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Changing Iran’s Nuclear Interests

In order to influence positive change in Iran, the United States must first recognize that U.S. policy toward Iran over the past twenty-six years has not worked; unilateral sanctions, denouncements, and other forms of coercion are insufficient; and the U.S. needs the cooperation of at least Europe and Russia to affect Iranian behavior.

by George Perkovich

Published on May 20, 2005

Nothing about Iran is easy. Everything about it is complicated. This essay begins with assessments of whether Iran intends to build nuclear weapons and whether its technological activities prove or disprove its intentions. Under current international rules, some activities that may lead to nuclear weapon capabilities are allowed as long as there is no evidence that a state intends to build nuclear weapons.

Click on link above for the full text of this Policy Outlook.

About the Author
George Perkovich is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and co-author of Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security(Carnegie Endowment, 2005), and author of India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (University of California Press, 2001).

Carnegie does not take institutional positions on public policy issues; the views represented herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of Carnegie, its staff, or its trustees.

Changing Iran’s Nuclear Interests

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