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commentary

On the Road: Humayan Khan

Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan was unfortunately never a fully public policy and in fact was determined by that branch of government which is by definition least open to public scrutiny: the ISI.

published by
Carnegie
 on October 25, 2001

Source: Carnegie

Pakistan, October 16, 2001

This talk was given on October 16th to a conference on “The Prevailing International Crisis and Pakistan” of the Muslim League, the former ruling party under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, which was ousted by General Musharraf's military coup of 1999. The faction of the League which hosted the conference now supports Musharraf, with reservations. Humayun Khan himself is a non-party figure, which allows him to be more independent and critical than some of the politicians. His views were echoed by a number of speakers, including retired Air Marshal Asghar Khan. Other speakers however took a much more anti-American view. These included the former cricketer Imran Khan, now leader of a small political party with a mainly Pashtun base.

On the Future of Afghanistan
“Pakistan's involvement in Afghanistan was unfortunately never a fully public policy and in fact was determined by that branch of government which is by definition least open to public scrutiny [in other words, the intelligence service or ISI]. The results are not ones in which we can take much pride, and in a sense, our chickens have now come home to roost?

But we have been lucky. Instead of isolating us, the international community showers us with compliments. And it is true that they need us, because in unravelling the tangled web that we have done so much to create, our role will also be critical. And we must play a role for our own sake, because there can be no doubt that the new policy is in the national interests of Pakistan.

This new policy must be based on the principle that the Afghans and only the Afghans must decide the fate of their country; because unfortunately, among many Afghans a mood of anger bordering on hatred has developed towards us because of our constant interventions in their affairs. At present, we are stressing that a post-Taleban government mustn't be exclusively made up of the Northern Alliance. This is quite true, but we shouldn't say that this is because it harms our interests, but because it is sgainst the interests of Afghanistan?

People here constantly criticise America, with some justice, but I must say that I am also disappointed at the response of the Muslim world to this crisis. The OIC meeting in Dauhar gave small comfort to Afghans. Instead, it talked mainly about the Arab world and its problems. It was their responsibility to call for a broad-based government in Afghanistan and to commit themselves to help create such a government, together with the UN.

For Afghans will never accept a government imposed by one country or a group of countries. The only international intervention which will be acceptable to them will be one representing the international community and the Muslim world as a whole?”

On Relations with the US and Kashmir
“International relations are not like holy wedlock. They are contingent and dependent on common interests, which have to be nurtured?

Why is Britain able to punch above its weight in international affairs? Not because of military might, but because experience, knowledge, diplomatic skill and a certain internal unity of purpose give it a prestige that influences even the US.

If we had this kind of prestige, we would be in a much better position to advise the US that its bombing campaign is counter-productive and should be stopped, and that instead the US should be pursuing a peaceful strategy aimed at bringing about a broad-based government. We can't hope that the US will take such advice from us unless we are regarded in Washington as a serious and reliable partner. Above all, we must shake off our chronic dependency syndrome vis a vis the US. If we receive aid, we must use it well, not steal it and then blame the Americans for what is our own fault?

Concerning our ever-favourite topic, India—because all our policies in the end are very India-centered. India has been caught badly off-balance by the latest events. As Arundhati Roy has written, ‘The World's Greatest Democracy has been gyrating her hips before even being asked to dance.’ Delhi has been flailing around, offering herself to the Us, then lashing out when she feels rejected. It's strange—usually Indian diplomacy is much more sophisticated.

But we shouldn't feel too reassured. After all, this business in Afghanistan is over, the West may not come down as hard on us all at once over support for the militants in Kashmir. No, they'll start with friendly advice; then suggestions, then maybe not so gentle persuasion; and then there will maybe be some kind of clampdown against us.

Nor is this necessarily bad. I too would like to see a change in our policy. It may be heresy to say this, but we must ask ourselves the fundamental question of what is good for Pakistan [at this he thumped the lectern with great emphasis]. How much good has it actually done Pakistan over the years to support this jihad in Kashmir? And above all, how can any government which claims to govern allow private armies to operate on its territory?

So perhaps in the long run some good may come out of the evil of September 11th: not just a new peace in Afghanistan but a new dawn in Pakistan.”

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.