Source: Carnegie
Recent events in Pakistan and Libya are directly affecting the Bush Administration's approach to North Korea's nuclear program. The disclosure of A.Q. Khan's elaborate efforts to proliferation uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons technology and the decision by Col. Khadaffi to abandon his WMD programs have reinforced the Bush administration's perception that their tough international approach on nuclear proliferation is paying dividends.
As a result, any moderation in the US position with regards to North Korea's nuclear program has been eliminated, suggesting the upcoming 6 party talks will make little, if any progress. Over the past few months, especially in light of the now all but certain conclusion that US intelligence was completely flawed in Iraq, doubts over America's allegation that North Korea had a secret uranium enrichment program had been growing. Chinese and even South Korean officials were publicly questioning why the U.S. was so confident in their belief that North Korea had an active program to enrich uranium, evidence the US was reluctant to provide. It is now understood that this US reluctance stemmed from a desire not to embarrass the Pakistani government until A.Q. Khan publicly assumed responsibility for the export of weapons technology.
Continued North Korean denials notwithstanding, it is now clear that the US had good reason to assert North Korea was violating its non-proliferation commitments, even if one disagrees with Washington's current approach to the situation in Northeast Asia.
All that is left is for North Korea to admit that it has, in fact, secretly pursued an HEU program. This delicate matter is the first, but by no means the biggest obstacle to progress in the 6 party talks. It is essential that all sides state and accept what the talks are designed to address, in this case how to define what North Korea will "completely, irreversibly and verifiably" dismantle. From both a political and a security perspective, this is the minimum that the US can accept if the talks are to proceed.
This raises the second recent influence on the 6 party talks: Libya. Bush administration officials are quick to take credit for forcing Libya to abandon their WMD programs. In claims similar to those giving Ronald Reagan credit for winning the cold war, President Bush is willing to accept total credit for a process that has been in the works for over a decade.
Regardless, this new model for cooperation and verification is quickly becoming the standards against which North Korea's actions will be judged.
By volunteering to give up its nuclear, chemical and missile programs and by providing exhaustive access to information, facilities and personnel, Libya has set the bar very high for any future state that decides to abandon their weapons ambitions. Several administration officials are quick to point out the difference between Iraq's willful non-compliance with disarmament requirements under the United Nations Resolutions and Libya's active and apparently comprehensive moves to hand over and facilitate the dismantlement of their weapons capabilities.
The recent experience with Libya is clearly influencing Washington's approach to North Korea. Officials have seen what they want, and it is Libyan like cooperation on disarmament. Of course, it remains to be seen how quickly and in what form the United States will move to reward Libya's actions. Many in the US Congress are thinking about lifting powerful sanctions against Libya, but the Bush administration wants to start with small steps such as low level diplomatic contacts until they are sure that Libya's moves are complete and permanent.
So in South Asia and North Africa, two events have directly affect how the Bush administration will approach the 6 party talks. US officials, including James Kelly will lay out our recent experiences with both states in order to demonstrate to North Korea the firm resolve and new standard against which North Korea's behavior will be judged.
The flip side of both lessons, however, have not yet been fully digested by the Bush administration. In Pakistan, the lesson is that failing to prevent proliferation and reverse it in its early stages can have lasting and unexpected consequences many decades after the fact. This should, if anything, increase the sense of urgency to resolve the North Korean issue.
The price for not doing so may be regional and global instability exponentially greater than that being faced today. In Libya, the lesson is only now being formed. Libya was motivated to abandon their weapons in exchange for access to the outside world and a fundamentally different relationship with Europe and the United States. How, and at what pace the US responds to Libya's moves will sow other countries, particularly North Korea, what to expect if they reform their ways. The slow pace and political challenges to returning the US-Libyan relationship to normal may undermine what, if any, true interest remains in North Korea to trade its nuclear weapons for a new relationship with the United States. While there is still hope that the US will learn these lessons soon, the consequences for ignoring them may be very high indeed.
Jon Wolfsthal is deputy director of the Non-Proliferation Project