Putin’s state of the nation address should have been a mere pre-election formality, but it left an extremely chilling impression of an unraveling spiral of escalation.
Tatiana Stanovaya is a senior fellow at the Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. She is also the founder of R.Politik. Reality of Russian Politics, a political analysis firm, and a member of the research council of L’Observatoire, the analysis center of the Franco-Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry.
Stanovaya spent 15 years as head of the analysis department of the Center for Political Technologies, a Moscow-based political consulting firm. She began her career at the Moscow office of the Severstal steel and mining company.
Stanovaya’s research interests include the impact of interest groups on Russian politics, with particular focus on connections within the elite as well as formal and informal mechanisms of decision-making.
A prolific writer on Russian domestic politics and foreign policy, Stanovaya has been quoted widely in Russian and Western media, including the Washington Post, Foreign Policy, Le Figaro, Libération, Politico, Wall Street Journal, Reuters, RBC, Vedomosti, and Kommersant, among others.
Putin’s state of the nation address should have been a mere pre-election formality, but it left an extremely chilling impression of an unraveling spiral of escalation.
The Russian leader wanted to use the encounter to reach out to U.S. conservatives, but the two men largely spoke past one another.
The war in Ukraine is starting to dictate its own rules to Putin. The president and his inner circle are being forced to submit to the new wartime reality that they themselves created.
Putin is waiting for the West to reconsider its policy and start looking for opportunities for an inclusive dialogue. Sending out the signal that Russia is ready for such a dialogue was one of the main aims of the phone-in and press conference.
Both the Prigozhin mutiny earlier this year and now the pogroms in the North Caucasus show that no matter how brutal and impenetrable the Russian regime may seem, it is weak and indecisive when confronted with any non-anti-Putin unrest.
A divide among Russia’s power players over how rapidly and extensively to Sovietize the country could form the basis for a conflict within the elite.
For Russia’s elites, the incident serves as a clear warning. Challenging the regime, whatever your achievements, inevitably leads to your downfall.
The way in which Prigozhin was apparently killed suggests the Kremlin wanted to show how it deals with traitors. Whatever really happened, the Russian elite will see the air crash as retribution for Wagner’s armed uprising.
Prigozhin circulated freely between Belarus and Russia. Putin met him in the Kremlin. He allowed him to live his life like nothing had happened. Today, those who were shocked can say, “Now we see Putin’s logic.” Putin doesn’t seem weak. He seems like he’s retaking control.
After Russian President Vladimir Putin launched an invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Russian elites acted as if the war had not really changed anything on the home front.