Source: Carnegie
Reprinted from Parliamentary Elections Bulletin, No. 3, December 1999
Like almost every discussion about Russia in the last ten
years (and the Soviet Union for the last seven decades before), the debate about
Russia's upcoming parliamentary election is polarized simplistically between
"optimists" and "pessimists." Optimists believe that the
election is a "good thing." People are voting, parties are participating,
and everyone is happy. Pessimists believe that the election is a "bad thing."
People do not care, parties don't matter, and everyone is sad.
In fact, both sides are both right and both wrong. In trying to fit everything
into a simple black and white picture, both sides see only the half of the more
complex story of Russia's developing political system. Russia's polity has a
poor institutional mix of both a PR (proportional representation) electoral
system for selecting its parliament that cohabitates with a powerful presidency.
In parliamentary democracies, proportional representation produces multi-party
systems. In contrast, presidential systems usually produce two-party systems.
The results of having PR and a presidential system are hybrid party systems
as Russia's parliamentary vote has clearly demonstrated.
The vote on Sunday will end two very different and almost unrelated electoral
campaigns at the national level (and a third, the single-mandate elections,
at the regional level not discussed here). One vote is a contest between political
parties vying for seats in the Duma through the party list system. This campaign
is dominated by well-known parties that have participated in previous elections.
The second vote also appears to be a battle for Duma seats. In fact, however,
this second national contest has nothing to do with the Duma and everything
to do with the presidential election next year. The two main players in this
campaign - Fatherland-All Russia (OVR) and Unity (Medved) - were formed first
and foremost to influence next year's election, not Sunday's vote.
When one analyzes these two contests separately, two very different stories
unfold. The first contest is a typical, boring parliamentary campaign that looks
like a PR vote in any European parliamentary democracy. The four main participants
- the Communist Party of Russia, Yabloko, the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia,
and the Union of Right Forces share many common attributes. First, all participated
in previous Duma votes. They are not newcomers to the parliamentary electoral
process. Second, all four parties have rather well defined political orientations,
loyal electorates, and notable leaders. In focus groups and opinion polls, voters
demonstrate that they know these parties well. Third, during this year's campaign,
these parties are not really competing with each other. Rather, they have been
busy trying to maintain their own electorates, and have not invested much campaign
time in seeking new supporters. Consequently, with the possible exception of
Yabloko and Union of Right Forces, they almost never engage each other directly.
There is little mud slinging between the CPRF and the Union of Right Forces,
or between Zhirinovsky and Yavlinsky.
Fourth, all are likely to win roughly the same percentage in this election that
they won in December 1995. The CPRF won 22% in 1995; they are poised to win
this same amount or a little more on Sunday. Yabloko may win exactly the same
percentage as in 1995. The Union of Rights Forces may creep a little ahead of
its 1995 showing, though the addition of 1-2 percentage points will mean this
difference between life and death in a system with a five percent threshold.
Zhirinovsky's LDPR looks to suffer a sharp decline and may win only half of
the 11% it captured in 1995. Yet, all four are going to be within plus of minus
five percentage points of what they won in 1995. Given all that has happened
in Russia over the last fours years - the August 1998 financial crash, rotating
prime ministers, and the wars in Kosovo and Chechnya - these numbers represent
incredible stability on par with other European PR parliamentary democracies.It
is also striking to note that no new ideological-based party has managed to
challenge these four established parties for their political niches. New nationalist,
communist, and liberal parties have formed; some even have long histories and
famous leaders. But none are poised to one percent, let along five percent.
Fifth, all four of these parties have enjoyed roughly the same amount of public
support throughout the entire campaign period, suggesting that the campaign
process has only marginally influenced their electoral potential. Most election
experts agree that the Union of Right Forces has run a most professional, well-financed,
and well-managed campaign, making it likely that they will cross the five- percent
threshold. Yet, despite this commendable campaign performance, the Union of
Right Forces is likely to win only 1-1.5% more than Democratic Choice of Russia
captured last year in what many agreed was a poor campaign. Many electoral experts
have observed that Yabloko has conducted an ineffective campaign. Yet, despite
this allegedly weak campaign performance, Yabloko is still likely to garner
the same percentage as they did in the last election.
An additional shared feature of all these parties is that they will take their
parliamentary roles very seriously should they cross the five- percent threshold.
These parties understand that parliamentary participation is an important component
of party development.
And they should take their parliamentary jobs seriously, because a final shared
attribute of these established parties is that none of them have a leader who
is a serious contender in next year's presidential race.
The contrast between these parliamentary parties and the presidential coalitions
also in this race could not be starker. First, neither Fatherland nor Unity
participated in the last election. They are both unlikely to participate in
the next parliamentary election. The 200 race is the focus of attention. Luzhkov
created Fatherland to promote his presidential aspirations. Primakov joined
Fatherland-All Russia as a way to further his presidential prospects. On behalf
of their current presidential hopeful, Vladimir Putting, the Kremlin created
Unity to weaken Luzhkov and Primakov as presidential candidates. Neither coalition
is very concerned with party development.
Second, both Fatherland and Unity have very poorly defined identities within
the electorate. Opinion polls and focus groups commissioned by the author reveal
that voters still do not understand what either coalition stands for or represents.
Third, in contrast to the other four established parties, these new coalitions
have engaged in a fierce, negative campaign against each other. Unity leaders
and Putting have avoided direct attacks against OVR, leaving the real dirty
work to ORT and RTR. Through their own media outlets, Fatherland leaders have
responded directly to these attacks. This action-reaction cycle witnessed almost
every day stands in sharp contrast to the non-confrontational and barely noticeable
campaigns being waged by the other parties mentioned above.
Fourth, again in contrast to stable levels of support expressed throughout the
fall for the four parliamentary parties, popular support for these presidential
coalitions has fluctuated considerably in the last four months. Fatherland has
taken a nosedive while Unity has enjoyed a radical climb in the polls. Fifth,
neither Fatherland nor Unity is likely to assume major roles in the next Duma.
Both coalitions could collapse after the presidential vote. Finally, if the
four parliamentary parties do not have serious presidential contenders within
their ranks, both of these presidential coalitions could have boasted one or
two candidates before the parliamentary campaign began-Primakov and Luzhkov
from OVR and Putin (Unity's surrogate leader) and Shoigu from Unity. After this
parliamentary campaign, however, both Primakov and Luzhkov may be through as
serious presidential contenders. This last observation suggests that parliamentary
parties best contest parliamentary races and non-party presidential coalitions
best cintest presidential races in Russia's current hybrid political system.
Eventually, Russia must either liquidate the presidency and develop a multi-party
parliamentary or liquidate proportional representation in the Duma and have
a two-party presidential system. Until these institutional changes, however,
expect more two-headed parliamentary elections in the future.