question with neutrality is what is the enforcement mechanism? What happens if neutrality is breached? And in this case, if Ukraine is attacked again, my argument will be that Ukraine would have a strong enough military itself with continued indirect support from us, maybe along the lines of what we've done over the last three years or maybe amped up a bit with maybe no restrictions on the use of weapons systems, for example, that that will be enough. But the Russians wouldn't consider that neutral. Ukraine will be in close partnership with us. I think if it makes people feel good to call that neutrality... It's not a fun treaty...
Chris Chivvis:
It will be a lot easier for the Russians to accept Ukrainian neutrality where Ukraine buys its weapons from wherever it wants, including the United States and Europe, then to accept the Ukrainian membership in NATO.
Tom Wright:
I think they're adamantly opposed to both, right? I think the Russian position in June of this year, now, previously, and what I mean is the Istanbul negotiations when they presented the memo, they do not want a militarized Ukraine that has external support from other countries. They don't want that at all because they realize, for Putin, that's as big a problem as NATO membership. So they're opposed to both. Right?
Chris Chivvis:
But if that's true, what you're saying, and I actually think it probably is, aren't we stuck? That's what I'm getting at. Then we're in a situation where there's no end in sight.
Tom Wright:
I think we're a long way off the end, yeah. But I guess where I push back on you is you seem to be suggesting we're stuck, therefore we ought to change and maybe not help them as much. Whereas I'm saying we're stuck, but we need to find a way of changing the Russian calculations because the alternative is much, much worse. I feel like you're not really grappling with the alternative. You're saying this isn't really working. I dispute that, but okay. It's not working in the sense that Russia's not about to be forced out of Ukraine, therefore we're stuck and we need to have the courage to be able to change our position. But I would just press you what does changing our position mean? Changing our position means embracing an alternative future that is demonstrably worse on almost every level for Europe, Ukraine, and the United States than where we are right now. I don't know if you agree with the nub of our disagreement, but I think that's how I would interpret it.
Chris Chivvis:
I think the point that I'm making is that I feel that we're rubbing up against the limits of American power, that America is very powerful. It's been able to support Ukraine, a much smaller country in a major war against a much larger nuclear-armed nation. But it hasn't been strong enough to bring about any of the long-term strategic end states that we have aimed at. That is problematic for me. And I wonder whether or not somehow... And I'll be honest, I don't necessarily have the solution to this, but I wonder whether or not somehow we ought to be changing our expectations of what the United States is actually capable of accomplishing in these kinds of situations.
Tom Wright:
Yeah, you see, I do have a very different view of that. As I look at it, this demonstrates not the limits, but in some ways the potential of American power, right? We were able to support a much smaller country than Russia and help it basically defend itself against a fully fledged onslaught by the Russians, a country with nuclear weapons, that at a certain point it was willing to contemplate using with support from China, North Korea, and Iran. And we were able to create a situation where three and a half years in Ukraine is still there. They have 80% ish of their country and they're inflicting massive casualties on Russian forces.
And Russia's basically stuck. And we're doing that at a very, very small financial price and military price with no US troops on the ground. No US casualties. To me, maybe it's glass half full. And I'm not saying we should be satisfied with that. Like I said, I think we should be pushing for a negotiated outcome, but I don't know why we at this point would throw up our hands and say that has failed. And we ought to... I'm not saying you're saying abandon Ukraine, but basically undertake certain actions that would significantly hurt Ukraine. I don't know why we would do that, especially when they are willing to negotiate. They want an unconditional ceasefire right now. So they're not the reason why this war is continuing.
Chris Chivvis:
Tom, thank you so much. I really respect your point of view on this one and-
Tom Wright:
Yeah, likewise.
Chris Chivvis:
... I have learned a lot talking to you about this in recent months and years. In fact, I hope we can continue to talk about it. Perhaps a year from now, we'll come back and things will look either the same or different and we can reflect on our conversation today. So thanks so much.
Tom Wright:
At least I haven't said the war will end in the next few months. Then you can come back and quote it to me.
Chris Chivvis:
Right. No predictions. It's dangerous for your career. Yeah.
Tom Wright:
Well, thank you.
Chris Chivvis:
Thank you, Tom. Thanks for listening to Pivotal States where we explore US relationships with key nations around the world and discuss what these relationships reveal about American power in the mid-21st century. Today I've been talking to Tom Wright about the dilemma the US faces with Ukraine, getting even a decent settlement for Ukraine is to make a costly commitment for several years to come. But is it worth it? Make sure to subscribe and join us next time as we take a close look at evolving relations between the United States and India with Ashley Tellis, my colleague here at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
