Source: Wall Street Journal Europe
This week, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov unveiled a new foreign policy doctrine for Russia. As a written document, the doctrine underscores all the right themes. Two themes stand out. First, Russian policymakers plan to follow a rational and realistic foreign policy that will serve Russian economic and political interests. Such a strategy includes active engagement with the West. Second, Russian leaders see an intimate relationship between domestic and foreign policy. The document stresses the need to use foreign policy to help solve Russia's domestic problems, including first and foremost Russia's economic woes.
Policy statements and policy actions, however, should never be confused for each other. To date, whether by design or misunderstanding, President Vladimir Putin's foreign policy initiatives have only partially reflected the ideas outlined in this new doctrine. In particular, Putin does not seem to grasp the intimate relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. Eventually, failure to recognize the international consequences of domestic actions will lead to greater isolation of Russia from the West -- an outcome that would be neither rational nor realistic for Russia.
Since becoming president in March, Putin wears one hat while traveling abroad and another while working at home. He has tried to compartmentalize foreign policy from his actions at home, hoping that he can develop closer ties with Western democracies abroad while at the same time pursuing anti-democratic policies at home. When visiting European capitals, Putin has stressed the importance of building market institutions in Russia and integrating Russia into the West. His new foreign policy doctrine stresses that "Russia shall actively work to attract foreign investments," and will work "to ensure favorable external conditions for forming a market-oriented economy in our country." He has gone out of his way to emphasize that he sees Russia as a European country that has many mutual interests with other European nations. Occasionally, he has even called for the deepening of Russian democracy.
To be sure, he believes that a multipolar system should replace the current unipolar world dominated by the United States. Yet, Putin rarely invokes the tired language of 19th century balance of power politics and has yet to adopt the rhetoric of Russian Eurasianists who believe that Russia must follow its unique, third path somewhere between Europe and Asia. Putin wants more, not less, cooperation with the West and Europe in particular.
At home, however, several of Putin's initiatives have a distinctly authoritarian flavor. While Putin does not aspire to become a dictator, he has displayed no passion for defending democracy. Instead, Putin has demonstrated that he is willing to use the power of the state and ignore the democratic rights of society in the pursuit of "more important" objectives such a state building and economic reform. Most gruesome has been Putin's indifference to human rights in Chechnya. Abundant and consistent testimony gathered by international organizations points to systematic and indiscriminate use of force against both civilians and those who care for the wounded. The State Security Service (the former KGB) under Putin's leadership also has harassed civil society leaders, including investigative journalists, environmental activists and even Western NGOs. Journalists, such as Andrei Babitsky from Radio Liberty and academics such as arms control researcher, Igor Sutyagin, are two of many to experience the indiscriminate use of power by the Russian state under Putin.
The Russian president's latest targets have been Russia's financial tycoons. Putin's government has arrested Media-Most head Vladimir Gusinsky, threatened to arrest Interros head (the owner of the giant Norilsk Nickel plant) Vladimir Potanin, and announced the opening of a criminal investigation against LUKoil, Russia's largest oil company. In principle, these state actions against some of Russia's richest businessmen could be interpreted as progress. Oligarchic capitalism in Russian needs to end; the rule of law needs to begin. However, the discriminate process regarding who is prosecuted and who is not undermines the integrity of these law enforcement acts. Gusinsky's media outlets have criticized Putin and supported opponents of the president. He is arrested. Boris Berezovsky -- one of Russia's most notorious oligarchs who is unlikely to have been more law abiding than Russia's other business leaders -- has used his media empire to support Putin. He has avoided arrest.
What does Gusinsky's arrest, LUKoil's harassment, and the war in Chechnya have to do with Putin's foreign policy agenda? So far, not much. In the short-term, Putin must believe that he can get away with this strategy of compartmentalization of foreign and domestic policy. Western leaders -- and especially British Prime Minister Blair and German Chancellor Schroeder -- have been willing to give Putin the benefit of the doubt during the honeymoon phase of his presidency. These Western leaders believe in the mutual benefits of Russian integration and therefore want Putin to succeed in pursuing his new foreign policy agenda. Likewise, Western investors want to return to Russia. They applaud Putin's rhetoric about restoring law and order and lose little sleep over the arrest of oligarchs or the harassment of corrupt regional leaders both who have done much to impede the development of markets in Russia.
In the long run, however, Putin will fail to achieve his newly-penned foreign policy objectives if he refuses to recognize the direct relationship between democracy and markets on the one hand and foreign policy on the other. For instance, Gusinsky's arrest occurred on the same day that Putin was speaking to foreign investors in Spain. Concern about the 'Gusinsky affair' that day eclipsed any positive message Putin might have had about the potential returns on investment in Russia. A few days later, in response to the Gusinsky ordeal, Robert Strauss, the Chairman of the U.S.-Russian Business Council, cancelled a trip that would have brought to Russia several CEO's from some of America's largest companies. The causal relationship between the domestic and the international could not be more obvious.
On the day that criminal investigations were announced against LUKoil, one of Russia's most respected companies among international investors, millions of dollars bolted from LUKoil stocks and the Russian stock market as a whole. The relationship between political actions at home and foreign policy objectives could not be more direct.
Months ago, Clinton Administration officials had hoped to make real progress regarding the rescheduling of Russian debt as well as Russian membership into the World Trade Organization (WTO) before the end of their term. Clinton officials recognize that the new Russian government has crafted a sound economic reform program, which deserves support. However, the war in Chechnya, the series of attacks against the press, and the general sense of deterioration of democratic practices in Russia has made advocates of engagement with Russia much more cautious and the prospects of a major debt rescheduling or WTO membership less likely.
Even if Russia could afford to ignore the outside world, further erosion of democracy in Russia is likely to produce more obstacles to economic development. Some around Putin believe that dictatorship might be a necessary, interim evil to crack down on corruption, restore the rule of law, and thereby achieve economic growth. In dreaming about becoming the next Chile in the 1970s, South Korea in the 1980s, or China in the 1990s, however, these advocates of authoritarian rule conveniently forget the experiences of many other dictatorships -- Nigeria in the 1970s, the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and Uzbekistan in the 1990s -- that did not achieve economic growth. Recent research on the post-communist world has revealed a very positive correlation between democracy and economic growth. The fastest democratizers in the region are also the countries with the highest growth rates. The positive correlation between high levels of democracy and low levels of corruption in the post-communist world is also striking.
Political developments in Russia already have begun to impede the "development of the of the national economy," which, according to the new foreign policy doctrine, should be the "main priority in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation in international economic relations." Before more damage is done, Putin and his new team should begin to actually implement the excellent ideas expressed in their new foreign policy doctrine and recognize that a rational policy abroad requires a rational policy at home.